Merge pull request #18 from narrrl/release/1.0.0

release/1.0.0

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Unit tests
         run: cargo test --workspace --locked
 
+      - name: Account-free filesystem acceptance
+        run: scripts/fuse-acceptance.sh --offline-only
+
       - name: Acceptance runner safety guard
         run: |
           if scripts/fuse-acceptance.sh /tmp >acceptance.out 2>&1; then

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -35,11 +35,29 @@ jobs:
       - name: Set up Rust
         uses: actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain@v1
         with:
-          toolchain: stable
+          toolchain: '1.96'
+          components: rustfmt, clippy
 
       - name: Cache Cargo target
         uses: swatinem/rust-cache@v2
 
+      - name: Verify tag and manifest versions
+        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          tag_version="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
+          manifest_version="$(sed -n 's/^version = "\([^"]*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | head -n1)"
+          pkgbuild_version="$(sed -n 's/^pkgver=//p' packaging/PKGBUILD | head -n1)"
+          test "$tag_version" = "$manifest_version"
+          test "$tag_version" = "$pkgbuild_version"
+
+      - name: Release quality gates
+        run: |
+          cargo fmt --all -- --check
+          cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
+          cargo test --workspace --locked
+          scripts/fuse-acceptance.sh --offline-only
+
       - name: Build release binaries
         run: |
           cargo build --release --locked
@@ -76,6 +94,8 @@ jobs:
           mkdir -p deb/usr/share/applications
           mkdir -p deb/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps
           mkdir -p deb/usr/share/licenses/proton-drive-linux
+          mkdir -p deb/usr/lib/systemd/user
+          mkdir -p deb/etc/xdg/autostart
 
           # Copy binaries
           cp target/release/pdfs deb/usr/bin/
@@ -85,7 +105,9 @@ jobs:
 
           # Copy desktop integration files
           cp packaging/io.narl.proton-drive-linux.desktop deb/usr/share/applications/
+          cp packaging/io.narl.proton-drive-linux-tray.desktop deb/etc/xdg/autostart/
           cp packaging/io.narl.proton-drive-linux.svg deb/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/
+          cp packaging/proton-drive.service deb/usr/lib/systemd/user/
           cp LICENSE deb/usr/share/licenses/proton-drive-linux/
 
           # Calculate Installed-Size in KB for the control file

Cargo.lock

@@ -3518,7 +3518,7 @@ checksum = "35fb2e5f958ec131621fdd531e9fc186ed768cbe395337403ae56c17a74c68ec"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pdfs-cli"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "clap 4.6.2",
@@ -3533,11 +3533,12 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pdfs-core"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 dependencies = [
  "directories",
  "ignore",
  "keyring",
+ "libc",
  "parking_lot",
  "proton-drive-rs",
  "proton-sdk",
@@ -3552,7 +3553,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pdfs-fuse"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 dependencies = [
  "fuser",
  "image",
@@ -3568,7 +3569,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pdfs-gui"
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "async-channel",

Cargo.toml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ resolver = "2"
 members = ["crates/pdfs-core", "crates/pdfs-fuse", "crates/pdfs-cli", "crates/pdfs-gui"]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.7.1"
+version = "1.0.0"
 edition = "2024"
 license = "MIT"
 authors = ["Nils Pukropp <contact@narl.io>"]

crates/pdfs-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ sha2.workspace = true
 rusqlite.workspace = true
 keyring.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
+libc.workspace = true

crates/pdfs-core/src/cache.rs

@@ -241,7 +241,9 @@ impl ContentCache {
         let recovery_dir = content_dir.join("recovery");
         std::fs::create_dir_all(&recovery_dir)?;
         Self::rescue_scratch(&scratch_dir, &recovery_dir);
-        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&scratch_dir);
+        // A failed rescue may leave the only durable copy here. Never clear the
+        // directory wholesale; discard only blobs that carry no fsync marker.
+        Self::discard_unmarked_scratch(&scratch_dir);
         std::fs::create_dir_all(&scratch_dir)?;
         // Staging, by contrast, is deliberately preserved across runs.
         let staging_dir = content_dir.join("staging");
@@ -669,18 +671,24 @@ impl ContentCache {
     pub fn create_scratch(&self) -> Result<(std::fs::File, PathBuf)> {
         use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
         static N: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
-        let path = self.scratch_dir.join(format!(
-            "w-{}-{}",
-            std::process::id(),
-            N.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
-        ));
-        let file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
-            .create(true)
-            .truncate(true)
-            .read(true)
-            .write(true)
-            .open(&path)?;
-        Ok((file, path))
+        loop {
+            let path = self.scratch_dir.join(format!(
+                "w-{}-{}-{}",
+                std::process::id(),
+                now_millis(),
+                N.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
+            ));
+            match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+                .create_new(true)
+                .read(true)
+                .write(true)
+                .open(&path)
+            {
+                Ok(file) => return Ok((file, path)),
+                Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => continue,
+                Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     /// The sidecar path for a scratch file, holding the [`StagedWrite`] that
@@ -709,16 +717,23 @@ impl ContentCache {
     /// have synced `scratch` first: a sidecar promising bytes that never reached
     /// the disk is worse than no sidecar.
     pub fn mark_scratch_durable(&self, scratch: &Path, meta: &StagedWrite) -> Result<()> {
+        use std::io::Write as _;
+
         let side = Self::scratch_sidecar(scratch);
         let tmp = side.with_extension("json.tmp");
-        std::fs::write(&tmp, serde_json::to_vec(meta)?)?;
+        let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create(true)
+            .truncate(true)
+            .open(&tmp)?;
+        file.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec(meta)?)?;
+        file.sync_all()?;
+        drop(file);
         std::fs::rename(&tmp, &side)?;
         // The rename is what publishes the sidecar; fsync the directory so the
         // rename itself survives, not just the bytes it points at.
-        if let Some(dir) = side.parent()
-            && let Ok(d) = std::fs::File::open(dir)
-        {
-            let _ = d.sync_all();
+        if let Some(dir) = side.parent() {
+            std::fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
         }
         Ok(())
     }
@@ -796,6 +811,21 @@ impl ContentCache {
         }
     }
 
+    fn discard_unmarked_scratch(scratch_dir: &Path) {
+        let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(scratch_dir) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        for entry in entries.flatten() {
+            let blob = entry.path();
+            if blob.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "json") {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if !Self::scratch_sidecar(&blob).exists() {
+                let _ = std::fs::remove_file(blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Emergency eviction of unpinned blobs when local disk runs out of space (ENOSPC).
     pub fn emergency_evict(&self) {
         let pinned: HashSet<String> = self
@@ -826,7 +856,8 @@ impl ContentCache {
 
