chore(version) bumped to 1.10.2

The "This computer" indexer walks $HOME, and `default_excludes` only kept it
out of the Drive mountpoint and our own state/cache dirs. A home directory
that also holds third-party FUSE mounts (sshfs, rclone) got walked into.

`scan` does ask for `same_file_system(true)`, which looks sufficient and is
not: `ignore` implements it as `is_same_file_system` -> `device_num(path)` ->
`path.metadata()`, run after the directory is queued. Learning that a mount is
foreign requires stat'ing it first, and against a mount whose server is gone
that stat never returns.

The consequence is worse than a stalled scan. The blocked thread sits in
uninterruptible FUSE wait, so it ignores SIGKILL: the daemon can never exit,
systemd's stop times out, and the unreapable process keeps the cache.db lock
the next start needs, turning one dead mount into a permanent restart loop.
No userspace recovery exists once a thread is in that state, so the fix has to
be to never enter it.

Exclude every mountpoint strictly below the scan root, read by path from
/proc/self/mounts (octal-unescaped, so a path with a space still matches).
`filter_entry` runs before the device stat, so the walker never touches them.
Re-read per scan rather than cached at startup: a mount that appeared since
the daemon started is the likeliest to be half-alive.

This does not change what is indexed — a nested mount is a different device,
so it was already going to be skipped. Only the stat in front of that decision
goes away.

Refs: docs/BUGS.md B90

Cargo.toml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ resolver = "2"
 members = ["crates/pdfs-core", "crates/pdfs-fuse", "crates/pdfs-cli", "crates/pdfs-gui"]
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "1.9.3"
+version = "1.10.2"
 edition = "2024"
 license = "MIT"
 authors = ["Nils Pukropp <contact@narl.io>"]
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ keywords = ["proton", "drive", "fuse", "sync", "linux"]
 categories = ["filesystem", "command-line-utilities"]
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
-proton-sdk = { version = "0.6.2" }
+proton-sdk = { version = "0.6.4" }
-proton-drive-rs = { version = "0.6.2" }
+proton-drive-rs = { version = "0.6.4" }
 
 # Internal crates.
 pdfs-core = { path = "crates/pdfs-core" }
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ pdfs-fuse = { path = "crates/pdfs-fuse" }
 tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "sync", "fs", "io-util", "time", "signal"] }
 serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1"
-base64 = "0.22"
+base64 = "0.23"
 thiserror = "2"
 anyhow = "1"
 # Non-poisoning mutexes. A handler that panics while holding a lock must not
@@ -35,24 +35,28 @@ anyhow = "1"
 parking_lot = "0.12"
 tracing = "0.1"
 tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
-directories = "5"
+directories = "6"
 ignore = "0.4"
-sha2 = "0.10"
+sha2 = "0.11"
 # Google Takeout exports are zip sets; the importer reads their central
 # directories and streams entries out without extracting to disk first.
 zip = { version = "8", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
 # Proton's photo duplicate detection is keyed on the plaintext SHA-1, so an
 # import has to speak SHA-1 whatever its age.
-sha1 = "0.10"
+sha1 = "0.11"
 # Thumbnail generation for photos the server has none for. Decoders only for the
 # formats a camera or phone actually produces — the rest of the crate's codecs
 # would be dead weight in the daemon.
 image = { version = "0.25", default-features = false, features = ["jpeg", "png", "webp", "gif", "tiff", "bmp", "rayon"] }
-rusqlite = { version = "0.32", features = ["bundled"] }
+rusqlite = { version = "0.40", features = ["bundled"] }
-keyring = { version = "3", features = ["sync-secret-service", "crypto-rust"] }
+# keyring 4 split into `keyring-core` plus per-platform stores. The libdbus
+# Secret Service store is the one keyring 3's `sync-secret-service` wrapped, and
+# with no `target` it matches items v3 wrote, so existing logins survive.
+keyring-core = "1"
+dbus-secret-service-keyring-store = { version = "1", features = ["crypto-rust"] }
 clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] }
 rpassword = "7"
 async-trait = "0.1"
 futures = "0.3"
-fuser = "0.17"
+fuser = "0.18"
 libc = "0.2"

