feat: slow down repeated failed logins

The login endpoint answered guesses as fast as they arrived, against a
single static password.

Wrong attempts now back off — 1s, 2s, 4s, up to 30s — and a correct one
clears the count. It is a single counter rather than a table keyed by
address: there is only one account, so an attacker gains nothing by
rotating source IPs, and there is no per-client map to grow. The cap is
there so that someone hammering the login delays the owner by half a
minute rather than locking them out.

Wrong credentials now answer 401 rather than 400. The server also warns
at startup if DIARY_PASSWORD is still the value from .env.example.
This commit is contained in:
nvrl committed 2026-09-05 09:47:27 +02:00
1 parent f0135d34ac
commit 41d2d7ef77
7 files changed
+119 -3

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+7
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@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ impl Config {
anyhow::bail!("DIARY_SECRET must be at least 16 characters");
}
if password == "change-me" {
tracing::warn!(
"DIARY_PASSWORD is still the example value from .env.example — \
anyone who can reach this server can read the diary"
);
}
let bind = var("DIARY_BIND")
.unwrap_or_else(|| "127.0.0.1:4242".to_string())
.parse()
+6
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@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ pub enum AppError {
Unauthorized,
NotFound,
BadRequest(String),
/// The caller must wait this many seconds before trying again.
TooManyRequests(i64),
Internal(anyhow::Error),
}
@@ -21,6 +23,10 @@ impl IntoResponse for AppError {
AppError::Unauthorized => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "unauthorized".to_string()),
AppError::NotFound => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found".to_string()),
AppError::BadRequest(m) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, m),
AppError::TooManyRequests(wait) => (
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
format!("too many attempts — wait {wait}s"),
),
AppError::Internal(e) => {
tracing::error!("internal error: {e:#}");
(
+2
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ mod error;
mod routes;
mod state;
mod static_files;
mod throttle;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let state = AppState {
db,
config: Arc::new(config),
login_throttle: Arc::default(),
};
let app = Router::new()
+9 -1
View File
@@ -23,9 +23,17 @@ pub async fn login(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Json(body): Json<LoginRequest>,
) -> AppResult<impl IntoResponse> {
state.login_throttle.check().map_err(|wait| {
tracing::warn!("login refused, {wait}s of backoff remaining");
AppError::TooManyRequests(wait)
})?;
if !auth::credentials_match(&state.config, &body.username, &body.password) {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest("invalid credentials".into()));
state.login_throttle.record_failure();
return Err(AppError::Unauthorized);
}
state.login_throttle.record_success();
let token = auth::issue_token(&state.config);
Ok((
StatusCode::OK,
+2 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use sqlx::SqlitePool;
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::{config::Config, throttle::LoginThrottle};
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AppState {
pub db: SqlitePool,
pub config: Arc<Config>,
pub login_throttle: Arc<LoginThrottle>,
}
+84
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@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// Failed logins get progressively slower to answer.
///
/// The diary has exactly one account, so this is one counter rather than a map
/// keyed by address: an attacker cannot step around it by changing source IP,
/// and there is no per-client table to grow. The cost of that choice is that
/// someone hammering the login can slow the owner's own attempt down — which is
/// why the wait is capped at `MAX_DELAY` seconds instead of locking the account.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct LoginThrottle {
state: Mutex<State>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct State {
failures: u32,
next_allowed: i64,
}
/// Wrong passwords happen; the first few are answered at full speed.
const FREE_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 3;
const MAX_DELAY: i64 = 30;
/// 1s, 2s, 4s, 8s… up to `MAX_DELAY`, starting once the free attempts are used.
fn delay_after(failures: u32) -> i64 {
match failures.checked_sub(FREE_ATTEMPTS) {
None | Some(0) => 0,
Some(over) => 1i64.checked_shl(over - 1).unwrap_or(MAX_DELAY).min(MAX_DELAY),
}
}
impl LoginThrottle {
/// `Err(seconds)` when this attempt is too soon after the last failure.
pub fn check(&self) -> Result<(), i64> {
let state = self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
match state.next_allowed - crate::now() {
wait if wait > 0 => Err(wait),
_ => Ok(()),
}
}
pub fn record_failure(&self) {
let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
state.failures = state.failures.saturating_add(1);
state.next_allowed = crate::now() + delay_after(state.failures);
}
pub fn record_success(&self) {
*self.state.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()) = State::default();
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{delay_after, LoginThrottle, MAX_DELAY};
#[test]
fn the_first_few_mistakes_are_free() {
assert_eq!(delay_after(0), 0);
assert_eq!(delay_after(3), 0);
}
#[test]
fn then_the_wait_doubles_up_to_the_cap() {
assert_eq!(delay_after(4), 1);
assert_eq!(delay_after(5), 2);
assert_eq!(delay_after(6), 4);
assert_eq!(delay_after(9), 30);
// Never overflows, however long the attack runs.
assert_eq!(delay_after(u32::MAX), MAX_DELAY);
}
#[test]
fn a_correct_password_clears_the_debt() {
let throttle = LoginThrottle::default();
for _ in 0..10 {
throttle.record_failure();
}
assert!(throttle.check().is_err());
throttle.record_success();
assert!(throttle.check().is_ok());
}
}
+9 -1
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
<script lang="ts">
import { ApiError } from './api'
import { diary } from './store.svelte'
let username = $state('')
@@ -18,7 +19,14 @@
try {
await diary.login(username, password)
} catch (e) {
error = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'login failed'
// The server answers a wrong password with a bare 401; the throttle's
// "wait Ns" message is worth showing verbatim.
error =
e instanceof ApiError && e.status === 401
? 'invalid credentials'
: e instanceof Error
? e.message
: 'login failed'
password = ''
} finally {
busy = false