Nothing set a CSP, a referrer policy, nosniff or a framing rule, so the
app relied entirely on the same-origin policy.
The referrer policy is the one with a concrete leak behind it: a share
token is part of the URL path, so following any outbound link from a
shared entry handed a third party a working link to a private entry.
`no-referrer` closes that.
The layer is `if_not_present`, so the media routes keep the stricter
sandbox CSP they set for themselves.
Single-user diary served as one Rust binary with the Svelte frontend
embedded.
- axum 0.8 + SQLite (sqlx), migrations run at startup
- stateless HMAC session cookie; credentials from .env, compared in
constant time
- FTS5 full-text search, user input rewritten into quoted prefix terms
- media uploads linked to entries by scanning bodies for /api/media/<id>,
which scopes share-token media access and entry deletion
- unguessable share links (192-bit token) serving a public read-only page
- vim keybindings via CodeMirror plus a modal browse layer and : command
line; disabled on touch devices
nvrl