crates/pdfs-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -1129,6 +1129,9 @@ fn cmd_shared_with_me(uid: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
                     format!("  ({})", e.role)
                 };
                 println!("{kind} {:>12}  {}{role}  [{}]", e.size, e.name, e.uid);
+                if let Some(line) = shared_by_line(&e) {
+                    println!("{:>15}{line}", "");
+                }
             }
         }
         CtlResponse::Error { message, kind } => bail!("{}", cli_error(kind, &message)),
@@ -1137,6 +1140,39 @@ fn cmd_shared_with_me(uid: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Who shared an entry with me, and when, as a line printed under it — `None`
+/// when the invitation said nothing (owned content, or a node inside a shared
+/// folder rather than its root). An inviter whose signature did not verify is
+/// said to be claimed, not stated: the name may be forged.
+fn shared_by_line(entry: &pdfs_core::control::DirEntry) -> Option<String> {
+    if entry.shared_by.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut line = format!("shared by {}", entry.shared_by);
+    if entry.shared_at > 0 {
+        line.push_str(&format!(" at {}", format_epoch_utc(entry.shared_at)));
+    }
+    if entry.shared_by_unverified {
+        line.push_str("  WARNING: invitation signature did not verify; the sender may be forged");
+    }
+    Some(line)
+}
+
+/// `YYYY-MM-DD` (UTC) for epoch seconds, without pulling a date crate into the
+/// CLI for one column. Civil-from-days per Howard Hinnant's algorithm.
+fn format_epoch_utc(secs: i64) -> String {
+    let z = secs.div_euclid(86_400) + 719_468;
+    let era = z.div_euclid(146_097);
+    let doe = z - era * 146_097;
+    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1_460 + doe / 36_524 - doe / 146_096) / 365;
+    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
+    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
+    let day = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
+    let month = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 };
+    let year = yoe + era * 400 + i64::from(month <= 2);
+    format!("{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}")
+}
+
 /// Download a file shared with me. The daemon puts the plaintext in its content
 /// cache and replies with that path; with a `dest` we copy it out, so the caller
 /// gets a file it owns rather than one the cache may later evict.
@@ -2805,4 +2841,39 @@ mod login_wait_tests {
         wait_for_session(|| Ok(()), |_| slept += 1).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(slept, 0);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn epoch_seconds_format_as_utc_calendar_dates() {
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(0), "1970-01-01");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(951_782_400), "2000-02-29");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(1_700_000_000), "2023-11-14");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(-86_400), "1969-12-31");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_forged_looking_invitation_is_flagged_not_stated() {
+        let mut entry = pdfs_core::control::DirEntry {
+            name: "Budget.ods".into(),
+            is_dir: false,
+            size: 1,
+            modified: 0,
+            pinned: false,
+            cached: false,
+            uid: "vol~link".into(),
+            path: String::new(),
+            role: "viewer".into(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(shared_by_line(&entry), None, "no invitation, no line");
+        entry.shared_by = "alice@proton.me".into();
+        entry.shared_at = 1_700_000_000;
+        assert_eq!(
+            shared_by_line(&entry).as_deref(),
+            Some("shared by alice@proton.me at 2023-11-14")
+        );
+        entry.shared_by_unverified = true;
+        assert!(shared_by_line(&entry).unwrap().contains("WARNING"));
+    }
 }

crates/pdfs-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ sha2.workspace = true
 sha1.workspace = true
 zip.workspace = true
 rusqlite.workspace = true
-keyring.workspace = true
+keyring-core.workspace = true
+dbus-secret-service-keyring-store.workspace = true
 parking_lot.workspace = true
 async-trait.workspace = true
 libc.workspace = true

crates/pdfs-core/src/auth.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 //! interactive step; the refresh token auto-renews via the HTTP client's 401
 //! path, so no fresh 2FA is required until the refresh token itself expires.
 
-use keyring::Entry;
+use keyring_core::Entry;
 use proton_drive_rs::{KeySalt, ProtonDriveClient};
 use proton_sdk::api::{HumanVerification, HumanVerificationCredential};
 use proton_sdk::cache::EncryptedCacheRepository;
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ fn client_config() -> ProtonClientConfiguration {
 }
 
 fn keyring_entry() -> Result<Entry> {
+    // Installed lazily rather than once at startup so a session bus that was not
+    // up yet on the first attempt is retried on the next one.
+    if keyring_core::get_default_store().is_none() {
+        keyring_core::set_default_store(dbus_secret_service_keyring_store::Store::new()?);
+    }
     Ok(Entry::new(KEYRING_SERVICE, KEYRING_USER)?)
 }
 
@@ -215,7 +220,7 @@ pub fn load() -> Result<StoredSession> {
     let entry = keyring_entry()?;
     match entry.get_password() {
         Ok(json) => Ok(serde_json::from_str(&json)?),
-        Err(keyring::Error::NoEntry) => Err(Error::NotLoggedIn),
+        Err(keyring_core::Error::NoEntry) => Err(Error::NotLoggedIn),
         Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
     }
 }
@@ -238,7 +243,7 @@ pub fn logout() -> Result<()> {
         }
     }
     match keyring_entry()?.delete_credential() {
-        Ok(()) | Err(keyring::Error::NoEntry) => Ok(()),
+        Ok(()) | Err(keyring_core::Error::NoEntry) => Ok(()),
         Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
     }
 }

crates/pdfs-core/src/control.rs

@@ -906,6 +906,22 @@ pub struct DirEntry {
     /// report. Defaulted for wire-compat with clients/daemons predating it.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub role: String,
+    /// Who shared this node with me, as the invitation claims it — empty for
+    /// content I own, for a node reached *inside* a shared folder (only the share
+    /// root carries the invitation), and when the API did not say. Trust it only
+    /// as far as [`shared_by_unverified`](Self::shared_by_unverified) allows.
+    /// Defaulted for wire-compat with clients/daemons predating it.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_by: String,
+    /// When it was shared with me, epoch seconds; 0 when unknown.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_at: i64,
+    /// The invitation's signature did not check out against `shared_by`'s keys,
+    /// so the name may be forged. False when it verified *and* when it could not
+    /// be checked at all (no signature, no keys): only an actual mismatch is a
+    /// warning worth showing.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_by_unverified: bool,
 }
 
 /// One hit in a [`Request::Search`] result. Like [`DirEntry`] but carries the

crates/pdfs-core/src/db/tests.rs

@@ -3201,6 +3201,8 @@ fn test_db_has_children_and_trashed_filtering() {
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     };
     db.upsert_node(&parent_node).unwrap();
 
@@ -3227,6 +3229,8 @@ fn test_db_has_children_and_trashed_filtering() {
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     };
     db.upsert_node(&child_node).unwrap();
 

crates/pdfs-core/src/error.rs

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ pub enum Error {
     Proton(#[from] proton_sdk::ProtonError),
 
     #[error("keyring: {0}")]
-    Keyring(#[from] keyring::Error),
+    Keyring(#[from] keyring_core::Error),
 
