Node update, delete and move each ran as separate statements, with the
slug chosen outside the write that took it. They are now one transaction
each, opened with BEGIN IMMEDIATE so a read-then-write cannot fail with
SQLITE_BUSY halfway. Creating a node, a space or a file does the same.
A delete is one function, delete_subtree, used by the API and the SFTP
mount alike: SFTP deletes used to skip the media cleanup and orphan the
files a document embedded. Rows go in the transaction, bytes after the
commit. Deleting a media row that backs a file in the tree is refused;
the media browser marks those files and stops counting them as
documents that embed them.
A space can no longer be moved into a folder. The diary is found by a
role column (migration 0013) instead of its slug, so renaming it no
longer breaks the reminder or the agenda, and it cannot be deleted. The
same migration adds the unique index root slugs never had.
A card is done exactly when it is in the last list: a done patch now
moves the card, a card made in the done list is stamped, and adding or
deleting lists settles the board. Seeding a fresh board is atomic, and
a card links only to a document.
Uploads are fsynced before the rename, and zip entries are written aside
and renamed like any other upload. A sweep at start and once a day
removes leftover .part files, files no row knows, and uploads nothing
has embedded for a week.
Before a new build migrates the database it writes a VACUUM INTO copy,
diary.db.pre-<version>, since migrations only go forward.
DELETE /api/media/{id} joined the raw, percent-decoded id onto uploads/,
so ..%2Fdiary.db deleted the database. Ids are now parsed as uuids before
they reach the filesystem, and a file is only removed when its row was.
Import panicked on a link like %aé: percent_decode sliced the string
between the bytes of a character. Hex digits are now read as bytes. The
SFTP write_at offset is checked before it is cast, so an offset near
u64::MAX no longer wraps past the size limit and panics the session.
The global body limit was the upload ceiling, about a gigabyte, and
applied to the login too. Only the upload routes take that much now;
other bodies stop at 16 MiB and the login at 16 KiB.
Writes a browser says came from another origin are refused, which
SameSite=Lax alone does not cover for sibling subdomains or for
multipart forms. Logout only locks the vault for a caller who is
logged in, so a cross-site form can no longer shut it.
Login and vault attempts go through one at a time, so a burst of
parallel guesses cannot all pass the throttle before the first failure
is recorded, and parallel Argon2 runs cannot pile up.
Sealed files are served with no-store instead of a year of cache, so
their plaintext does not outlive :lock in the browser. The SFTP host key
is created 0600 rather than narrowed after being written.
SIGTERM is handled: as PID 1 in the container it was ignored, and every
docker stop ended in SIGKILL. Requests get eight seconds to finish, the
pool is closed so the WAL is checkpointed, and compose runs tini.
WORKSPACE_SESSION_KEY_FILE names a file holding a 32-byte key, meant to
be a Docker secret. When it is set, proton-session.json is written as
AES-256-GCM ciphertext, so a copy of the data volume alone no longer
carries a usable session. That is what the OS keyring gives a native
host, for a container that has no Secret Service.
A plain session found while a key is set is sealed the first time it is
read. A sealed file without its key, or a malformed key file, is an
error at startup rather than a quiet fall back to plain JSON.
The stored session used to hold the mailbox password, which on a
single-password account is the login password. It now holds the per-key
passphrases derived from it at login, which unlock the keys but cannot
log in, change the password or turn 2FA off. Login also checks them
against the account's keys, so a wrong mailbox password fails there
rather than at the first backup.
A session stored by an older build is upgraded on the next start: its
key salts are already known, so the passphrases derive locally and the
file is rewritten without the password.
Argon2id turns the vault password into a key that seals a random master
key; only the sealed copy is kept. Each file gets its own key, sealed
under the master key in its header with its media id, and its bytes are
AES-256-GCM STREAM records, so a swapped, cut or altered file refuses
to open. Uploads with ?encrypt=true are sealed as they stream in.
:vault, :unlock, :lock, :passwd, :encrypt, :decrypt and :upload! drive
it. The vault locks after WORKSPACE_VAULT_IDLE_MIN idle minutes, on
logout and on restart; while locked, sealed files answer 423, share
links never serve them, and :export! refuses rather than leave them out.