     /// Writes rescued from an unclean shutdown, as `(blob, meta)` pairs for the
     /// daemon to hand to the upload queue. A blob whose sidecar did not survive
-    /// the rescue is deleted here — nothing can address it.
+    /// is not actionable automatically, but is retained for manual recovery:
+    /// unexplained bytes are never evidence that user data is disposable.
     pub fn recovered_writes(&self) -> Vec<(PathBuf, StagedWrite)> {
         let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&self.recovery_dir) else {
             return Vec::new();
@@ -837,14 +868,11 @@ impl ContentCache {
             if blob.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "json") {
                 continue;
             }
-            match std::fs::read(Self::scratch_sidecar(&blob))
+            if let Some(meta) = std::fs::read(Self::scratch_sidecar(&blob))
                 .ok()
                 .and_then(|b| serde_json::from_slice::<StagedWrite>(&b).ok())
             {
-                Some(meta) => out.push((blob, meta)),
-                None => {
-                    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&blob);
-                }
+                out.push((blob, meta));
             }
         }
         out
@@ -872,6 +900,8 @@ impl ContentCache {
     /// failure here means we could not save the bytes at all, so it is reported
     /// rather than swallowed.
     pub fn stage_write(&self, meta: &StagedWrite, scratch: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+        use std::io::Write as _;
+
         static N: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
         // The uid goes in the name so a staged file can be tied back to its node
         // without a database; `/` in a uid would otherwise open a path.
@@ -882,18 +912,32 @@ impl ContentCache {
             now_millis(),
             N.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
         ));
-        if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(scratch, &path) {
-            // Cross-device: rename cannot move it, so copy and drop the original.
-            let _ = e;
+        let copied = if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(scratch, &path) {
+            if e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::CrossesDevices {
+                return Err(e.into());
+            }
             std::fs::copy(scratch, &path)?;
-            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(scratch);
-        }
+            true
+        } else {
+            false
+        };
+        std::fs::File::open(&path)?.sync_all()?;
         // Sidecar last: a staged file without one is still recoverable bytes,
         // while a sidecar without a file would describe nothing.
-        std::fs::write(
-            path.with_extension("json"),
-            serde_json::to_vec_pretty(meta)?,
-        )?;
+        let side = path.with_extension("json");
+        let side_tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let mut side_file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .open(&side_tmp)?;
+        side_file.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec_pretty(meta)?)?;
+        side_file.sync_all()?;
+        drop(side_file);
+        std::fs::rename(&side_tmp, &side)?;
+        std::fs::File::open(&self.staging_dir)?.sync_all()?;
+        if copied {
+            std::fs::remove_file(scratch)?;
+        }
         Ok(path)
     }
 
@@ -1906,6 +1950,51 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(c2.recovered_writes().is_empty(), "recovery does not repeat");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn recovery_keeps_an_orphan_blob_when_its_sidecar_is_missing() {
+        let (c, dir) = cache();
+        let orphan = dir.path().join("content/recovery/orphaned-user-bytes");
+        std::fs::write(&orphan, b"retain me").unwrap();
+
+        assert!(c.recovered_writes().is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read(&orphan).unwrap(),
+            b"retain me",
+            "metadata loss must not trigger deletion of unexplained content"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn failed_scratch_rescue_does_not_delete_the_durable_source() {
+        use std::io::Write as _;
+        let dir = TempDir::new();
+        let db = Arc::new(Db::open_in_memory().unwrap());
+        let content = dir.path().join("content");
+        let pins = dir.path().join("pins.json");
+        let c = ContentCache::open(content.clone(), pins.clone(), 0, db.clone()).unwrap();
+        let (mut file, scratch) = c.create_scratch().unwrap();
+        file.write_all(b"durable source").unwrap();
+        file.sync_all().unwrap();
+        let meta = StagedWrite {
+            uid: uid("rescue").to_string(),
+            len: 14,
+            base_size: 0,
+            base_mtime: 0,
+            authored: vec![(0, 14)],
+            complete: true,
+            based_on: None,
+        };
+        c.mark_scratch_durable(&scratch, &meta).unwrap();
+        let blocking_destination = content.join("recovery").join(scratch.file_name().unwrap());
+        std::fs::create_dir(&blocking_destination).unwrap();
+        drop(file);
+        drop(c);
+
+        let _c2 = ContentCache::open(content, pins, 0, db).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&scratch).unwrap(), b"durable source");
+        assert!(ContentCache::scratch_sidecar(&scratch).exists());
+    }
+
     /// Releasing a write hands the bytes to staging, so the sidecar an earlier
     /// `fsync` left must not offer recovery a second, stale copy of it.
     #[test]

crates/pdfs-core/src/config.rs

@@ -105,11 +105,21 @@ impl AppDirs {
     /// Load config from disk, creating default if missing.
     pub fn load_config(&self) -> AppConfig {
         let path = self.config_path();
-        if path.exists()
-            && let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
-            && let Ok(config) = serde_json::from_str::<AppConfig>(&content)
-        {
-            return config;
+        if path.exists() {
+            match std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
+                .map_err(Error::from)
+                .and_then(|content| {
+                    serde_json::from_str::<AppConfig>(&content).map_err(Error::from)
+                }) {
+                Ok(config) => return config,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    // Preserve the original bytes for diagnosis/recovery.  In
+                    // particular, never replace a truncated config with defaults
+                    // and silently lose mount, device, or ignore settings.
+                    tracing::error!(path = %path.display(), error = %e, "config is unreadable; using in-memory defaults without overwriting it");
+                    return AppConfig::default();
+                }
+            }
         }
 
         let default_config = AppConfig::default();
@@ -125,10 +135,26 @@ impl AppDirs {
     /// cache budget or mountpoint; the daemon re-reads the file on its next mount.
     pub fn save_config(&self, config: &AppConfig) -> Result<()> {
         let path = self.config_path();
-        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
-        }
-        std::fs::write(&path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(config)?)?;
+        let parent = path
+            .parent()
+            .ok_or_else(|| Error::Other("configuration path has no parent".into()))?;
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+        let nonce = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .map(|duration| duration.as_nanos())
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+        let tmp = path.with_extension(format!("json.tmp-{}-{nonce}", std::process::id()));
+        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt as _;
+        let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .open(&tmp)?;
+        use std::io::Write as _;
+        file.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec_pretty(config)?)?;
+        file.sync_all()?;
+        std::fs::rename(&tmp, &path)?;
+        std::fs::File::open(parent)?.sync_all()?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -211,24 +237,41 @@ impl AppDirs {
     pub fn ensure(&self) -> Result<()> {
         for dir in [self.state_dir(), self.cache_dir()] {
             std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir)?;
-            restrict_dir(&dir);
+            restrict_dir(&dir)?;
         }
         let config_dir = self.dirs.config_dir().to_path_buf();
-        if std::fs::create_dir_all(&config_dir).is_ok() {
-            restrict_dir(&config_dir);
-        }
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&config_dir)?;
+        restrict_dir(&config_dir)?;
         Ok(())
     }
 }
 