     #[error("serialization: {0}")]
     Serde(#[from] serde_json::Error),

crates/pdfs-core/src/localindex.rs

@@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ fn to_entry(entry: &ignore::DirEntry) -> Option<LocalEntry> {
 /// The paths a scan should never descend into: the Drive mountpoint (walking it
 /// would fault every remote node in through FUSE) plus our own state and cache
 /// dirs, which hold blobs no user searches for by name.
+///
+/// Callers should extend this with [`nested_mount_points`] for each scan root —
+/// see that function for why `same_file_system(true)` is not enough on its own.
 pub fn default_excludes(mountpoint: &Path, state_dir: &Path, cache_dir: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
     vec![
         mountpoint.to_path_buf(),
@@ -207,6 +210,66 @@ pub fn default_excludes(mountpoint: &Path, state_dir: &Path, cache_dir: &Path) -
     ]
 }
 
+/// Every mountpoint strictly below `root`, read from `/proc/self/mounts`.
+///
+/// [`scan`] already asks the walker to stay on one filesystem, but that check is
+/// a *stat of the mountpoint* (`ignore`'s `is_same_file_system`), performed after
+/// the directory is queued — so the walker has to touch a foreign mount to learn
+/// it should skip it. On a dead network FUSE mount (an sshfs whose server is
+/// gone, an unresponsive rclone) that stat blocks in `request_wait_answer` with
+/// nobody left to answer it, and blocks *uninterruptibly*: the walker thread then
+/// ignores SIGKILL, so the daemon can never exit, systemd's stop times out, and
+/// the half-dead process keeps the cache.db lock that the next start needs
+/// (docs/BUGS.md B90).
+///
+/// Excluding the mountpoints by path avoids that stat entirely. It does not
+/// change what ends up indexed: a nested mount is a different device, so
+/// `same_file_system(true)` was already going to skip it.
+pub fn nested_mount_points(root: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    let Ok(mounts) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/mounts") else {
+        return Vec::new();
+    };
+    parse_nested_mount_points(&mounts, root)
+}
+
+/// The mountpoint-field parse behind [`nested_mount_points`], split out so it can
+/// be tested without a real `/proc`.
+fn parse_nested_mount_points(mounts: &str, root: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    mounts
+        .lines()
+        .filter_map(|line| line.split_whitespace().nth(1))
+        .map(|field| PathBuf::from(unescape_mount_field(field)))
+        // Strictly below: `root` itself being a mountpoint must not exclude the
+        // whole scan.
+        .filter(|path| path.starts_with(root) && path != root)
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Undo the octal escaping `/proc/self/mounts` applies to space, tab, newline and
+/// backslash in path fields. An un-unescaped `\040` would simply fail to match a
+/// real path, silently putting a mount with a space in its name back in the walk.
+fn unescape_mount_field(field: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(field.len());
+    let mut rest = field;
+    while let Some(at) = rest.find('\\') {
+        out.push_str(&rest[..at]);
+        let escape = rest[at + 1..].get(..3);
+        match escape.and_then(|digits| u8::from_str_radix(digits, 8).ok()) {
+            Some(byte) => {
+                out.push(byte as char);
+                rest = &rest[at + 4..];
+            }
+            // Not an octal escape after all — keep the backslash verbatim.
+            None => {
+                out.push('\\');
+                rest = &rest[at + 1..];
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    out.push_str(rest);
+    out
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -268,4 +331,42 @@ mod tests {
 
         std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).unwrap();
     }
+
+    /// A dead network FUSE mount under the scan root must be skipped by *path*,
+    /// before anything stats it — see `nested_mount_points`. The scan root itself
+    /// being a mountpoint must not exclude the entire walk.
+    #[test]
+    fn nested_mount_points_are_excluded_but_the_root_mount_is_not() {
+        let mounts = "\
+/dev/sda2 /home ext4 rw 0 0
+narl@narl.io:/opt /home/narl/remote/narl.io fuse.sshfs rw 0 0
+google_drive: /home/narl/remote/gdrive fuse.rclone rw 0 0
+tmpfs /run/user/1000 tmpfs rw 0 0
+";
+        let nested = parse_nested_mount_points(mounts, Path::new("/home/narl"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            nested,
+            vec![
+                PathBuf::from("/home/narl/remote/narl.io"),
+                PathBuf::from("/home/narl/remote/gdrive"),
+            ]
+        );
+
+        // `/home` is an ancestor, not a descendant: excluding it would empty the
+        // scan. `/run/user/1000` is unrelated.
+        assert!(parse_nested_mount_points(mounts, Path::new("/home")).len() == 2);
+    }
+
+    /// `/proc/self/mounts` octal-escapes a space; leaving it escaped would put a
+    /// mount whose path contains one back into the walk.
+    #[test]
+    fn mount_paths_are_unescaped() {
+        let mounts = "srv:/x /home/narl/My\\040Cloud fuse.sshfs rw 0 0\n";
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_nested_mount_points(mounts, Path::new("/home/narl")),
+            vec![PathBuf::from("/home/narl/My Cloud")]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(unescape_mount_field("/a\\134b"), "/a\\b");
+        assert_eq!(unescape_mount_field("/plain/path"), "/plain/path");
+    }
 }

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/background.rs

@@ -487,7 +487,12 @@ fn scan_local_once(
         }
     };
 
-    let excludes = localindex::default_excludes(mountpoint, &dirs.state_dir(), &dirs.cache_dir());
+    let mut excludes =
+        localindex::default_excludes(mountpoint, &dirs.state_dir(), &dirs.cache_dir());
+    // Resolved per scan rather than once at startup: mounts come and go, and a
+    // mount that appeared since the daemon started is exactly the one most
+    // likely to be a half-alive network filesystem (see `nested_mount_points`).
+    excludes.extend(localindex::nested_mount_points(&home));
     indexing.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
     let started = Instant::now();
 
