WORKSPACE_SESSION_KEY_FILE names a file holding a 32-byte key, meant to
be a Docker secret. When it is set, proton-session.json is written as
AES-256-GCM ciphertext, so a copy of the data volume alone no longer
carries a usable session. That is what the OS keyring gives a native
host, for a container that has no Secret Service.
A plain session found while a key is set is sealed the first time it is
read. A sealed file without its key, or a malformed key file, is an
error at startup rather than a quiet fall back to plain JSON.
Three-stage build: bun compiles the frontend, cargo embeds it into the
release binary, and the runtime stage carries only that binary on
debian:trixie-slim as an unprivileged user.
compose.yml pins DIARY_BIND and DIARY_DATA_DIR over whatever .env says,
keeps state in a named volume, publishes on localhost only and probes the
port with bash so the image needs no curl. compose.override.yml.example
shows the traefik overlay for the personal host.
Single-user diary served as one Rust binary with the Svelte frontend
embedded.
- axum 0.8 + SQLite (sqlx), migrations run at startup
- stateless HMAC session cookie; credentials from .env, compared in
constant time
- FTS5 full-text search, user input rewritten into quoted prefix terms
- media uploads linked to entries by scanning bodies for /api/media/<id>,
which scopes share-token media access and entry deletion
- unguessable share links (192-bit token) serving a public read-only page
- vim keybindings via CodeMirror plus a modal browse layer and : command
line; disabled on touch devices
nvrl