-/// Make `dir` owner-only (`0700`). Best effort: a mode we cannot set (an
-/// exotic filesystem, a directory we do not own) is not worth refusing to
-/// start over, and the caller has no better answer than continuing.
-fn restrict_dir(dir: &Path) {
-    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-    if let Err(e) = std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)) {
-        tracing::warn!(path = %dir.display(), error = %e, "could not restrict directory to 0700");
+/// Make `dir` owner-only (`0700`). These directories contain decrypted bytes,
+/// plaintext names, and an authenticated control socket, so failure is fatal.
+fn restrict_dir(dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::{MetadataExt as _, PermissionsExt};
+    let before = std::fs::symlink_metadata(dir)?;
+    if before.file_type().is_symlink() || !before.is_dir() {
+        return Err(Error::Other(format!(
+            "sensitive path is not a real directory: {}",
+            dir.display()
+        )));
     }
+    if before.uid() != unsafe { libc::geteuid() } {
+        return Err(Error::Other(format!(
+            "sensitive directory is not owned by the current user: {}",
+            dir.display()
+        )));
+    }
+    std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;
+    let after = std::fs::symlink_metadata(dir)?;
+    if after.permissions().mode() & 0o777 != 0o700 {
+        return Err(Error::Other(format!(
+            "sensitive directory did not become owner-only: {}",
+            dir.display()
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Make a just-bound Unix socket owner-only (`0600`).
@@ -263,29 +306,57 @@ mod tests {
     /// and the control socket that commands the daemon's session.
     #[test]
     fn restrict_dir_makes_a_directory_owner_only() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("pdfs-cfg-{}", std::process::id()));
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "pdfs-cfg-{}-{:?}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            std::thread::current().id()
+        ));
         let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
         std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
         // Start deliberately world-readable, as `create_dir_all` under a typical
         // umask would leave it.
         std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
 
-        restrict_dir(&dir);
+        restrict_dir(&dir).unwrap();
 
         assert_eq!(mode_of(&dir), 0o700, "group and other must have no access");
         let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn restrict_dir_refuses_a_symlink() {
+        let root = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "pdfs-cfg-link-{}-{:?}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            std::thread::current().id()
+        ));
+        let target = root.join("target");
+        let link = root.join("state");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&target).unwrap();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &link).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(restrict_dir(&link).is_err());
+
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
+    }
+
     /// Connecting to the control socket confers the daemon's authenticated
     /// session with no credential, so it is an authority boundary rather than
     /// merely private data.
     #[test]
     fn restrict_socket_makes_a_socket_owner_only() {
-        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("pdfs-sock-{}", std::process::id()));
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+            "pdfs-sock-{}-{:?}",
+            std::process::id(),
+            std::thread::current().id()
+        ));
         let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
         std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
         let sock = dir.join("control.sock");
-        let listener = std::os::unix::net::UnixListener::bind(&sock).unwrap();
+        // chmod semantics are identical for a socket path and a regular file;
+        // use a file so this regression also runs in sandboxes that prohibit
+        // creating Unix sockets.
+        let listener = std::fs::File::create(&sock).unwrap();
 
         restrict_socket(&sock).unwrap();
 

crates/pdfs-core/src/db/migrations.rs

@@ -31,7 +31,12 @@ impl Db {
             .and_then(|v| v.parse().ok())
             .unwrap_or(0);
 
-        if current >= SCHEMA_VERSION {
+        if current > SCHEMA_VERSION {
+            return Err(crate::Error::Other(format!(
+                "database schema {current} is newer than this build supports ({SCHEMA_VERSION}); refusing to open it to avoid corrupting user data"
+            )));
+        }
+        if current == SCHEMA_VERSION {
             return Ok(());
         }
 

crates/pdfs-core/src/db/ops.rs

@@ -118,9 +118,10 @@ pub struct AttachedBlob {
 
 impl Db {
     pub fn enqueue_op(&self, op: &PendingOp) -> Result<(i64, Option<String>)> {
-        let conn = self.conn.lock();
+        let mut conn = self.conn.lock();
+        let tx = conn.transaction()?;
         let superseded: Option<String> = if op_supersedes(&op.kind) {
-            let blob: Option<String> = conn
+            let blob: Option<String> = tx
                 .query_row(
                     "SELECT blob_path FROM pending_op WHERE uid = ?1 AND kind = ?2",
                     params![op.uid, op.kind],
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ impl Db {
                 )
                 .optional()?
                 .flatten();
-            conn.execute(
+            tx.execute(
                 "DELETE FROM pending_op WHERE uid = ?1 AND kind = ?2",
                 params![op.uid, op.kind],
             )?;
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ impl Db {
         } else {
             None
         };
-        conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
             "INSERT INTO pending_op
                (kind, uid, parent_uid, name, blob_path, meta_json, created_at, next_attempt_at)
              VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8)",
@@ -151,7 +152,9 @@ impl Db {
                 op.next_attempt_at
             ],
         )?;
-        Ok((conn.last_insert_rowid(), superseded))
+        let id = tx.last_insert_rowid();
+        tx.commit()?;
+        Ok((id, superseded))
     }
 
     /// Point a queued create at the bytes that were just written to it, returning

crates/pdfs-core/src/db/tests.rs

@@ -784,6 +784,41 @@ fn opens_and_migrates() {
     assert_eq!(version, SCHEMA_VERSION.to_string());
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn refuses_a_schema_newer_than_the_running_build() {
+    let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
+        "pdfs-db-future-{}-{}.db",
+        std::process::id(),
+        std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .unwrap()
+            .as_nanos()
+    ));
+    let conn = rusqlite::Connection::open(&path).unwrap();
+    conn.execute_batch(
+        "CREATE TABLE sync_state (key TEXT PRIMARY KEY, value TEXT);
+         INSERT INTO sync_state VALUES ('schema_version', '9999');",
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(conn);
+
+    let err = Db::open(&path)
+        .err()
+        .expect("future schema must fail closed");
+    assert!(err.to_string().contains("newer than this build supports"));
+    let conn = rusqlite::Connection::open(&path).unwrap();
+    let version: String = conn
+        .query_row(
+            "SELECT value FROM sync_state WHERE key = 'schema_version'",
+            [],
+            |row| row.get(0),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(version, "9999", "failed open must not rewrite the database");
+    drop(conn);
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
+}
+
 /// A queued write whose baseline is restamped must keep everything else.
 ///
 /// The restamp happens after our *own* upload seals a new revision under a
@@ -867,6 +902,39 @@ fn a_second_write_supersedes_the_first_pending_op() {
     assert_eq!(db.pending_op_counts().unwrap().uploads, 1);
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn failed_superseding_insert_keeps_the_old_pending_op() {
+    let db = Db::open_in_memory().unwrap();
+    let op = |blob: &str| PendingOp {
+        id: 0,
+        kind: OP_REVISION.to_string(),
+        uid: uid("atomic").to_string(),
+        parent_uid: None,
+        name: None,
+        blob_path: Some(blob.to_string()),
+        meta_json: Some("{}".to_string()),
+        created_at: 1,
+        attempts: 0,
+        last_error: None,
+        next_attempt_at: 0,
+    };
+    db.enqueue_op(&op("/staging/original")).unwrap();
+    db.with_conn(|conn| {
+        conn.execute_batch(
+            "CREATE TRIGGER reject_replacement BEFORE INSERT ON pending_op
+             WHEN NEW.blob_path = '/staging/replacement'
+             BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'injected insert failure'); END;",
+        )?;
+        Ok(())
+    })
+    .unwrap();
+
+    assert!(db.enqueue_op(&op("/staging/replacement")).is_err());
+    let ops = db.pending_ops().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(ops.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].blob_path.as_deref(), Some("/staging/original"));
+}
+
 /// Deleting a folder that was created offline must take the ops queued
 /// underneath it with it: they name a placeholder parent that will now never
 /// become real, so nothing could ever drain them and nothing is left to