@@ -541,6 +546,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/drain.rs

@@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
 
+use futures::StreamExt;
 use pdfs_core::batch;
 use pdfs_core::cache::{Baseline, StagedWrite};
 use pdfs_core::control::{ActivityKind, TransferDirection};
 use pdfs_core::db::{OP_CREATE, OP_MKDIR, OP_RENAME, OP_REVISION, OP_TRASH, PendingOp, RenameMeta};
-use proton_drive_rs::Node;
+use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::error::ProtonError;
 use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::ids::NodeUid;
+use proton_drive_rs::{Node, NodeMoveItem};
 use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
 
 use super::state::Intervals;
@@ -642,61 +644,46 @@ impl Core {
                 return Ok(());
             }
         };
-        // The name half goes first, so that a collision on the move half below is
+        let landed = if node.parent_uid.as_ref() == Some(&parent) {
-        // about the name the node will actually land under rather than the one it
+            self.drain_rename_in_place(&uid, &node.name, &name)?
-        // is about to lose.
+        } else {
-        let mut landed = node.name.clone();
+            // Move and rename land as one request (`move-multiple` takes a
-        if landed != name {
+            // target name), so there is no half-applied state between them and
-            match self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &name, None)) {
+            // no window for the requirements to go stale between two calls —
-                Ok(()) => landed = name.clone(),
+            // the race B46 queued this op to get away from.
-                // Someone took the name while we were offline. Renaming to a
+            let target = (node.name != name).then_some(name.as_str());
+            match self.move_renaming(&uid, &parent, target) {
+                Ok(()) => name.clone(),
+                // The destination holds that name already. Landing under a
                 // *different* name is the non-destructive resolution: it neither
                 // clobbers their file nor drops ours, and it is visible.
                 Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
                     let alt = conflict_name(&name, now_secs());
-                    warn!(%uid, name, alt, "rename target name is taken; using a conflict name");
+                    warn!(%uid, name, alt, "destination already holds that name; using a conflict name");
-                    self.rt
+                    self.move_renaming(&uid, &parent, Some(&alt))?;
-                        .block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &alt, None))?;
-                    landed = alt.clone();
                     self.adopt_drained_name(&uid, &alt);
                     self.log_activity(
                         ActivityKind::Rename,
                         &name,
-                        format!("name was taken remotely; renamed to {alt}"),
-                        false,
-                    );
-                }
-                Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
-            }
-        }
-        if node.parent_uid.as_ref() != Some(&parent) {
-            match self.rt.block_on(self.client.move_node(&uid, &parent)) {
-                Ok(()) => {}
-                // The destination holds a `landed` of its own. Same resolution as
-                // a name collision, and it has to happen before the move: the API
-                // has no move-and-rename, so the node is renamed out of the way
-                // here and moved second.
-                Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
-                    let alt = conflict_name(&landed, now_secs());
-                    warn!(%uid, name = %landed, alt, "destination already holds that name; using a conflict name");
-                    self.rt
-                        .block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &alt, None))?;
-                    self.rt.block_on(self.client.move_node(&uid, &parent))?;
-                    self.adopt_drained_name(&uid, &alt);
-                    self.log_activity(
-                        ActivityKind::Rename,
-                        &landed,
                         format!("destination already had that name; moved as {alt}"),
                         false,
                     );
+                    alt
                 }
                 // The destination folder is gone. Leaving the node in its current
                 // parent is the honest outcome: it is not where the user asked for
-                // it, but it exists, it is where it has always been, and the
+                // it, but it exists and it is where it has always been. The name
-                // rename half above still applied. Retrying could only fail again
+                // the user chose still applies there. Retrying the move could
-                // — the folder is not coming back — and would wedge the queue.
+                // only fail again — the folder is not coming back — and would
+                // wedge the queue.
                 Err(e) if is_gone(&e) => {
-                    warn!(%uid, name = %landed, %parent, "move destination is gone; leaving the node where it is");
+                    warn!(%uid, name, %parent, "move destination is gone; leaving the node where it is");
+                    let landed = match self.drain_rename_in_place(&uid, &node.name, &name) {
+                        Ok(landed) => landed,
+                        // The node went with it; nothing is left to rename.
+                        Err(e) if is_gone(&e) => node.name.clone(),
+                        Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+                    };
                     self.log_activity(
                         ActivityKind::Rename,
                         &landed,
@@ -704,16 +691,73 @@ impl Core {
                             .to_string(),
                         false,
                     );
+                    landed
                 }
                 Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
             }
-        }
+        };
         self.db.delete_op(op.id)?;
         self.note_self_change(&uid);
         info!(%uid, name = %landed, "pending rename landed");
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Rename `uid` without moving it, from `current` to `name`, and return the
+    /// name it landed under. Someone may have taken the name while we were
+    /// offline; the node then lands under a conflict name instead.
+    fn drain_rename_in_place(
+        &self,
+        uid: &NodeUid,
+        current: &str,
+        name: &str,
+    ) -> Result<String, ProtonError> {
+        if current == name {
+            return Ok(current.to_string());
+        }
+        match self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(uid, name, None)) {
+            Ok(()) => Ok(name.to_string()),
+            Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
+                let alt = conflict_name(name, now_secs());
+                warn!(%uid, name, alt, "rename target name is taken; using a conflict name");
+                self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(uid, &alt, None))?;
+                self.adopt_drained_name(uid, &alt);
+                self.log_activity(
+                    ActivityKind::Rename,
+                    name,
+                    format!("name was taken remotely; renamed to {alt}"),
+                    false,
+                );
+                Ok(alt)
+            }
+            Err(e) => Err(e),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Move `uid` under `parent` in one request, renaming it to `target_name` on
+    /// the way when one is given.
+    fn move_renaming(
+        &self,
+        uid: &NodeUid,
+        parent: &NodeUid,
+        target_name: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtonError> {
+        let item = NodeMoveItem {
+            uid: uid.clone(),
+            target_name: target_name.map(str::to_string),
+        };
+        self.rt.block_on(async {
+            let mut outcomes =
+                std::pin::pin!(self.client.move_nodes_streaming(vec![item], parent.clone()));
+            match outcomes.next().await {
+                Some(Ok((_, outcome))) => outcome,
+                Some(Err(e)) => Err(e),
+                None => Err(ProtonError::invalid_operation(format!(
+                    "move of {uid} reported no outcome"
+                ))),
+            }
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Apply a queued trash to the remote.
     ///
     /// A node that is already gone is a success, not a failure: the outcome the
@@ -1587,6 +1631,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -1879,6 +1925,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs

