`x`, `dd`, `:delete` and `:rmspace` no longer end anything. What they
delete is moved, whole, under one hidden root, and `u` puts the last of it
back where it was. `:trash` lists everything deleted, the last first:
Enter or `r` restores, `x` deletes one for good and `:trash purge` empties
it, each asking first. Something whose folder has gone since comes back to
the root of its space; something whose space is in the trash too waits for
the space. The daily sweep purges what has waited WORKSPACE_TRASH_DAYS (30),
and only then are its files deleted.
While it waits, a trashed node is out of the tree, the search, the agenda,
the mails, the SFTP mount, the export and the readable files/ view, and a
shared document answers 404 until it comes back with the same link. `rm`
over the mount trashes too; a rename onto a taken name still replaces what
was there, so editor saves do not fill the trash.
:backup login <username> shows Proton's third-party disclosure (and a
warning when no session key file seals the stored session), asks for
the password, then for a two-factor code when the account has one. If
Proton answers with a human check, its own verify.proton.me page opens
in a sheet; the token it posts back resumes the login. :backup logout
forgets the session and ends it on Proton's side where Proton answers.
The mirror picks up a new session within a minute, without a restart.
The login is split into steps in backup::proton (start, second_factor,
verified), and a half-done login waits in memory for five minutes at
most. Every step goes through its own throttle, so the workspace cannot
hammer Proton into locking the account. FIDO2-only accounts are told to
add an authenticator app. The CLI runs over the same steps and points
to :backup login when Proton wants a human check. The CSP lets
verify.proton.me into a frame and nothing else.
:passwd used to wrap the same master key under the new password, so an
old diary.db (a pre-* snapshot, an old revision on Proton Drive) and the
old password still opened every sealed file. It now makes a new master
key. The old password opens nothing from that moment; the old master
key is kept, sealed under the new one, in two new vault columns, only
until every sealed file has been re-sealed.
A background worker does that while the vault is open, without holding
it open. Each file gets a new id with its file key wrapped under the new
master key; its records are copied as they are. The move goes through
the same repointing as :encrypt, so the old id is put on backup_retired
and the mirror purges it from Drive. Which files are left is read off
their headers, so a lock or a restart halfway only pauses the work until
the next unlock. Once none is left, the old key is dropped.
Readers take a Keyring that tries the current key, then the retired
one. A second :passwd is refused until the first has finished. :vault
shows the progress. Every sealed file is uploaded to Proton once more.
The share page used to put the key in the API path, and every embedded
picture or video carried it in its src, so a reverse proxy's access log
held whole links. The page now sends the key in the body of
POST /api/share/{token}. The answer sets a diary_share cookie
(__Secure- over HTTPS) scoped to /api/share/{token}/, HttpOnly,
SameSite=Strict, good for twelve hours, and signed over the key's hash.
Media is served from /api/share/{token}/media/{id} only to a browser
holding that cookie, so minting a new key or unsharing voids it.
The old /api/share/{token}/{key} routes are gone; links themselves are
unchanged, since the key was always in their fragment.
A session cookie now carries the id of a row in the new sessions table,
and is refused once that row is gone. :sessions lists the browsers
signed in, newest first, and :sessions rm <n> signs one out without
touching the rest; it locks the vault too, since the vault is open for
the whole workspace. Logging out deletes the row, :logout! and a login
password change delete them all, and the sweep drops expired rows.
last_seen is kept in memory and written at most every five minutes.
Cookies issued before this carry no id and are refused: every browser
logs in once more after the upgrade.
Since e4e3e2b every registered SSH key could read sealed files over the
mount while the vault was open in the browser. A key is a standing
credential on another machine, so it now needs vault access, given and
taken per key with :sshkey vault <name> on|off (PATCH /api/ssh-keys/{id},
migration 0016). Existing keys start without it. The access is asked on
every read of a sealed file, so taking it away cuts off a read under way,
as locking does. That includes a write handle opened over a sealed file:
its .part holds the decrypted bytes and could be read back through it.
