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Author SHA1 Message Date
nvrl e15e1dcc76 refactor(core): sign in through proton_auth_rs::session
The sign-in steps are now the sequence Proton Gallery and Proton Stream
share. The stored session, the lock/unlock choice for two-password
accounts, the three mailbox-password tries and the errors front-ends
word themselves are unchanged. An account whose only second factor is
a security key now gets a clear message instead of a code prompt that
could only fail.
2026-11-20 15:43:31 +01:00
16 changed files with 4221 additions and 5319 deletions

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+4 -2
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@@ -3926,14 +3926,16 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "proton-auth-rs"
version = "0.1.0"
version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e140db8b4444e50c818c9793c2078b57c16c5b6c285a8d4bbd74886f41b05c6f"
checksum = "383119b502a1741f1ec4a248cb1e8d2f4835d5ea415803b041f76b6f89cf1ffc"
dependencies = [
"apple-native-keyring-store",
"dbus-secret-service",
"dbus-secret-service-keyring-store",
"keyring-core",
"proton-sdk",
"serde_json",
"thiserror 2.0.21",
"tracing",
"windows-native-keyring-store",
+1 -1
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@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ rusqlite = { version = "0.41", features = ["bundled"] }
keyring-core = "1"
# The keyring store all three apps share: reconnects after a Secret Service
# restart (B285) and replaces items instead of editing them (B291).
proton-auth-rs = "0.1"
proton-auth-rs = "0.1.1"
proton-base-rs = "0.1"
proton-media-rs = "0.1.1"
dbus-secret-service-keyring-store = { version = "1", features = ["crypto-rust"] }
+1 -1
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ shell-words.workspace = true
sha2.workspace = true
rusqlite.workspace = true
keyring-core.workspace = true
proton-auth-rs = { workspace = true, features = ["keyring"] }
proton-auth-rs = { workspace = true, features = ["keyring", "session"] }
proton-base-rs.workspace = true
dbus-secret-service-keyring-store.workspace = true
dbus-secret-service.workspace = true
+60 -72
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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use base64::Engine as _;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use keyring_core::Entry;
use proton_auth_rs::session::{self, SignInError, Step};
use proton_auth_rs::{KeyringStore, SecretStore};
use proton_drive_rs::{KeySalt, ProtonDriveClient};
use proton_sdk::account::KeyPassphrases;
@@ -279,74 +280,58 @@ pub async fn login_verified(
get_totp: impl Fn() -> Result<String>,
get_mailbox: impl Fn(u32) -> Result<Mailbox>,
) -> Result<()> {
let password = Zeroizing::new(password.to_owned());
let session = ProtonApiSession::begin_verified(
client_config(),
username,
password.as_bytes(),
verification,
)
.await
.map_err(classify_verification_gate);
let mut session = session?;
if session.is_waiting_for_second_factor() {
let code = get_totp()?;
session.apply_second_factor_code(code.trim()).await?;
}
// Grab the key salts while this access token still has the `locked` scope:
// after its first refresh it never will again, and without them no later
// resume can unlock the key chain. See `StoredSession::key_salts`.
let key_salts = ProtonDriveClient::new(&session, Vec::new())
.account()
.key_salts()
.await?;
// A single-password account's mailbox password is the login password. A
// two-password one has a second secret the user must type, and it is checked
// against the account now — a typo found at login is a retry, found later it
// is a daemon that never mounts.
let (passphrases, remember) = match session.password_mode() {
PasswordMode::Single => (
derive_verified(&session, password.as_bytes(), key_salts.clone()).await?,
true,
),
PasswordMode::Dual => {
let mut attempt = 0;
loop {
let mailbox = get_mailbox(attempt)?;
match derive_verified(&session, mailbox.password.as_bytes(), key_salts.clone())
.await
{
Ok(passphrases) => break (passphrases, mailbox.remember),
Err(Error::WrongMailboxPassword) if attempt + 1 < MAILBOX_ATTEMPTS => {
attempt += 1;
}
Err(e) => return Err(e),
}
// The sequence is `proton_auth_rs::session`, shared with the other Proton
// apps. It reads the key salts before unlocking, while this access token
// still has the `locked` scope: after its first refresh it never will
// again, and without them no later resume can unlock the key chain. See
// `StoredSession::key_salts`.
let mut step = session::begin(client_config(), username, password, verification)
.await
.map_err(sign_in_error)?;
let (unlocked, remember) = loop {
step = match step {
Step::SecondFactor(pending) => {
let code = get_totp()?;
pending.second_factor(&code).await.map_err(sign_in_error)?
}
}
// A single-password account's mailbox password is the login password.
Step::Unlock(pending) => break (pending.unlock().await.map_err(sign_in_error)?, true),
// A two-password one has a second secret the user must type, and it is
// checked against the account now — a typo found at login is a retry,
// found later it is a daemon that never mounts.