@@ -3738,6 +3738,9 @@ impl Core {
                 // My own tree: a role only means something under a share, and
                 // this listing never crosses into one.
                 role: String::new(),
+                shared_by: String::new(),
+                shared_at: 0,
+                shared_by_unverified: false,
             })
             .collect())
     }
@@ -4319,6 +4322,9 @@ impl Core {
                 uid: item.uid,
                 path: String::new(),
                 role: String::new(),
+                shared_by: String::new(),
+                shared_at: 0,
+                shared_by_unverified: false,
             })
             .collect())
     }
@@ -4994,6 +5000,8 @@ fn local_node(uid: NodeUid, parent_uid: NodeUid, name: String, is_dir: bool) ->
         album: None,
         // Nothing signed it: it has never been near the crypto layer.
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -5918,6 +5926,8 @@ mod pending_size_tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -7128,6 +7138,9 @@ mod tests {
                 share_id,
                 membership_id: ShareMembershipId::from("membership"),
                 permissions,
+                invite_time: None,
+                inviter_email: None,
+                inviter_verification: None,
             });
             node
         };
@@ -7588,6 +7601,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 }

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sharing.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ use pdfs_core::{CoreError, CoreResult};
 use tracing::debug;
 
 use crate::QUOTA_TTL;
+use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::crypto::VerificationStatus;
 use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::ids::NodeUid;
 use proton_drive_rs::{MemberRole, NodeKind};
 
@@ -47,6 +48,18 @@ fn shared_entry_of(core: &Core, n: Node) -> DirEntry {
         .map(role_to_str)
         .unwrap_or_default()
         .to_string();
+    let invitation = n.membership.as_ref();
+    let shared_by = invitation
+        .and_then(|m| m.inviter_email.clone())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let shared_at = invitation.and_then(|m| m.invite_time).unwrap_or(0);
+    // Only a signature that is present and wrong is a warning. An invitation
+    // that could not be checked — unsigned, or no keys for the claimed inviter —
+    // is not evidence of forgery, and flagging every such share would teach the
+    // user to ignore the flag.
+    let shared_by_unverified = invitation
+        .and_then(|m| m.inviter_verification)
+        .is_some_and(|status| status == VerificationStatus::Failed);
     DirEntry {
         name: n.name,
         is_dir,
@@ -57,6 +70,9 @@ fn shared_entry_of(core: &Core, n: Node) -> DirEntry {
         path: core.rel_path_for_uid(&n.uid).unwrap_or_default(),
         uid: n.uid.to_string(),
         role,
+        shared_by,
+        shared_at,
+        shared_by_unverified,
     }
 }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/state.rs

@@ -1120,6 +1120,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -1128,6 +1130,9 @@ mod tests {
             share_id: ShareId::from("share"),
             membership_id: ShareMembershipId::from("membership"),
             permissions,
+            invite_time: None,
+            inviter_email: None,
+            inviter_verification: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sweep.rs

@@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/virtual.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ pub(crate) fn virtual_node(parent_uid: NodeUid, name: String, timestamp: i64) ->
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     }
 }
 

crates/pdfs-gui/Cargo.toml

@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ anyhow.workspace = true
 tokio.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
-ksni = "0.2"
+ksni = { version = "0.3", features = ["blocking"] }
-gtk4 = { version = "0.9", features = ["v4_12"] }
+gtk4 = { version = "0.11", features = ["v4_12"] }
-adw = { package = "libadwaita", version = "0.7", features = ["v1_5"] }
+adw = { package = "libadwaita", version = "0.9", features = ["v1_5"] }
 async-channel = "2"
 exif = { version = "0.6", package = "kamadak-exif" }
-webkit6 = "0.4"
+webkit6 = "0.6"

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/browser.rs

@@ -2345,6 +2345,9 @@ pub(crate) fn repaint_search(ui: &Rc<Ui>, hits: &[SearchHit]) {
             uid: h.uid.clone(),
             path: h.path.clone(),
             role: String::new(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
         })
         .collect();
     entries.sort_by(|a, b| {

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/shared.rs

@@ -309,6 +309,17 @@ fn shared_entry_row(ui: &Rc<Ui>, entry: &DirEntry) -> adw::ActionRow {
     if let Some(badge) = role_badge(&entry.role) {
         row.add_suffix(&badge);
     }
+    // The "shared by" in the subtitle is what the invitation claims. When its
+    // signature does not check out against that person's keys, the claim must
+    // not read as fact — someone may be impersonating a contact to get a file
+    // opened.
+    if entry.shared_by_unverified {
+        let warning = gtk4::Image::from_icon_name("dialog-warning-symbolic");
+        warning.add_css_class("warning");
+        warning.set_valign(gtk4::Align::Center);
+        warning.set_tooltip_text(Some(UNVERIFIED_INVITER_TOOLTIP));
+        row.add_suffix(&warning);
+    }
     row.add_prefix(&file_thumbnail(ui, entry, 40, 24, true));
     let ui_act = ui.clone();
     let uid = entry.uid.clone();
@@ -329,12 +340,29 @@ fn shared_entry_row(ui: &Rc<Ui>, entry: &DirEntry) -> adw::ActionRow {
     row
 }
 