A mount no longer holds the vault open: it takes the key through the new
Vault::peek_key, which does not count as use. Opening sealed files over
and over from an indexer kept the idle lock from ever firing.
The rest of the audit's findings on this side:
- An unfinished upload's .part is removed when it is dropped, so a sealed
file's plaintext does not sit in uploads/ after a client goes away.
- A deleted key can no longer write, setstat or close-and-save through a
session that was already open.
- A session holds at most 256 handles and 64 MiB in memory, the server at
most 32 connections; keepalives drop a peer that stopped answering.
- A sealed download in the browser ends when the vault locks, the way a
read over the mount already did.
- Certificate inspection refuses a key or keystore that asks for more
than ten million rounds, or scrypt beyond 2^20 and r = 8, before running
the derivation: the file chooses those numbers, and the work could not
be stopped once begun.
m now adds the row under the cursor to a set of marks and steps on, so
mmm picks up three; M takes the whole folder, Esc or :unmark puts it all
back. Marks stay while the list walks, so they can be gathered from
several folders. p, :mv and Shift+digit move the whole set.
With a pointer, Ctrl- or Cmd-click marks a row and Shift-click every row
from the cursor to it. Rows drag onto a folder row, a crumb or a space
pill; a marked row carries every marked node with it.
POST /api/nodes/move takes { ids, parent_id } and moves them all or
none: every node is checked before any moves, sealing into a sealed
folder happens before the one transaction that moves them, and two of a
name get slugs of their own. The single move goes the same way.
`:encrypt` on a folder sealed the files in it once; whatever arrived
afterwards was plaintext. A folder or space that is encrypted now
carries `sealed` (0015), and so does every folder under it, so "is
this place sealed?" is one column of the parent. What lands there is
sealed on the way in, or refused with 423 while the vault is shut:
- uploads, with or without `?encrypt`, encrypted as they stream
- imports, sealed where they lie before any row names them
- SFTP writes, sealed out of their `.part`, and refused at the open
when the vault is shut
- files and folders moved in, through the web or SFTP: seal::enter
seals them first and the move happens only if that worked
Triggers make it hold for any path: a folder made inside a sealed one
is sealed, and a file node whose media is not encrypted cannot be
inserted into or moved into a sealed folder (a 400, not a 500).
Decrypting the sealed folder lifts the flag on its subtree and opens
its files; a file or folder inside it cannot be decrypted on its own.
An empty folder can be sealed. Documents are not files and stay as
they are.
The list shows a lock on sealed folders, the touch menu offers to
unseal one, and an upload or import into one asks for the vault
password first. Tests cover sealing, inheritance, the trigger, moves
with the vault open and shut, unsealing, an SFTP write and an import.
The file pane decided what to show by MIME type, and uploads keep a
type only when it cannot execute, so a .md, a .json or a .pem arrived
as application/octet-stream and got "no preview". It now goes by name
first (preview.ts), and a file with a name it does not know has its
first 8 KiB looked at: no NUL bytes and valid UTF-8 means text.
- text and code: the first 256 KiB with line numbers, as before
- markdown: rendered through the same sanitiser as documents, with a
source toggle
- CSV/TSV: a table of the first 500 rows, quotes respected
- PDF: the browser's own viewer in a frame. Only a PDF is served
without the sandbox CSP (Chrome's viewer will not start under it),
with frame-ancestors 'self' and X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN; the app
CSP allows same-origin frames.
- certificates, keys, keystores: POST /api/nodes/{id}/inspect reads
PEM (chains, keys, requests, public keys), DER and PKCS#12 on the
server, in pure Rust, including the RC2/3DES keystores that
openssl -legacy and older keychains write. It answers with subject,
issuer, validity, key, names, usage and fingerprints, and pairs each
private key with its certificate by public key. A password is asked
for only when needed, used for that one answer and never stored;
no key material is ever sent back. Sealed files are read through the
vault, and only while it is open.
The tests read throwaway fixtures under src/routes/testdata, made with
the openssl commands listed beside them; .gitignore lets their .pem
files past a global *.pem rule.