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/background.rs

@@ -126,12 +126,16 @@ pub(super) async fn run_event_sync(
                 match client.enumerate_events(&scope, None).await {
                     Ok(events) => {
                         let head = events.last().map(|e| e.id().clone());
-                        if let Some(c) = &head
-                            && let Err(e) = db.set_event_cursor(c.as_str())
-                        {
-                            warn!(error = %e, "persist seed cursor failed");
+                        let Some(c) = &head else {
+                            break None;
+                        };
+                        if let Err(e) = db.set_event_cursor(c.as_str()) {
+                            warn!(error = %e, ?delay, "persist seed cursor failed; retrying");
+                            tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
+                            delay = (delay * 2).min(ONLINE_PROBE_MAX);
+                            continue;
                         }
-                        break head;
+                        break Some(c.clone());
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
                         warn!(error = %e, ?delay, "seed event cursor failed; retrying");
@@ -168,15 +172,19 @@ pub(super) async fn run_event_sync(
             // the life of the daemon (SDK plan #9). `apply_event` only touches
             // our FUSE state, so nothing else does this.
             if let Err(e) = client.invalidate_caches_for_event(event).await {
-                warn!(error = %e, "sdk cache invalidation for event failed");
+                warn!(error = %e, "sdk cache invalidation for event failed; retaining cursor for retry");
+                break;
             }
             apply_event(&state, &content, &pending, &notifier, event);
-        }
-        cursor = events.last().map(|e| e.id().clone());
-        if let Some(c) = &cursor
-            && let Err(e) = db.set_event_cursor(c.as_str())
-        {
-            warn!(error = %e, "persist event cursor failed");
+            let applied = event.id().clone();
+            if let Err(e) = db.set_event_cursor(applied.as_str()) {
+                warn!(error = %e, "persist event cursor failed; retaining prior cursor for retry");
+                break;
+            }
+            // Advance only after this exact event is durably acknowledged. If a
+            // later event fails, polling resumes from here and replays nothing
+            // that was not already made visible locally.
+            cursor = Some(applied);
         }
     }
 }

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/control.rs

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
 use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Write as _};
 use std::os::unix::net::{UnixListener, UnixStream};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-use std::time::Instant;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 use pdfs_core::config::AppDirs;
 use pdfs_core::control::{
@@ -27,6 +27,67 @@ use tracing::{info, warn};
 use super::transfers::CountingReader;
 use super::{Core, count_noun, human_bytes, human_duration, parse_uid};
 
+const MAX_CONTROL_REQUEST_BYTES: u64 = 1024 * 1024;
+const CONTROL_READ_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
+const MAX_CONTROL_HANDLERS: usize = 64;
+static ACTIVE_CONTROL_HANDLERS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+
+struct ControlHandlerPermit;
+
+impl ControlHandlerPermit {
+    fn acquire() -> Option<Self> {
+        ACTIVE_CONTROL_HANDLERS
+            .fetch_update(Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Acquire, |active| {
+                (active < MAX_CONTROL_HANDLERS).then_some(active + 1)
+            })
+            .ok()
+            .map(|_| Self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for ControlHandlerPermit {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        ACTIVE_CONTROL_HANDLERS.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
+    }
+}
+
+fn read_request_line(reader: &mut impl BufRead) -> std::io::Result<Option<String>> {
+    let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+    loop {
+        let available = reader.fill_buf()?;
+        if available.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+        let take = available
+            .iter()
+            .position(|byte| *byte == b'\n')
+            .map_or(available.len(), |index| index + 1);
+        if bytes.len().saturating_add(take) > MAX_CONTROL_REQUEST_BYTES as usize {
+            return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+                std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "control request exceeds size limit",
+            ));
+        }
+        bytes.extend_from_slice(&available[..take]);
+        reader.consume(take);
+        if bytes.ends_with(b"\n") {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if bytes.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    if bytes.len() as u64 > MAX_CONTROL_REQUEST_BYTES || !bytes.ends_with(b"\n") {
+        return Err(std::io::Error::new(
+            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+            "control request exceeds limit or is not newline terminated",
+        ));
+    }
+    String::from_utf8(bytes)
+        .map(Some)
+        .map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))
+}
+
 /// Turn a CLI-supplied path into a mountpoint-relative path. An absolute path
 /// must live under `mountpoint`; a relative path is taken as already relative to
 /// the mount root.
@@ -44,6 +105,10 @@ fn rel_to_mount(mountpoint: &Path, path: &str) -> CoreResult<PathBuf> {
 /// Handle one control-socket connection: read a single JSON request line,
 /// dispatch it against `core`, and write back a JSON response line.
 fn handle_control_conn(core: &Core, username: &str, mountpoint: &Path, stream: UnixStream) {
+    if let Err(e) = stream.set_read_timeout(Some(CONTROL_READ_TIMEOUT)) {
+        warn!(error = %e, "control: could not set request timeout");
+        return;
+    }
     let mut reader = BufReader::new(match stream.try_clone() {
         Ok(s) => s,
         Err(e) => {
@@ -51,10 +116,14 @@ fn handle_control_conn(core: &Core, username: &str, mountpoint: &Path, stream: U
             return;
         }
     });
-    let mut line = String::new();
-    if reader.read_line(&mut line).is_err() || line.trim().is_empty() {
-        return;
-    }
+    let line = match read_request_line(&mut reader) {
+        Ok(Some(line)) if !line.trim().is_empty() => line,
+        Ok(_) => return,
+        Err(e) => {
+            warn!(error = %e, "control: rejected request");
+            return;
+        }
+    };
     let response = match serde_json::from_str::<CtlRequest>(line.trim()) {
         Ok(CtlRequest::Status) => {
             let pins = core.cache.list_pins();
@@ -792,12 +861,22 @@ pub(crate) fn run_control_socket(
     for conn in listener.incoming() {
         match conn {
             Ok(stream) => {
+                let Some(permit) = ControlHandlerPermit::acquire() else {
+                    warn!(
+                        limit = MAX_CONTROL_HANDLERS,
+                        "control: rejecting connection at handler limit"
+                    );
+                    continue;
+                };
                 let core = core.clone();
                 let username = username.clone();
                 let mountpoint = mountpoint.clone();
                 if let Err(e) = std::thread::Builder::new()
                     .name("pdfs-control".into())
-                    .spawn(move || handle_control_conn(&core, &username, &mountpoint, stream))
+                    .spawn(move || {
+                        let _permit = permit;
+                        handle_control_conn(&core, &username, &mountpoint, stream);
+                    })
                 {
                     warn!(error = %e, "control: spawn handler failed");
                 }
@@ -808,3 +887,38 @@ pub(crate) fn run_control_socket(
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod request_limit_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::io::Cursor;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_one_bounded_newline_terminated_request() {
+        let mut input = Cursor::new(b"{\"Status\":null}\n".to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_request_line(&mut input).unwrap().as_deref(),
+            Some("{\"Status\":null}\n")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_a_request_without_a_terminating_newline() {
+        let mut input = Cursor::new(b"{\"Status\":null}".to_vec());
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_request_line(&mut input).unwrap_err().kind(),
+            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_a_request_larger_than_the_limit() {
+        let mut bytes = vec![b'x'; MAX_CONTROL_REQUEST_BYTES as usize + 1];
+        bytes.push(b'\n');
+        let mut input = Cursor::new(bytes);
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_request_line(&mut input).unwrap_err().kind(),
+            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/filesystem.rs