Sealing an existing file rewrites it under a new id and retires the old
one: the mirror deletes the plaintext from Proton Drive outright,
trash included, whatever WORKSPACE_BACKUP_PRUNE says, and drops it from
the readable files/ view. The mirror now compares on-disk sizes, so
sealed files are not re-hashed every run.
data/uploads/<uuid> is what a restore needs but nobody can find a PDF
in it. files/<space>/<folder>/<name> holds the same bytes as the tree
shows them. Renames and moves become renames and moves on Drive, gone
files go to Drive's trash, emptied folders follow, and clashing names
get the later node's id. Failures there are logged, not fatal: the
restorable copy in data/ is already up when the view runs.
A file node points at one media row and owns it the way a document owns
what it embeds, so folder deletes, the media browser and exports keep
working. POST /api/nodes/{id}/files streams uploads into a folder;
imports turn non-markdown files into file nodes; exports put them at
their tree path. The browser previews images, video, audio and text,
offers the rest as a download, and takes files dropped on the list.
Migration 0010 widens the kind CHECK by editing the stored schema, as
SQLite documents for loosening a constraint: sqlx runs migrations in a
transaction, where foreign keys cannot be switched off for a rebuild.
Media uploads and imports now write each multipart field to uploads/ a
chunk at a time, and a zip is unpacked from disk on the blocking pool,
so the limit bounds disk rather than memory. What an archive unpacks to
is held to the same limit. The default goes from 64 MB to 1024 MB.
GET /api/agenda gathers unfinished cards from every board that are late,
due within a week, or in hand, plus whether the diary has today; the
reminder mail and the agenda share one diary check. t opens it (and it
opens itself once a day when something is late or due), T writes today's
entry, the bar counts late and due cards, Ctrl-P searches every space,
and a document o made that is left empty is removed on the way out.
Space sends a card to the done list or back to the inbox instead of
ticking it in place. Enter on a card with no document starts one named
after it, and q comes back to the board on the same card. :card captures
into the inbox without leaving the current view (c anywhere), :due takes
fri, tm, +3d and the like, :name! renames a list, done cards older than a
week fold away behind z, and the board spells out its keys. The phone dock
gains send, done, due and notes doors.
dd, x, i, R, s, y and :mv used the open document whenever one was open,
so walking the list and pressing dd deleted the document beside it. They
now act on the row under the cursor while the list has focus. Deletes ask
an in-app y/N naming the node instead of confirm(), and the board no
longer lets tree keys through to the hidden list.
The diary grows into a workspace: a flat list of dated entries becomes a
tree of spaces, and the app is renamed to match what it now is.
Spaces and nodes
One recursive `nodes` table replaces `entries`: a space is a root node,
and folders and documents nest under it without limit. Entries keep
their ids through the migration, so share tokens, media links and the
drafts in localStorage all still resolve.
Folder import
A folder or a zip is uploaded as a document tree. Markdown becomes
documents titled from their first heading, everything else becomes
media, and relative links between the imported files are rewritten to
the paths they landed at, so a set of cross-linked notes stays
navigable after the upload.
Boards
A kanban board per space, with the space as the board: lists, cards,
due dates and an optional link to a document. `diary` has none.
Mail
SMTP notifications through an outbox. A mail is enqueued under a key
naming the occurrence it belongs to, so a restart cannot resend and a
relay that refuses is retried with a widening backoff. Four kinds: the
diary reminder, cards due and overdue, a weekly digest, and logins
from a browser that has not been seen before or a burst of failures.
All of it is dormant until WORKSPACE_SMTP_URL is set.
Rename
Everything user-visible says workspace; everything that already exists
outside this repo keeps its name, because renaming it would break a
running deployment for tidiness alone: the database file, the docker
volume, the session cookie, the Proton device, the keyring entry and
the localStorage keys. Configuration reads WORKSPACE_* first and falls
back to DIARY_*, so the deployed .env keeps working untouched.