PUT /api/nodes/{id} takes base_updated_at and answers 409 when the node
was saved since; the editor sends it, so a save from another tab, the
phone or the SFTP mount is no longer overwritten in silence. :w! and
:wq! now force the write.
An autosave the server could not take is kept and retried with backoff,
and at once on the online event; network failures say "the server
cannot be reached" rather than "Failed to fetch". At boot that is no
longer shown as a login screen. A session that expires mid-edit shows
the login with a note, and logging back in resumes the open draft.
Folder listings and the media list are read page by page, so more than
500 children are no longer cut off. Search results carry the space and
folder they sit in, and the overview's recent list includes files.
Embedding uploads report progress, like uploads into a folder.
On touch devices vim is off by default. Each row has an actions sheet
(rename, move, share, seal, delete), folders start with a .. row, and
the dock gains today's entry, upload, search all spaces, drop for a
marked node, help, and the board's list, reorder, rename and delete.
The agenda gets a done button per card and a button for today's entry.
Sharing a folder or a file is refused in the client. :mv .. in a search
moves up from the match's own folder. Files dropped outside the list or
editor no longer navigate the tab away. The public share view renders
/n/ links as plain text, and tells a network error from a dead link.
Media answers Range requests with 206 and Content-Range, so videos seek
and Safari plays them. Sealed files too: the vault's opener now decrypts
by record position (STREAM BE32 through StreamPrimitive, the same
construction and the same files), so a range starts at the record that
holds its first byte. Compression is limited to text, because a gzipped
body no longer matches the byte ranges a player asks for.
GET /api/health answers without a session once the database does, and
the compose healthcheck asks it instead of only opening the port.
Requests are logged at info with share tokens and keys left out of the
path and no query strings. A request that is not answered in 30 seconds
gets a 503, except uploads, imports, the export, re-sealing and backups.
The backup, mail, sweep and SFTP loops run under a supervisor that logs
a panic and starts the loop again. The backup loop starts without a
Proton session and picks up a later proton-login without a restart. A
lock file keeps backup-now and the server from mirroring at once, and an
unreadable session key file turns backups off instead of failing boot.
Numbers in the configuration are checked against bounds at startup, so
a session length or an upload limit can no longer overflow later, and a
switch that is neither on nor off is an error rather than off. Config
and MailConfig print with the password, secret and SMTP URL redacted.
A session epoch is signed into each cookie (migration 0014). :logout!
advances it, which ends every session, and a changed WORKSPACE_PASSWORD
advances it on the next start. Cookies issued before this keep working
in the first epoch.
The idle timeout was checked only when the key was next asked for, so a
vault nobody touched kept its key in memory indefinitely while status
reported it locked. A ticker now drops the key once it is idle, and
status() expires it too. Vault passwords are Zeroizing from the request
body to Argon2.
Re-sealing a file rewrote links with a case-sensitive replace, and only
in documents linked through node_media. Links are now matched by regex,
whatever their case, in every document and card body that names the id.
A folder re-seal carries on past a file that fails and reports how many
failed. Two re-seals of one file no longer both commit.
:share reports how many sealed files the document embeds, since a share
link never serves them, and :encrypt reports how many shared documents
embed what it just sealed. Vault status counts sealed files, so :export!
asks for the password first rather than navigating into a 423 page. A
sealed embed that fails to load while the vault is shut becomes a button
that unlocks it and puts the embed back.
An export used to lose what plain files cannot carry: dates, names as
typed, the boards. It now writes .workspace.json beside the tree (format
1), and an import that finds one restores them. The markdown stays
plain, so the archive still reads without the application.
POST /api/import (:import! / in the UI) imports at the root: each
top-level directory becomes a space, or merges into the space already
there by that name, with its board and cards and the diary role. With a
manifest, media/ comes back as embedded files rather than a folder, a
file whose name ends in .md stays a file, and empty folders come back.
Export claims every path in one set, folders, then documents, then
files, so a file named notes.md beside a document notes no longer makes
a duplicate entry that failed the whole zip. Links to folders are
rewritten like links to documents, in one regex pass per kind instead
of a replace per file and document. A sealed file that will not open
now fails the export instead of being left out silently. The temporary
zip is made in the data directory, not in /tmp.