@@ -1129,17 +1129,16 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
         // A failure past this point has already trashed any node the rename was
         // replacing, so put it back rather than leaving the caller with neither
         // the source moved nor the destination intact.
-        if newname != name {
-            if let Err(e) = self
+        if newname != name
+            && let Err(e) = self
                 .core
                 .rt
                 .block_on(self.core.client.rename_node(&uid, &newname, None))
-            {
-                error!(%uid, error = %e, "rename failed");
-                self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
-                reply.error(Errno::EIO);
-                return;
-            }
+        {
+            error!(%uid, error = %e, "rename failed");
+            self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
+            reply.error(Errno::EIO);
+            return;
         }
         if newparent != parent {
             let mut attempts = 0u32;

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs

@@ -1548,8 +1548,32 @@ impl Core {
                 );
             }
             Err(e) => {
-                error!(%uid, error = %e, "staging write failed; bytes lost");
-                let _ = std::fs::remove_file(src);
+                // `src` is the only known copy of bytes the kernel already
+                // accepted.  A failure to publish them into staging must never
+                // turn into permission to delete them: leave the scratch file
+                // in place so startup recovery or a human can still salvage it.
+                error!(
+                    %uid,
+                    error = %e,
+                    scratch = %src.display(),
+                    "staging write failed; retaining the only scratch copy"
+                );
+                let name = {
+                    let st = self.state.lock();
+                    st.entries
+                        .get(&ino)
+                        .map(|entry| entry.node.name.clone())
+                        .unwrap_or_default()
+                };
+                self.log_activity(
+                    ActivityKind::Upload,
+                    &name,
+                    format!(
+                        "write not queued and could not be staged; recovery copy retained at {}",
+                        src.display()
+                    ),
+                    false,
+                );
             }
         }
     }

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sync.rs

@@ -55,9 +55,11 @@ use local_scan::is_write_mode;
 use local_scan::open_for_write_set;
 use model::{LocalItem, Outcome, PassAbort, Pending, RemoteItem};
 pub(crate) use planner::base_name;
+#[cfg(test)]
+use planner::conflict_path;
 use planner::{
-    FilePlan, classification_order, conflict_path, filter_baseline, guard_local_wipe, join_rel,
-    parent_rel, plan_file, rel_to_path, remote_sig, unchanged_remote_size,
+    FilePlan, classification_order, conflict_path_with_suffix, filter_baseline, guard_local_wipe,
+    join_rel, parent_rel, plan_file, rel_to_path, remote_sig, unchanged_remote_size,
 };
 /// What a [`Pending`] op did, so the reconcile can update shared state on the
 /// engine thread (never inside a task).
@@ -711,7 +713,17 @@ impl Core {
                     }
                 },
                 FilePlan::DeleteLocal => {
-                    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(local_root.join(rel_to_path(rel)));
+                    if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_file(local_root.join(rel_to_path(rel))) {
+                        warn!(rel, error = %e, "sync: remove local file failed");
+                        self.log_activity(
+                            ActivityKind::Trash,
+                            base_name(rel),
+                            e.to_string(),
+                            false,
+                        );
+                        outcome.errors += 1;
+                        continue;
+                    }
                     let _ = self.db.sync_entry_remove(folder_id, rel);
                     self.log_activity(ActivityKind::Trash, base_name(rel), "removed locally", true);
                     outcome.deleted += 1;
@@ -758,7 +770,12 @@ impl Core {
         // Deferred folder deletions, deepest first.
         delete_local_dirs.sort_by_key(|p| std::cmp::Reverse(p.matches('/').count()));
         for rel in delete_local_dirs {
-            let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_root.join(rel_to_path(&rel)));
+            if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_dir_all(local_root.join(rel_to_path(&rel))) {
+                warn!(rel, error = %e, "sync: remove local folder failed");
+                self.log_activity(ActivityKind::Trash, base_name(&rel), e.to_string(), false);
+                outcome.errors += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
             let _ = self.db.sync_entry_remove(folder_id, &rel);
             self.log_activity(
                 ActivityKind::Trash,
@@ -802,18 +819,24 @@ impl Core {
         out: &mut HashMap<String, LocalItem>,
     ) -> Result<(), String> {
         let entries = std::fs::read_dir(dir).map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {e}", dir.display()))?;
-        for entry in entries.filter_map(|e| e.ok()) {
+        for entry in entries {
+            let entry = entry.map_err(|e| format!("read entry in {}: {e}", dir.display()))?;
             let path = entry.path();
-            let meta = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path) {
-                Ok(m) => m,
-                Err(_) => continue,
-            };
-            let Ok(stripped) = path.strip_prefix(root) else {
-                continue;
-            };
-            let Some(rel) = stripped.to_str() else {
-                continue;
-            };
+            let meta = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path)
+                .map_err(|e| format!("stat {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
+            let stripped = path.strip_prefix(root).map_err(|e| {
+                format!(
+                    "local path {} escaped sync root {}: {e}",
+                    path.display(),
+                    root.display()
+                )
+            })?;
+            let rel = stripped.to_str().ok_or_else(|| {
+                format!(
+                    "local path {} is not valid UTF-8; refusing a destructive sync pass",
+                    path.display()
+                )
+            })?;
             // Ignore our own in-flight download temp files.
             if rel.contains(".pdfs-tmp-") {
                 continue;
@@ -1153,12 +1176,9 @@ impl Core {
                 // pass), then take the remote version as the shared truth.
                 let path = local_root.join(rel_to_path(rel));
                 if path.exists() {
-                    let conflict = conflict_path(&path, now_secs());
-                    if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&path, &conflict) {
-                        warn!(rel, error = %e, "sync: could not set aside conflict copy");
-                    } else {
-                        info!(rel, "sync: kept local changes as a conflict copy");
-                    }
+                    preserve_conflict_copy(&path, now_secs())
+                        .map_err(|e| format!("set aside conflict copy for {rel}: {e}"))?;
+                    info!(rel, "sync: kept local changes as a conflict copy");
                 }
                 self.download_file(folder_id, local_root, rel, uid, *mtime, *size)
                     .await?;
@@ -1171,8 +1191,7 @@ impl Core {
                 // evicted. Push the conflict copy now, while it still exists, and
                 // leave the remote file holding the original path.
                 let path = local_root.join(rel_to_path(rel));
-                let conflict = conflict_path(&path, now_secs());
-                std::fs::rename(&path, &conflict)
+                let conflict = preserve_conflict_copy(&path, now_secs())
                     .map_err(|e| format!("set aside conflict copy for {rel}: {e}"))?;
                 let name = conflict
                     .file_name()
@@ -1297,13 +1316,24 @@ impl Core {
                     let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
                     format!("download {rel}: {e}")
                 })?;
-            out.into_inner().flush().ok();
+            let mut out = out.into_inner();
+            out.flush().map_err(|e| format!("flush tmp {rel}: {e}"))?;
+            out.sync_all().map_err(|e| format!("sync tmp {rel}: {e}"))?;
         }
         std::fs::rename(&tmp, &path).map_err(|e| format!("place {rel}: {e}"))?;
         // Match local mtime to the remote's so neither side looks "changed" next pass.
-        if let Ok(f) = std::fs::File::options().write(true).open(&path) {
-            let _ =
-                f.set_modified(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(mtime.max(0) as u64));
+        let f = std::fs::File::options()
+            .write(true)
+            .open(&path)
+            .map_err(|e| format!("open placed file {rel}: {e}"))?;
+        f.set_modified(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(mtime.max(0) as u64))
+            .map_err(|e| format!("set mtime for {rel}: {e}"))?;
+        f.sync_all()
+            .map_err(|e| format!("sync placed file {rel}: {e}"))?;
+        if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+            std::fs::File::open(parent)
+                .and_then(|dir| dir.sync_all())
+                .map_err(|e| format!("sync directory for {rel}: {e}"))?;
         }
         self.record_file_baseline(folder_id, rel, &path, uid).await
     }
@@ -1350,6 +1380,46 @@ impl Core {
     }
 }
 