Step::MailboxPassword(pending) => {
let mut attempt = 0;
break loop {
let mailbox = get_mailbox(attempt)?;
match pending.mailbox_password(&mailbox.password).await {
Ok(unlocked) => break (unlocked, mailbox.remember),
Err(SignInError::WrongMailboxPassword)
if attempt + 1 < MAILBOX_ATTEMPTS =>
{
attempt += 1;
}
Err(e) => return Err(sign_in_error(e)),
}
};
}
};
};
let tokens = session.current_tokens().await;
register_refresh_handler(&session, tokens.refresh_token.clone());
let tokens = unlocked.tokens().await;
register_refresh_handler(&unlocked.session, tokens.refresh_token.clone());
let stored = StoredSession {
session_id: session.session_id().as_str().to_owned(),
username: session.username().to_owned(),
user_id: session.user_id().as_str().to_owned(),
session_id: tokens.session_id,
username: tokens.username,
user_id: tokens.user_id,
access_token: tokens.access_token,
refresh_token: tokens.refresh_token,
scopes: session.scopes().to_vec(),
password_mode: match session.password_mode() {
PasswordMode::Single => 1,
PasswordMode::Dual => 2,
},
scopes: tokens.scopes,
password_mode: session::password_mode_to_wire(tokens.password_mode),
mailbox_password: String::new(),
key_salts,
key_salts: unlocked.key_salts,
key_passphrases: None,
};
keep_passphrases(stored, &passphrases, remember)
keep_passphrases(stored, &unlocked.key_passphrases, remember)
}
/// Derive the key passphrases from `mailbox` and prove they unlock the account.
@@ -420,20 +405,23 @@ fn decode_secret(secret: &[u8]) -> Option<KeyPassphrases> {
decode(&serde_json::from_slice(secret).ok()?)
}
/// Lift a human-verification gate out of the generic API error into the typed
/// variant a front-end can act on.
/// A failed sign-in step as this crate's error.
///
/// Only a gate that names a solvable method is converted. A `9001` with no
/// `Details`, or one offering only `email`/`sms`, stays a plain API error:
/// promoting it would send the UI to open a verification page it cannot
/// complete, which reads to the user as a hang rather than a refusal.
fn classify_verification_gate(e: ProtonError) -> Error {
let ProtonError::Api(api) = &e else {
return e.into();
};
match api.human_verification() {
Some(hv) if hv.supports_captcha() => Error::HumanVerificationRequired(Box::new(hv)),
_ => e.into(),
/// A blocked, refused or wrong-code attempt goes back to the Proton error it
/// came from, which is what the front-ends word themselves. Only a gate that
/// names a solvable method is a [`Error::HumanVerificationRequired`]: one that
/// offers only `email`/`sms` stays a plain API error, because sending the UI to
/// open a page it cannot complete reads as a hang rather than a refusal.
fn sign_in_error(e: SignInError) -> Error {
match e {
SignInError::HumanVerification(hv) => Error::HumanVerificationRequired(hv),
SignInError::SecurityKeyOnly => Error::SecurityKeyOnly,
SignInError::Blocked(api) | SignInError::Rejected(api) | SignInError::WrongCode(api) => {
Error::Proton(ProtonError::Api(api))
}
SignInError::WrongMailboxPassword => Error::WrongMailboxPassword,
SignInError::Proton(e) => e.into(),
other => Error::Other(other.to_string()),
}
}
+8
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@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ pub enum Error {
#[error("that mailbox password does not unlock your account")]
WrongMailboxPassword,
/// The account's only second factor is a security key, which needs
/// WebAuthn. Asking for a code would only fail as a wrong one.
#[error(
"this account's only second factor is a security key, which pdfs cannot use yet — add an authenticator app in your Proton account settings"
)]
SecurityKeyOnly,
/// The login was gated behind human verification. Not a failure the user can
/// fix by retrying: the challenge has to be solved and the login restarted
/// with the resulting token (see [`auth::login_verified`](crate::auth::login_verified)).
@@ -220,6 +227,7 @@ fn core_kind(e: &Error) -> ErrorKind {
| Error::ReloginRequired
| Error::Locked
| Error::WrongMailboxPassword
| Error::SecurityKeyOnly
| Error::HumanVerificationRequired(_) => ErrorKind::Denied,
Error::Proton(proton) => proton_kind(proton),
_ => ErrorKind::Internal,
+6
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@@ -336,6 +336,9 @@ pub(crate) fn login_error_message(error: &pdfs_core::Error) -> String {
pdfs_core::Error::WrongMailboxPassword => {
gettext("That mailbox password didn't unlock your account.")
}
pdfs_core::Error::SecurityKeyOnly => gettext(
"This account's only second factor is a security key, which this app can't use yet. Add an authenticator app in your Proton account settings, then sign in with its code.",
),
pdfs_core::Error::Other(message) if message.contains("verification") => gettext(
"Sign-in cancelled: the verification wasn't completed. Sign in again to get a new one.",
),
@@ -711,6 +714,9 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn a_cancelled_prompt_says_which_step_was_skipped() {
assert!(
login_error_message(&pdfs_core::Error::SecurityKeyOnly).contains("authenticator app")
);
let totp = pdfs_core::Error::Other("two-factor entry cancelled".into());
assert!(login_error_message(&totp).contains("two-factor code"));
let hv = pdfs_core::Error::Other("verification cancelled".into());
+5
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@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ scratch (user data in `staging/` and `recovery/` is never touched by this).
### Changed
- Signing in runs through `proton_auth_rs::session`, the sequence Proton Gallery and
Proton Stream use too. The stored session, the lock/unlock choice for two-password
accounts, the three mailbox-password tries and the messages stay as they were.
- An account whose only second factor is a security key now gets a clear message at
sign-in instead of a code prompt that could only fail.
- Block fetches shared by concurrent readers now use `SingleFlight` from
`proton-media-rs`, the same code Proton Stream uses. Same behaviour: one
download per block, every reader gets its result, and a reader whose fetch was
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