Node update, delete and move each ran as separate statements, with the
slug chosen outside the write that took it. They are now one transaction
each, opened with BEGIN IMMEDIATE so a read-then-write cannot fail with
SQLITE_BUSY halfway. Creating a node, a space or a file does the same.
A delete is one function, delete_subtree, used by the API and the SFTP
mount alike: SFTP deletes used to skip the media cleanup and orphan the
files a document embedded. Rows go in the transaction, bytes after the
commit. Deleting a media row that backs a file in the tree is refused;
the media browser marks those files and stops counting them as
documents that embed them.
A space can no longer be moved into a folder. The diary is found by a
role column (migration 0013) instead of its slug, so renaming it no
longer breaks the reminder or the agenda, and it cannot be deleted. The
same migration adds the unique index root slugs never had.
A card is done exactly when it is in the last list: a done patch now
moves the card, a card made in the done list is stamped, and adding or
deleting lists settles the board. Seeding a fresh board is atomic, and
a card links only to a document.
Uploads are fsynced before the rename, and zip entries are written aside
and renamed like any other upload. A sweep at start and once a day
removes leftover .part files, files no row knows, and uploads nothing
has embedded for a week.
Before a new build migrates the database it writes a VACUUM INTO copy,
diary.db.pre-<version>, since migrations only go forward.
Argon2id turns the vault password into a key that seals a random master
key; only the sealed copy is kept. Each file gets its own key, sealed
under the master key in its header with its media id, and its bytes are
AES-256-GCM STREAM records, so a swapped, cut or altered file refuses
to open. Uploads with ?encrypt=true are sealed as they stream in.
:vault, :unlock, :lock, :passwd, :encrypt, :decrypt and :upload! drive
it. The vault locks after WORKSPACE_VAULT_IDLE_MIN idle minutes, on
logout and on restart; while locked, sealed files answer 423, share
links never serve them, and :export! refuses rather than leave them out.
Sealing an existing file rewrites it under a new id and retires the old
one: the mirror deletes the plaintext from Proton Drive outright,
trash included, whatever WORKSPACE_BACKUP_PRUNE says, and drops it from
the readable files/ view. The mirror now compares on-disk sizes, so
sealed files are not re-hashed every run.
A file node points at one media row and owns it the way a document owns
what it embeds, so folder deletes, the media browser and exports keep
working. POST /api/nodes/{id}/files streams uploads into a folder;
imports turn non-markdown files into file nodes; exports put them at
their tree path. The browser previews images, video, audio and text,
offers the rest as a download, and takes files dropped on the list.
Migration 0010 widens the kind CHECK by editing the stored schema, as
SQLite documents for loosening a constraint: sqlx runs migrations in a
transaction, where foreign keys cannot be switched off for a rebuild.
GET /api/agenda gathers unfinished cards from every board that are late,
due within a week, or in hand, plus whether the diary has today; the
reminder mail and the agenda share one diary check. t opens it (and it
opens itself once a day when something is late or due), T writes today's
entry, the bar counts late and due cards, Ctrl-P searches every space,
and a document o made that is left empty is removed on the way out.
Add an in-process SFTP server (russh) backed directly by the nodes
table, so a space can be edited from nvim or synced with sshfs without
a separate filesystem mirror. Access is authenticated by public key
against a new ssh_keys table, managed via :sshkey in the app; the
feature stays off until WORKSPACE_SFTP_BIND is set.
The diary grows into a workspace: a flat list of dated entries becomes a
tree of spaces, and the app is renamed to match what it now is.
Spaces and nodes
One recursive `nodes` table replaces `entries`: a space is a root node,
and folders and documents nest under it without limit. Entries keep
their ids through the migration, so share tokens, media links and the
drafts in localStorage all still resolve.
Folder import
A folder or a zip is uploaded as a document tree. Markdown becomes
documents titled from their first heading, everything else becomes
media, and relative links between the imported files are rewritten to
the paths they landed at, so a set of cross-linked notes stays
navigable after the upload.