Proton refuses a file directly in a device's root folder — 422 "Cannot
create file at the root of a device" — so the first real backup died on
RESTORE.txt, before it had written anything. The mirror now lives in a
`data/` folder on the device, which is both what Proton permits and the
honest name for what it holds: the contents of DIARY_DATA_DIR.
Every remote path changed with it, so the bookkeeping describing the old
layout is dropped and rebuilt on the next run. A device root that
already collected an empty `uploads/` folder from the failed attempt
keeps it; it is not ours to guess about, and deleting it is one click.
Also quiet rPGP's packet-header warnings by default. They fire on every
key Proton wrote slightly differently to how rPGP re-serialises it —
cosmetic, once per unlock, and loud enough to bury the backup's own log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D5Gk8FPkRXu1e6Nj2BCRE1
The data directory is the whole diary, and until now keeping a copy of it
was someone's manual job. The server can now register itself in Proton
Drive as a device — its own sync root, next to the desktop clients — and
keep that folder equal to DIARY_DATA_DIR, encrypted client-side by the
same Rust SDK the Linux client uses.
One interactive `narl-diary proton-login`, then nothing prompts again.
The stored session carries the tokens, the mailbox password (the key
chain is rebuilt from it on every start) and the account key salts, which
have to be captured at login: `core/v4/keys/salts` needs the `locked`
scope, and only a password-login token has it. Refresh tokens are
single-use, so every rotation is written back before it can be needed.
It lives as a 0600 file next to the database, on the same volume as the
data it protects; `--features keyring` puts it in the OS keyring instead,
for hosts that have a Secret Service.
The mirror is one-way and change-driven: writes mark the diary dirty and
it is mirrored once the writing stops, with an interval as the backstop —
an hour of writing is one backup, not sixty. `diary.db` goes up as a
VACUUM INTO snapshot, so it is a real point in time rather than a file
copied out from under a writer, and as a new revision each time, so
Proton keeps the older ones. Uploads are immutable, so they are written
once and skipped by size afterwards. Deletions do not propagate unless
asked: a backup that forgets on command is one accident away from being
no backup at all.
Identification follows Proton's third-party rules — an honest
`external-drive-narl_diary@<version>-alpha`, the disclosure printed
before any credential is asked for, and remembered folder uids instead of
walking the tree every run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D5Gk8FPkRXu1e6Nj2BCRE1
auth.rs was the largest untested surface and the one where a mistake is
worth the most: the tests pin the round trip, expiry, secret rotation,
forged expiries, flipped signature bytes, malformed input, and that
credentials have to match in full rather than by prefix.
Also documents autosave, :export! and the security headers in the README.
Mocha with the palette's red as the accent is now the default; the old
green scheme moves to `:set theme=green` alongside amber and ice.
Two readability fixes in the editor:
- The vim block cursor paints the character inside itself in that
character's own syntax colour, so an accent-coloured glyph — a
heading's `#`, a link — vanished against the accent-coloured block.
The glyph is now forced to the background colour.
- CodeMirror injects its own `.cm-activeLine` rule after this stylesheet,
so the equally specific override never applied and the current line
rendered as a bright blue box. Qualified the selector and toned the
band down to a faint tint of the foreground.
Insert mode also gets a 2px bar instead of the browser hairline caret.
Three-stage build: bun compiles the frontend, cargo embeds it into the
release binary, and the runtime stage carries only that binary on
debian:trixie-slim as an unprivileged user.
compose.yml pins DIARY_BIND and DIARY_DATA_DIR over whatever .env says,
keeps state in a named volume, publishes on localhost only and probes the
port with bash so the image needs no curl. compose.override.yml.example
shows the traefik overlay for the personal host.
Single-user diary served as one Rust binary with the Svelte frontend
embedded.
- axum 0.8 + SQLite (sqlx), migrations run at startup
- stateless HMAC session cookie; credentials from .env, compared in
constant time
- FTS5 full-text search, user input rewritten into quoted prefix terms
- media uploads linked to entries by scanning bodies for /api/media/<id>,
which scopes share-token media access and entry deletion
- unguessable share links (192-bit token) serving a public read-only page
- vim keybindings via CodeMirror plus a modal browse layer and : command
line; disabled on touch devices
nvrl