-/// A shared row's subtitle: its size (files only), and where it can be reached
+/// Tooltip on the warning shown next to a share whose invitation did not verify.
-/// in the local mount once the synthetic `Shared with me/` directory has interned
+const UNVERIFIED_INVITER_TOOLTIP: &str = "The invitation's signature doesn't match the sender's keys. \
-/// it. An unlisted share has no local path yet, and says nothing rather than
+     It may not really be from them.";
-/// pointing at a directory that is not there.
+
+/// A shared row's subtitle: who shared it and when (share roots only — that is
+/// where the invitation lives), its size (files only), and where it can be
+/// reached in the local mount once the synthetic `Shared with me/` directory has
+/// interned it. An unlisted share has no local path yet, and says nothing rather
+/// than pointing at a directory that is not there.
 pub(crate) fn shared_row_subtitle(entry: &DirEntry) -> String {
     let mut parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    if !entry.shared_by.is_empty() {
+        let date = if entry.shared_at > 0 {
+            format_modified(entry.shared_at)
+        } else {
+            String::new()
+        };
+        parts.push(if date.is_empty() {
+            format!("Shared by {}", entry.shared_by)
+        } else {
+            format!("Shared by {} on {date}", entry.shared_by)
+        });
+    }
     if !entry.is_dir {
         parts.push(human_bytes(entry.size));
     }
@@ -723,9 +751,25 @@ mod tests {
             uid: "vol~link".into(),
             path: path.into(),
             role: role.into(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn a_share_root_says_who_shared_it() {
+        let mut root = entry(true, "", "viewer");
+        root.shared_by = "alice@proton.me".into();
+        assert_eq!(shared_row_subtitle(&root), "Shared by alice@proton.me");
+        root.shared_at = 1_700_000_000;
+        let subtitle = shared_row_subtitle(&root);
+        assert!(
+            subtitle.starts_with("Shared by alice@proton.me on "),
+            "{subtitle}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn a_share_with_no_local_path_says_nothing_about_one() {
         // Before the synthetic directory has been listed, the daemon cannot

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/shared_by_me.rs

@@ -293,5 +293,8 @@ pub(crate) fn shared_item_as_entry(item: &SharedItem) -> DirEntry {
         path: item.path.clone(),
         // Shared *by* me: I own it, so there is no role of mine to report.
         role: String::new(),
+        shared_by: String::new(),
+        shared_at: 0,
+        shared_by_unverified: false,
     }
 }

crates/pdfs-gui/src/main.rs

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ use std::process::Command;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use ksni::blocking::TrayMethods;
 use ksni::menu::StandardItem;
-use ksni::{MenuItem, Tray, TrayService};
+use ksni::{MenuItem, Tray};
 use pdfs_core::auth;
 use pdfs_core::config::AppDirs;
 use pdfs_core::control::{
@@ -282,13 +283,13 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
         state: poll_state(&socket, &default_mountpoint),
     };
 
-    let service = TrayService::new(tray);
+    // The tray autostarts with the session and can beat the desktop's SNI
-    let handle = service.handle();
+    // watcher onto the bus. Without `assume_sni_available` that race is a hard
-    std::thread::spawn(move || {
+    // spawn error; with it the item waits and registers once the watcher shows.
-        if let Err(e) = service.run() {
+    let handle = tray
-            tracing::error!("tray service stopped: {e:?}");
+        .assume_sni_available(true)
-        }
+        .spawn()
-    });
+        .context("start tray service")?;
 
     // Poll the daemon forever, pushing each fresh snapshot into the tray so the
     // menu reflects mount/login changes made elsewhere (e.g. via the CLI).

crates/pdfs-gui/src/prompt.rs

@@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ fn icon_for(name: &str, is_dir: bool) -> gio::Icon {
     if is_dir {
         return gio::ThemedIcon::new("folder").upcast();
     }
-    let (content_type, _uncertain) = gio::functions::content_type_guess(Some(name), &[]);
+    let (content_type, _uncertain) = gio::functions::content_type_guess(Some(name), None);
     gio::functions::content_type_get_icon(&content_type)
 }
 

docs/BUGS.md

@@ -12,6 +12,79 @@ Conventions:
 