Boards
A kanban board per space, with the space as the board: lists, cards,
due dates and an optional link to a document. `diary` has none.
Mail
SMTP notifications through an outbox. A mail is enqueued under a key
naming the occurrence it belongs to, so a restart cannot resend and a
relay that refuses is retried with a widening backoff. Four kinds: the
diary reminder, cards due and overdue, a weekly digest, and logins
from a browser that has not been seen before or a burst of failures.
All of it is dormant until WORKSPACE_SMTP_URL is set.
Rename
Everything user-visible says workspace; everything that already exists
outside this repo keeps its name, because renaming it would break a
running deployment for tidiness alone: the database file, the docker
volume, the session cookie, the Proton device, the keyring entry and
the localStorage keys. Configuration reads WORKSPACE_* first and falls
back to DIARY_*, so the deployed .env keeps working untouched.
The data directory is the whole diary, and until now keeping a copy of it
was someone's manual job. The server can now register itself in Proton
Drive as a device — its own sync root, next to the desktop clients — and
keep that folder equal to DIARY_DATA_DIR, encrypted client-side by the
same Rust SDK the Linux client uses.
One interactive `narl-diary proton-login`, then nothing prompts again.
The stored session carries the tokens, the mailbox password (the key
chain is rebuilt from it on every start) and the account key salts, which
have to be captured at login: `core/v4/keys/salts` needs the `locked`
scope, and only a password-login token has it. Refresh tokens are
single-use, so every rotation is written back before it can be needed.
It lives as a 0600 file next to the database, on the same volume as the
data it protects; `--features keyring` puts it in the OS keyring instead,
for hosts that have a Secret Service.
The mirror is one-way and change-driven: writes mark the diary dirty and
it is mirrored once the writing stops, with an interval as the backstop —
an hour of writing is one backup, not sixty. `diary.db` goes up as a
VACUUM INTO snapshot, so it is a real point in time rather than a file
copied out from under a writer, and as a new revision each time, so
Proton keeps the older ones. Uploads are immutable, so they are written
once and skipped by size afterwards. Deletions do not propagate unless
asked: a backup that forgets on command is one accident away from being
no backup at all.
Identification follows Proton's third-party rules — an honest
`external-drive-narl_diary@<version>-alpha`, the disclosure printed
before any credential is asked for, and remembered folder uids instead of
walking the tree every run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D5Gk8FPkRXu1e6Nj2BCRE1
Only Ctrl-S and :w ever wrote. A closed laptop, a crashed tab or an
expired session took the draft with it, and clicking another entry in the
list silently discarded unsaved work without so much as a prompt.
Every change now goes to localStorage immediately and to the server two
and a half seconds after typing stops. Opening an entry that has a stash
newer than the server's copy restores it and says so, the way vim reports
a swap file; :e! and :q! discard it. Switching entries flushes the
outgoing draft first.
The save response carries the entry's excerpt, so a save patches its list
row in place instead of re-reading the whole list — which autosave would
otherwise have done every few seconds.
media.entry_id modelled ownership as one entry per file, but link_to_entry
reassigns it on every save. Embedding the same image in a second entry
therefore moved the claim, and deleting that second entry deleted the file
out from under the first — a broken image in the entry and a 404 on its
share link.
A join table replaces the column. Deleting an entry now removes only the
files no other entry embeds, and link_to_entry runs in a transaction so an
entry is never briefly attached to nothing while its share link is being
read.
Single-user diary served as one Rust binary with the Svelte frontend
embedded.
- axum 0.8 + SQLite (sqlx), migrations run at startup
- stateless HMAC session cookie; credentials from .env, compared in
constant time
- FTS5 full-text search, user input rewritten into quoted prefix terms
- media uploads linked to entries by scanning bodies for /api/media/<id>,
which scopes share-token media access and entry deletion
- unguessable share links (192-bit token) serving a public read-only page
- vim keybindings via CodeMirror plus a modal browse layer and : command
line; disabled on touch devices
nvrl