+/// Publish a conflict copy without overwriting an earlier conflict bearing the
+/// same timestamp. The original is removed only after the new copy is durable.
+fn preserve_conflict_copy(path: &Path, stamp: i64) -> std::io::Result<PathBuf> {
+    let metadata = std::fs::metadata(path)?;
+    for suffix in 0..=u32::MAX {
+        let conflict = conflict_path_with_suffix(path, stamp, suffix);
+        let mut source = std::fs::File::open(path)?;
+        let mut target = match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .open(&conflict)
+        {
+            Ok(file) => file,
+            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => continue,
+            Err(e) => return Err(e),
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = std::io::copy(&mut source, &mut target).and_then(|_| target.sync_all()) {
+            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&conflict);
+            return Err(e);
+        }
+        target.set_permissions(metadata.permissions())?;
+        if let Ok(modified) = metadata.modified() {
+            target.set_modified(modified)?;
+        }
+        target.sync_all()?;
+        sync_parent_dir(&conflict)?;
+        std::fs::remove_file(path)?;
+        sync_parent_dir(&conflict)?;
+        return Ok(conflict);
+    }
+    unreachable!("u32 conflict suffix space exhausted")
+}
+
+fn sync_parent_dir(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    match path.parent() {
+        Some(parent) => std::fs::File::open(parent)?.sync_all(),
+        None => Ok(()),
+    }
+}
+
 // ---- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
 
 /// A remote node's `(mtime, size)` change signature. Size prefers the plaintext
@@ -1609,9 +1679,10 @@ mod tests {
             guard_local_wipe(&base, &one).is_ok(),
             "one survivor means the tree is readable; the rest are real deletions"
         );
-        // A one-entry baseline is a genuine single delete, not a wipe to detect.
+        // A one-entry folder can disappear because its mount or parent became
+        // unavailable just as easily as a larger tree can.
         let single: HashMap<String, ()> = [("a.txt".to_string(), ())].into_iter().collect();
-        assert!(guard_local_wipe(&single, &none).is_ok());
+        assert!(guard_local_wipe(&single, &none).is_err());
         // Nothing synced yet: a first pass over an empty folder is not a wipe.
         assert!(guard_local_wipe(&none, &none).is_ok());
         // Local paths that are not in the baseline are new uploads, and do not
@@ -1781,6 +1852,52 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(no_ext, PathBuf::from("/home/me/README (sync-conflict 42)"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn conflict_preservation_never_replaces_an_existing_copy() {
+        let dir = sync_test_dir("conflict-collision");
+        let source = dir.join("notes.txt");
+        let existing = conflict_path(&source, 1700);
+        std::fs::write(&source, b"new local edit").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(&existing, b"older conflict").unwrap();
+
+        let preserved = preserve_conflict_copy(&source, 1700).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&existing).unwrap(), b"older conflict");
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&preserved).unwrap(), b"new local edit");
+        assert_eq!(
+            preserved.file_name().unwrap(),
+            "notes (sync-conflict 1700-1).txt"
+        );
+        assert!(!source.exists());
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn conflict_preservation_failure_keeps_the_source() {
+        let dir = sync_test_dir("conflict-failure");
+        // A directory cannot be copied through the regular-file preservation
+        // path, deterministically forcing publication to fail after the source
+        // has been discovered.
+        let source = dir.join("not-a-file.txt");
+        std::fs::create_dir(&source).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(preserve_conflict_copy(&source, 1700).is_err());
+        assert!(source.is_dir(), "failure must not remove the source");
+        assert!(!conflict_path(&source, 1700).exists());
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(dir).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    fn sync_test_dir(label: &str) -> PathBuf {
+        let nonce = SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .unwrap()
+            .as_nanos();
+        let path =
+            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("pdfs-sync-{label}-{}-{nonce}", std::process::id()));
+        std::fs::create_dir(&path).unwrap();
+        path
+    }
+
     // ---- open-for-write detection tests -----------------------------------
 
     #[test]

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sync/planner.rs

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ pub(super) fn guard_local_wipe<B, L>(
     baseline: &HashMap<String, B>,
     local: &HashMap<String, L>,
 ) -> Result<(), String> {
-    if baseline.len() >= 2 && baseline.keys().all(|rel| !local.contains_key(rel)) {
+    if !baseline.is_empty() && baseline.keys().all(|rel| !local.contains_key(rel)) {
         return Err(format!(
             "every one of the {} synced paths is missing locally; refusing to trash \
              them on Drive. Check that the folder is mounted and readable.",
@@ -162,12 +162,24 @@ pub(super) fn rel_to_path(rel: &str) -> PathBuf {
 }
 
 /// The name for a conflict copy of `path`, e.g. `notes (sync-conflict 1700000000).txt`.
+#[cfg(test)]
 pub(super) fn conflict_path(path: &Path, stamp: i64) -> PathBuf {
+    conflict_path_with_suffix(path, stamp, 0)
+}
+
+/// As [`conflict_path`], with a deterministic suffix used when that name already
+/// exists. This keeps conflict preservation from ever replacing an older copy.
+pub(super) fn conflict_path_with_suffix(path: &Path, stamp: i64, suffix: u32) -> PathBuf {
     let stem = path.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("file");
     let ext = path.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str());
+    let suffix = if suffix == 0 {
+        String::new()
+    } else {
+        format!("-{suffix}")
+    };
     let name = match ext {
-        Some(ext) => format!("{stem} (sync-conflict {stamp}).{ext}"),
-        None => format!("{stem} (sync-conflict {stamp})"),
+        Some(ext) => format!("{stem} (sync-conflict {stamp}{suffix}).{ext}"),
+        None => format!("{stem} (sync-conflict {stamp}{suffix})"),
     };
     match path.parent() {
         Some(dir) => dir.join(name),

docs/BUGS.md

@@ -1206,7 +1206,8 @@ retracted.
 
 ## B19 — Remote Folder Trashing on Mode Switch Failure (CRIT-02)
 
-**Status:** Fixed in code (unverified on a live mount, 2026-07-22)
+**Status:** Fixed; all four managed-live mode pairs verified 2026-07-22,
+fault-injected mount failure still pending
 **Found:** 2026-07-21, multi-agent sync engine audit (`audit_bugs.md` CRIT-02)  
 **Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/devices.rs`, `apply_sync_folder_mode`
 
@@ -1220,8 +1221,9 @@ user deletion, evict the underlying local mirror while holding the sync-folder
 lock, and only then mount FUSE. A mount failure leaves an inert `ondemand` row;
 switching back to `mirror` clears the baseline and restores the local copy.
 