 ---
 
+## B90 — The local-file indexer walks into foreign FUSE mounts, and a dead one makes the daemon unkillable
+
+**Status:** Fixed (unverified) — the walker no longer stats a nested mountpoint. The stuck-daemon
+half cannot be fixed in userspace at all; see "Why there is no second line of defence".
+**Found:** 2026-09-16, from a user report of `systemctl --user restart` failing in a loop.
+**Where:** `crates/pdfs-core/src/localindex.rs` (`default_excludes`, `scan`),
+`crates/pdfs-fuse/src/background.rs` (`scan_local_once`).
+
+**Symptom.** Stopping the service times out, SIGKILL does not help, and every subsequent start
+fails with `another Proton Drive daemon is already using .../cache.db`:
+
+```
+systemd[2196]: proton-drive.service: State 'final-sigterm' timed out. Killing.
+systemd[2196]: proton-drive.service: Killing process 2221 (pdfs) with signal SIGKILL.
+systemd[2196]: proton-drive.service: Processes still around after final SIGKILL. Entering failed mode.
+systemd[2196]: proton-drive.service: Unit process 2221 (pdfs) remains running after unit stopped.
+pdfs[73921]: ERROR mount failed; retrying in 5s error="open cache db: another Proton Drive daemon
+             is already using /home/narl/.local/state/proton-drive-linux/cache.db"
+```
+
+**Diagnosis.** The surviving process is a zombie that still has a live thread:
+
+```
+$ cat /proc/2221/status | grep -E 'State|Threads'
+State:  Z (zombie)
+Threads: 2
+$ cat /proc/2221/task/73231/comm; cat /proc/2221/task/73231/stack
+pdfs-localindex
+request_wait_answer
+```
+
+`pdfs-localindex` is parked in a FUSE request nobody will answer, in uninterruptible `D` state, so
+it ignores SIGKILL. The thread group leader exits, the thread does not, the process cannot be
+reaped — and it keeps the `cache.db` lock, which is what turns one stuck scan into a permanent
+restart loop. The same dead connection also blocked an unrelated `duf` in `fuse_statfs`
+(`/sys/fs/fuse/connections/69/waiting` was 2).
+
+**Cause.** `scan_local_once` walks `$HOME`, and `default_excludes` only excluded the Drive
+mountpoint plus our own state and cache dirs. The reporter's home also held
+`~/remote/narl.io` (sshfs) and `~/remote/gdrive` (rclone) — third-party FUSE mounts the walk
+descends into.
+
+`scan` does set `same_file_system(true)`, which looks like it should already cover this. It does
+not: in `ignore` 0.4.33 the check is `is_same_file_system` → `device_num(path)` →
+`path.metadata()` (`walk.rs:2164`), i.e. **a stat of the mountpoint**, performed in `run_one`
+*after* the directory has been queued. To discover that a mount is foreign, the walker first has
+to touch it. Against a network FUSE mount whose server is gone, that stat never returns.
+
+**Fix.** `localindex::nested_mount_points` reads `/proc/self/mounts` and returns every mountpoint
+strictly below the scan root; `scan_local_once` appends those to the excludes. `filter_entry` runs
+before the device stat (`walk.rs:1926`, before `send`), so a path-only rejection keeps the walker
+from ever touching the mount. Mountpoint fields are octal-unescaped, because a `\040` left in
+place would silently fail to match and put the mount back in the walk. Re-read per scan, not
+cached at startup: a mount that appeared since the daemon started is the likeliest to be a
+half-alive network filesystem.
+
+This changes nothing about what gets indexed. A nested mount is a different device, so
+`same_file_system(true)` was always going to skip it — the exclude only removes the stat that had
+to happen first.
+
+**Why there is no second line of defence.** Once a thread is in uninterruptible FUSE wait, no
+userspace change rescues it: not a join timeout, not `std::process::exit`, not SIGKILL. The kernel
+will not reap the task until the syscall returns, which needs someone to answer the request or
+abort the connection (`echo 1 > /sys/fs/fuse/connections/<id>/abort`, root-only). Avoiding entry is
+the entire fix. That makes any *new* code path that stats a user-supplied or mount-crossing path
+from a daemon thread a repeat of this bug — mirror-folder scanning is the obvious next candidate.
+
+**Recovery for an already-wedged daemon.** As root, abort the connection with waiters
+(`grep . /sys/fs/fuse/connections/*/waiting` finds it), which releases the thread, lets the zombie
+be reaped and frees the `cache.db` lock. A reboot also clears it.
+
+---
+
 ## B89 — The recorded SDK dependency is three minor versions out of date in the working memory
 
 **Status:** Open — documentation only, but it misdirects every reader of the SDK code.
@@ -2650,6 +2723,16 @@ collisions without losing the source. Simple rename-only and move-only calls
 remain synchronous. The managed live suite subsequently passed the replacement
 and combined move/rename cases.
 
+**Follow-up (2026-09-15, unverified):** With SDK 0.6.3 the drain sends the
+move and the rename as one `move-multiple` request carrying the target name,
+instead of renaming in the source folder and then moving. That removes the
+second call the stale requirements could hit, and the SDK retries a remaining
+`InvalidRequirements` once with the server's current name hash. A destination
+name collision now moves under a conflict name in one step. Same-folder renames
+are unchanged. The synchronous FUSE `rename` path (`serve_rename`) still renames
+then moves with its bounded retry and has not been converted. Needs a managed
+live run of the combined move/rename cases.
+
 ---
 
