DELETE /api/media/{id} joined the raw, percent-decoded id onto uploads/,
so ..%2Fdiary.db deleted the database. Ids are now parsed as uuids before
they reach the filesystem, and a file is only removed when its row was.
Import panicked on a link like %aé: percent_decode sliced the string
between the bytes of a character. Hex digits are now read as bytes. The
SFTP write_at offset is checked before it is cast, so an offset near
u64::MAX no longer wraps past the size limit and panics the session.
The global body limit was the upload ceiling, about a gigabyte, and
applied to the login too. Only the upload routes take that much now;
other bodies stop at 16 MiB and the login at 16 KiB.
Writes a browser says came from another origin are refused, which
SameSite=Lax alone does not cover for sibling subdomains or for
multipart forms. Logout only locks the vault for a caller who is
logged in, so a cross-site form can no longer shut it.
Login and vault attempts go through one at a time, so a burst of
parallel guesses cannot all pass the throttle before the first failure
is recorded, and parallel Argon2 runs cannot pile up.
Sealed files are served with no-store instead of a year of cache, so
their plaintext does not outlive :lock in the browser. The SFTP host key
is created 0600 rather than narrowed after being written.
SIGTERM is handled: as PID 1 in the container it was ignored, and every
docker stop ended in SIGKILL. Requests get eight seconds to finish, the
pool is closed so the WAL is checkpointed, and compose runs tini.
Argon2id turns the vault password into a key that seals a random master
key; only the sealed copy is kept. Each file gets its own key, sealed
under the master key in its header with its media id, and its bytes are
AES-256-GCM STREAM records, so a swapped, cut or altered file refuses
to open. Uploads with ?encrypt=true are sealed as they stream in.
:vault, :unlock, :lock, :passwd, :encrypt, :decrypt and :upload! drive
it. The vault locks after WORKSPACE_VAULT_IDLE_MIN idle minutes, on
logout and on restart; while locked, sealed files answer 423, share
links never serve them, and :export! refuses rather than leave them out.
Sealing an existing file rewrites it under a new id and retires the old
one: the mirror deletes the plaintext from Proton Drive outright,
trash included, whatever WORKSPACE_BACKUP_PRUNE says, and drops it from
the readable files/ view. The mirror now compares on-disk sizes, so
sealed files are not re-hashed every run.
A file node points at one media row and owns it the way a document owns
what it embeds, so folder deletes, the media browser and exports keep
working. POST /api/nodes/{id}/files streams uploads into a folder;
imports turn non-markdown files into file nodes; exports put them at
their tree path. The browser previews images, video, audio and text,
offers the rest as a download, and takes files dropped on the list.
Migration 0010 widens the kind CHECK by editing the stored schema, as
SQLite documents for loosening a constraint: sqlx runs migrations in a
transaction, where foreign keys cannot be switched off for a rebuild.
Media uploads and imports now write each multipart field to uploads/ a
chunk at a time, and a zip is unpacked from disk on the blocking pool,
so the limit bounds disk rather than memory. What an archive unpacks to
is held to the same limit. The default goes from 64 MB to 1024 MB.
The diary grows into a workspace: a flat list of dated entries becomes a
tree of spaces, and the app is renamed to match what it now is.
Spaces and nodes
One recursive `nodes` table replaces `entries`: a space is a root node,
and folders and documents nest under it without limit. Entries keep
their ids through the migration, so share tokens, media links and the
drafts in localStorage all still resolve.
Folder import
A folder or a zip is uploaded as a document tree. Markdown becomes
documents titled from their first heading, everything else becomes
media, and relative links between the imported files are rewritten to
the paths they landed at, so a set of cross-linked notes stays
navigable after the upload.
Boards
A kanban board per space, with the space as the board: lists, cards,
due dates and an optional link to a document. `diary` has none.
Mail
SMTP notifications through an outbox. A mail is enqueued under a key
naming the occurrence it belongs to, so a restart cannot resend and a
relay that refuses is retried with a widening backoff. Four kinds: the
diary reminder, cards due and overdue, a weekly digest, and logins
from a browser that has not been seen before or a burst of failures.
All of it is dormant until WORKSPACE_SMTP_URL is set.
Rename
Everything user-visible says workspace; everything that already exists
outside this repo keeps its name, because renaming it would break a
running deployment for tidiness alone: the database file, the docker
volume, the session cookie, the Proton device, the keyring entry and
the localStorage keys. Configuration reads WORKSPACE_* first and falls
back to DIARY_*, so the deployed .env keeps working untouched.
The data directory is the whole diary, and until now keeping a copy of it
was someone's manual job. The server can now register itself in Proton
Drive as a device — its own sync root, next to the desktop clients — and
keep that folder equal to DIARY_DATA_DIR, encrypted client-side by the
same Rust SDK the Linux client uses.
One interactive `narl-diary proton-login`, then nothing prompts again.
The stored session carries the tokens, the mailbox password (the key
chain is rebuilt from it on every start) and the account key salts, which
have to be captured at login: `core/v4/keys/salts` needs the `locked`
scope, and only a password-login token has it. Refresh tokens are
single-use, so every rotation is written back before it can be needed.
It lives as a 0600 file next to the database, on the same volume as the
data it protects; `--features keyring` puts it in the OS keyring instead,
for hosts that have a Secret Service.
The mirror is one-way and change-driven: writes mark the diary dirty and
it is mirrored once the writing stops, with an interval as the backstop —
an hour of writing is one backup, not sixty. `diary.db` goes up as a
VACUUM INTO snapshot, so it is a real point in time rather than a file
copied out from under a writer, and as a new revision each time, so
Proton keeps the older ones. Uploads are immutable, so they are written
once and skipped by size afterwards. Deletions do not propagate unless
asked: a backup that forgets on command is one accident away from being
no backup at all.
Identification follows Proton's third-party rules — an honest
`external-drive-narl_diary@<version>-alpha`, the disclosure printed
before any credential is asked for, and remembered folder uids instead of
walking the tree every run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D5Gk8FPkRXu1e6Nj2BCRE1
media.entry_id modelled ownership as one entry per file, but link_to_entry
reassigns it on every save. Embedding the same image in a second entry
therefore moved the claim, and deleting that second entry deleted the file
out from under the first — a broken image in the entry and a 404 on its
share link.
A join table replaces the column. Deleting an entry now removes only the
files no other entry embeds, and link_to_entry runs in a transaction so an
entry is never briefly attached to nothing while its share link is being
read.
The MIME came straight from the client's multipart Content-Type and was
handed back verbatim with Content-Disposition: inline. A file uploaded as
text/html therefore ran as script on the diary's own origin, with the
session cookie's full authority — and share::serve_media exposed the same
path to anyone holding a share link, without a session at all.
Uploads are now pinned to an allowlist of types that cannot execute
(image except SVG, video, audio, text/plain, application/pdf); everything
else is stored and served as application/octet-stream + attachment. The
check runs on the way out as well as on the way in, so rows written before
this commit are covered too. Media responses also carry nosniff and a
sandbox CSP.
Single-user diary served as one Rust binary with the Svelte frontend
embedded.
- axum 0.8 + SQLite (sqlx), migrations run at startup
- stateless HMAC session cookie; credentials from .env, compared in
constant time
- FTS5 full-text search, user input rewritten into quoted prefix terms
- media uploads linked to entries by scanning bodies for /api/media/<id>,
which scopes share-token media access and entry deletion
- unguessable share links (192-bit token) serving a public read-only page
- vim keybindings via CodeMirror plus a modal browse layer and : command
line; disabled on touch devices
nvrl