-**Verified:** `cargo clippy -p pdfs-fuse --all-targets -- -D warnings` and the
-`pdfs-fuse` unit suite pass. A fault-injected/live mode-switch test is still needed.
+**Verified:** `cargo clippy -p pdfs-fuse --all-targets -- -D warnings`, the
+`pdfs-fuse` unit suite, and the complete managed-live matrix passed against the
+1.0.0 release binary. A fault-injected mount-failure test is still needed.
 
 ---
 
@@ -1646,7 +1648,7 @@ and combined move/rename cases.
 
 ## B47 — FUSE Accepts Path Components Longer Than NAME_MAX
 
-**Status:** Fixed (unverified)
+**Status:** Fixed and managed-live verified (2026-07-22)
 **Found:** 2026-07-22, managed FUSE acceptance suite
 **Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/filesystem.rs`, name-taking callbacks
 
@@ -1772,3 +1774,339 @@ the FUSE handler invalidates both exact dentries and both directory inodes; the
 ordering matters because an invalidation sent before the rename reply is
 overwritten by the kernel's response processing. Uids are immutable and never
 reused, making a session-long tombstone safe.
+
+---
+
+## B49 — Failed Conflict Preservation Still Overwrites the Local File (CRIT-05)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code with deterministic regressions; live/fault verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 data-safety audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sync.rs`, download/conflict handling
+
+**Cause:** If renaming a concurrently changed local file to a conflict copy
+fails, sync only logs the error and continues publishing the remote download
+over the local version. Second-resolution conflict names can also collide.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Abort download publication unless preservation succeeds;
+use collision-resistant names. Test existing names, permissions, `ENOSPC`,
+`EIO`, and cross-filesystem behavior. This is B39's failure path; B25 remains
+the separate weak-baseline problem.
+
+---
+
+## B50 — Failed Orphan Staging Deletes the Sole Scratch Copy (CRIT-06)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code; injected filesystem-failure verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 data-safety audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs`, `Core::stage_orphaned_write`
+
+**Cause:** If preserving an orphaned scratch write into staging fails, the
+failure path removes the original even though no other durable copy exists.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Never unlink the source until a durable replacement and
+metadata are committed. Inject `ENOSPC`, `EIO`, `EROFS`, permission, and
+cross-device failures and assert a byte-identical copy remains discoverable.
+Related: B23, B27, and B28.
+
+---
+
+## B51 — Scratch Sidecar Does Not Establish a Durable Recovery Record (CRIT-07)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code; power-loss verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 crash-consistency audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/cache.rs`, scratch durability markers
+
+**Cause:** A temporary sidecar is renamed without syncing the sidecar first or
+the directory afterward. Power loss after successful user `fsync` can preserve
+bytes but lose authored-range metadata; recovery may discard the write or treat
+a sparse partial write as complete and replace untouched ranges with zeros.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Sync data, write and sync temporary metadata, rename it,
+then sync the directory before acknowledging durability. Crash-test every
+boundary and corrupt/partial sidecars. B20 and B23 do not cover this invariant.
+
+---
+
+## B52 — Staged-Write Publication Is Not Crash-Safe (CRIT-08)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code; cross-filesystem and power-loss verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 crash-consistency audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/cache.rs`, staged-write publication
+
+**Cause:** Rename/copy and direct sidecar writes lack a complete sync protocol.
+The cross-filesystem fallback can remove its source after an unsynced copy,
+leaving no complete data/metadata pair after a crash.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Publish synced temporary data and metadata via atomic
+renames and directory syncs; delete the source only after verification. Inject
+failure after every write, sync, rename, DB enqueue, and deletion. Related: B50
+and B51.
+
+---
+
+## B53 — Superseding a Pending Operation Is Not Transactional (CRIT-09)
+
+**Status:** Fixed with rollback regression; crash/ENOSPC verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 SQLite durability audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/db/ops.rs`, `Db::enqueue_op`
+
+**Cause:** The old durable row is deleted before its replacement is inserted,
+outside a transaction. A crash, constraint error, full disk, or I/O failure can
+erase acknowledged upload work and orphan its blob.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Select and replace in one transaction; retain the old
+blob until commit and make cleanup recoverable. Inject insert/commit failures
+and prove that old or new operation—never neither—remains queued. B27 concerns
+a retained failing row; this issue erases the row.
+
+---
+
+## B54 — Total-Wipe Guard Does Not Protect a One-Entry Baseline (CRIT-10)
+
+**Status:** Fixed with one-entry regression; live mode-matrix verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 mirror-sync audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sync/planner.rs`
+
+**Cause:** The safeguard activates only when the baseline has at least two
+paths. A one-file local folder that is missing, unreadable, or wrongly mounted
+can therefore trash its sole remote file.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Protect every non-empty baseline and require an
+independently complete scan plus an explicit deliberate-delete signal for a
+total wipe. Test absent roots, replaced mountpoints, permissions, and one-file
+folders in every mode combination.
+
+---
+
+## B55 — Incomplete Local Scans Are Interpreted as Deletions (CRIT-11)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code; injected iterator/stat failure tests pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 mirror-sync audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sync.rs`, local scan/reconciliation
+
+**Cause:** Directory-entry and metadata errors omit paths instead of marking the
+snapshot incomplete. Reconciliation can treat omissions as intentional local
+deletions and propagate them remotely.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Carry completeness/errors into planning; an incomplete
+subtree must make the pass non-destructive and retain its prior baseline. Test
+`readdir`, `stat`, permission, transient-I/O, and disappearing-entry failures.
+B42 covers the inverse local-delete failure.
+
+---
+
+## B56 — Database Schema Version Parsing Fails Open (HIGH-13)
+
+**Status:** Partly fixed — future schemas are refused; malformed-version handling remains open
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 database audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/db/migrations.rs`, `Db::migrate`
+
+**Cause:** Missing, malformed, or non-numeric version values become zero, while
+all future versions are accepted. Corruption can replay migrations, and an
+older binary can open a newer incompatible database.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Distinguish a new DB from corrupt metadata; reject
+malformed/future versions without mutation and validate required schema. Test
+empty, malformed, negative, future, partial/interrupted migration, and upgrade
+fixtures from every released schema.
+
+---
+
+## B57 — Event Cursor Can Advance Past Unapplied State (HIGH-14)
+
+**Status:** Partly fixed — cursor now advances per successfully invalidated event; DB/apply fault tests remain
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 event-recovery audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/background.rs`, `run_event_sync`
+
+**Cause:** Cache invalidation failures are ignored while the batch cursor still
+advances. Cursor-persistence failure also leaves the in-memory cursor moving;
+first-seed persistence failure can later reseed at a newer head. Applying state
+and committing its cursor have no atomic relationship.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Apply idempotently and persist derived DB state plus the
+cursor atomically, or advance only through the last durable event. Retry failed
+prerequisites. Crash/fault-test every event and cursor boundary, first seed,
+duplicate replay, malformed events, and database-full conditions.
+
+---
+
+## B58 — Control Socket Has Unbounded Frames and Connections (HIGH-15)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code with frame-limit regressions; connection-flood verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 IPC audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/control.rs`
+
+**Cause:** The server uses unbounded `read_line`, a new thread per connection,
+and no concurrency or idle limit. A local process can exhaust memory, file
+descriptors, and threads, blocking filesystem control and safe shutdown.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Bound frames, clients, and idle lifetime. Test slow/no-
+newline clients, oversized/truncated JSON, floods, and recovery. B6/B35 cover
+socket authority and permissions, not resource bounds.
+
+---
+
+## B59 — Private State Permission Enforcement Fails Open (HIGH-16)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code with symlink regression; wrong-owner integration verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 local-privacy audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/config.rs`, `AppDirs::ensure`
+
+**Cause:** chmod/creation failures are warned about or ignored while decrypted
+content, plaintext metadata, and the authenticated socket may remain accessible
+to other local users.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Before loading credentials or serving data, verify every
+sensitive directory is owned by the effective user, is not a symlink, and is
+owner-only. Test wrong owner, symlink substitution, read-only filesystems,
+permissive restored directories, and chmod failure. This tightens B6/B35.
+
+---
+
+## B60 — Config Writes Are Non-Atomic and Parse Errors Are Overwritten (HIGH-17)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in code; fault/concurrent-save verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 configuration audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/config.rs`, `load_config` / `save_config`
+
+**Cause:** Save truncates in place without sync. Load treats read/parse failure
+as absence and best-effort overwrites with defaults, silently losing mountpoint,
+ignore policy, budget, and explicit device adoption.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Atomically publish a restricted, synced temporary file
+and sync its directory. Preserve malformed input and report an actionable error.
+Test invalid/truncated JSON, permissions, `ENOSPC`, crash points, and concurrent
+saves.
+
+---
+
+## B61 — Rotated Single-Use Credentials Can Be Lost (HIGH-18)
+
+**Status:** Open — 1.0 authentication/recovery blocker
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 authentication audit
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/auth.rs`, refresh callback
+
+**Cause:** Failure to serialize or persist rotated credentials is only logged
+(and some setup failures are silent). The daemon continues in memory while the
+keyring retains an invalid single-use refresh token, so restart loses login.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Expose unhealthy persistence, retry with bounded backoff,
+notify the user, and define a safe re-login/shutdown path. Test locked/full/
+unavailable keyrings, callback races, repeated rotations, death, and restart.
+
+---
+
+## B62 — Debian Artifact Omits Required Service and Autostart Units (HIGH-19)
+
+**Status:** Fixed in workflow; clean-install VM verification pending
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 packaging audit
+**Where:** `.github/workflows/release.yml`; `packaging/`
+
+**Cause:** The generated package omits `proton-drive.service` and the tray
+autostart entry even though normal login/GUI flows assume that lifecycle.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Package all units/resources with correct paths, modes,
+and hooks. In clean supported-distribution VMs test install, login, reboot,
+daemon/tray/FUSE, upgrade, rollback, and uninstall without deleting user state.
+
+---
+
+## B63 — Release Version Identity Is Inconsistent and Unenforced (HIGH-20)
+
+**Status:** Partly fixed — tag/workspace/PKGBUILD equality is enforced; protocol identity remains
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 release audit
+**Where:** manifests, client identity constants, tags, release workflow
+
+**Cause:** Workspace/binary versions, protocol identity strings, and tags can
+disagree; the workflow trusts any `v*` tag without checking package metadata or
+installed `--version` output.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Establish one version source and fail CI on every tag,
+manifest, package, and binary mismatch. Document any intentionally independent
+protocol identity.
+
+---
+
+## B64 — Stable Publishing Lacks Data-Safety and Recovery Gates (CRIT-12)
+
+**Status:** Partly fixed — automated gates and managed-live matrix pass; recovery approval remains open
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 release audit
+**Where:** CI and `.github/workflows/release.yml`
+
+**Cause:** A tag can publish without required format/lint/tests, offline and
+dedicated-account live acceptance, migrations, or crash/recovery drills. Fixes
+still marked unverified can ship as stable.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Publish immutable RC artifacts only after all workspace
+checks, full managed mode matrix, migration/power-loss recovery, clean install/
+upgrade tests, and explicit sign-off for every critical/high integrity issue.
+
+---
+
+## B65 — Release Artifacts Lack Supply-Chain Verification (MED-11)
+
+**Status:** Open — 1.0 release/security blocker
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 supply-chain audit
+**Where:** CI and release workflows
+
+**Cause:** Releases do not enforce advisory/license policy or publish signed
+provenance, SBOMs, and verifiable checksums for exact distributed artifacts.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Add locked audit/license gates, SBOM and provenance,
+checksums and signatures, documented verification, and an independent clean-job
+verification/install test.
+
+---
+
+## B66 — Local-Only Pending Data Is Not Protected at Shutdown (HIGH-21)
+
+**Status:** Open — 1.0 data-safety/UX blocker
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 recovery audit
+**Where:** shutdown, CLI/GUI status, logout/unregister workflows
+
+**Cause:** Undrained writes may exist only on one machine, but there is no flush
+command with a completion contract, prominent pending byte/count health, or
+shutdown/logout warning/inhibition.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Add `pdfs sync flush`, expose pending operations/bytes
+and last errors, and protect destructive lifecycle actions. Test offline stop,
+logout, unregister, reboot, retry exhaustion, and drain. Credential removal must
+never delete staged bytes.
+
+---
+
+## B67 — Fresh-State Restore Can Silently Select a New Device (HIGH-22)
+
+**Status:** Open — 1.0 recovery blocker
+**Found:** 2026-07-22, 1.0 disaster-recovery audit
+**Where:** device discovery/adoption; `docs/RECOVERY.md`
+
+**Cause:** Restore depends on hostname and folder basename. After local-state
+loss, a mismatch can silently create/select another device rather than attach
+the intended remote roots, making recovery appear complete while data is absent.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Require explicit adoption/confirmation on ambiguity and
+show old/proposed device and root IDs. Test state loss, hostname change,
+duplicates, renamed folders, multiple devices, and byte-identical restoration.
+
+---
+
+## B68 — Profile Backup Cannot Be Written to the Device Root
+
+**Status:** Open — live-reproduced 2026-07-22
+**Found:** complete managed-live mode matrix against the 1.0.0 release binary
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/profile.rs`, profile backup destination
+
+**Repro:** Every sync-folder registration or mode transition attempted the
+profile backup and received `NotEnoughPermissions` (HTTP 422): `Cannot create
+file at the root of a device`. The filesystem matrix itself passed, but profile
+backup never became durable remotely.
+
+**Impact:** The recovery feature appears active but does not preserve the device
+profile, so a replacement machine still lacks modes, pins, mount settings, and
+the explicit remote-folder mapping. Repeated retries also add noisy warnings.
+
+**Required fix/test:** Store the profile below a writable application folder
+rather than directly at the device root, reuse that folder by stable identity,
+and make backup health visible. Verify upload, replacement, restart restore, and
+byte-identical fresh-state recovery on a dedicated account.

packaging/PKGBUILD

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # Build + install:   cd packaging && makepkg -fi
 
 pkgname=proton-drive-linux
-pkgver=0.7.1
+pkgver=1.0.0
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Proton Drive client for Linux: FUSE files-on-demand mount, CLI, GTK4 app + tray"
 arch=('x86_64')