 ## B47 — FUSE Accepts Path Components Longer Than NAME_MAX

docs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -11,7 +11,99 @@ scratch (user data in `staging/` and `recovery/` is never touched by this).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
-No schema change.
+Nothing yet.
+
+## [1.10.2] — 2026-09-16
+
+Fixes a daemon that could not be stopped or restarted. No schema change.
+Schema: **28**; no SDK change.
+
+### Fixed
+- **A dead network mount in your home directory no longer wedges the daemon (B90).** The
+  "This computer" file indexer walked `$HOME` and descended into other FUSE mounts — an sshfs
+  whose server had gone away, an unresponsive rclone. Stat'ing one of those blocks
+  uninterruptibly, so the indexer thread stopped responding to SIGKILL, the daemon could never
+  exit, `systemctl --user stop` timed out, and the half-dead process kept the cache database lock
+  that the next start needed: every restart then failed with "another Proton Drive daemon is
+  already using cache.db". The indexer now skips mountpoints below your home directory by path,
+  without touching them. Nothing changes about which files are indexed — those mounts were always
+  excluded from the results, just not before they had been stat'ed.
+
+## [1.10.1] — 2026-09-15
+
+Dependency upgrade release, clearing both open Dependabot advisories. No schema change.
+Schema: **28**; SDK bumped to `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` **0.6.4**.
+
+### Security
+- **`lru` IterMut Stacked Borrows advisory.** The SDK now depends on `lru` 0.18.
+- **`atty` unaligned read advisory.** The tray moved to `ksni` 0.3, which no longer pulls
+  `dbus-codegen` → `clap` 2 → `atty`.
+
+### Changed
+- **Keyring backend is `keyring-core` + `dbus-secret-service-keyring-store`** (keyring 4's split).
+  Same libdbus Secret Service as before; stored sessions written by earlier releases are still
+  found, so no re-login is needed.
+- **The tray waits for a late StatusNotifierWatcher** instead of failing to start when it beats
+  the desktop's tray host onto the session bus.
+- Upgraded `gtk4` 0.11, `libadwaita` 0.9, `webkit6` 0.6, `rusqlite` 0.40 (bundled SQLite),
+  `fuser` 0.18, `directories` 6, `sha1`/`sha2` 0.11, `base64` 0.23.
+
+## [1.10.0] — 2026-09-15
+
+One-request move-and-rename in the drain, and who shared an item with you. No schema change.
+Schema: **28**; SDK bumped to `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` **0.6.3**.
+
+### Added
+- **Shared with me says who shared an item, and when.** The GUI row subtitle and `pdfs
+  shared-with-me` show the inviter and invite date for a share root. The invitation's signature is
+  checked against the claimed inviter's keys; when it does not verify, the GUI shows a warning
+  and the CLI prints one, since the sender may be forged. `DirEntry` gains `shared_by`,
+  `shared_at` and `shared_by_unverified` (defaulted, so older front-ends and daemons interoperate).
+
+### Changed
+- **A queued move-and-rename lands as one request.** `drain_rename` used to rename in the source
+  folder and then move, with a rename-out-of-the-way step when the destination held the name. It
+  now calls `move-multiple` with a target name, so there is no half-applied state between the two
+  halves and no second call for the encrypted-name requirements to go stale against (B46). A
+  rename that stays in the same folder still uses the rename endpoint.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Moving a node with no signature email no longer fails.** Such nodes (created anonymously, e.g.
+  through a public link) need the passphrase signed by the mover; SDK 0.6.3 sends that signature.
+- **A node trashed through the newer API field is recognised as trashed.** The SDK now reads
+  `TrashTime` as well as the legacy `Trashed` field, so the drain no longer tries to rename a node
+  that is already in the trash.
+
+## [1.9.3] — 2026-09-01
+
+The daemon's wait-for-login loop, and the latency that fixing it introduced. No schema change.
+Schema: **28**; SDK unchanged at `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` **0.6.2**.
+
+### Fixed
+- **An enabled service with no saved session no longer polls the keyring 28,800 times a day.**
+  `wait_for_session` slept a flat 3 s between checks, and a check is not just a sleep — `auth::load`
+  builds a fresh `keyring::Entry`, so every iteration opened a new D-Bus connection to the Secret
+  Service and negotiated a session on it. The wait now backs off, and "not logged in" is said once
+  at `info` instead of on every pass, which also stops the journal filling with tens of thousands
+  of identical lines (`#21`).
+- **Signing in wakes the parked daemon instead of leaving the mount up to an interval late.** The
+  backoff had no wake-up path: a unit started at boot reaches the ceiling within ~90 s, and
+  `enable --now` is a no-op on an already-active unit, so the GUI login and the tray's Connect left
+  it sleeping. `service::enable_start` now runs `enable` + `restart`, which interrupts the sleep and
+  still starts a unit that is down, and `pdfs login` restarts the unit when it is already active —
+  deliberately without touching `enable`, so a headless setup driving `pdfs daemon` by hand is left
+  alone. The ceiling also drops from 60 s to 15 s, still an 80% cut in keyring/D-Bus wakeups
+  (28,800/day → 5,760/day), bounding the worst case for paths that never reach systemd.
+
+### Changed
+- The wait is extracted into `wait_for_session()`, taking the load and sleep calls as parameters,
+  so the schedule is testable without a keyring and without real time passing.
+
+## [1.9.2] — 2026-08-28
+
+Repair for photos a Takeout import filed under the day they were imported, an `fzf` launcher front
+end, and a gallery that survives 1,600 photos on one date. No schema change. Schema: **28**; SDK
+`proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` **0.6.2**.
 
 ### Added
 - **`pdfs redate-photos`: repair photos filed under the day they were imported.** A Takeout whose
@@ -621,6 +713,8 @@ First stable release: FUSE files-on-demand mount, sync daemon under `proton-driv
 - The outstanding FUSE defects tracked in `docs/BUGS.md`, plus a truncate defect, validated
   by a new POSIX compliance suite for the filesystem.
 
+[1.9.3]: https://github.com/narrrl/proton-drive-linux/releases/tag/v1.9.3
+[1.9.2]: https://github.com/narrrl/proton-drive-linux/releases/tag/v1.9.2
 [1.9.1]: https://github.com/narrrl/proton-drive-linux/releases/tag/v1.9.1
 [1.9.0]: https://github.com/narrrl/proton-drive-linux/releases/tag/v1.9.0
 [1.8.2]: https://github.com/narrrl/proton-drive-linux/releases/tag/v1.8.2

packaging/PKGBUILD

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 # Build + install:   cd packaging && makepkg -fi
 
 pkgname=proton-drive-linux
-pkgver=1.9.3
+pkgver=1.10.2
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Unofficial Proton Drive client for Linux: files-on-demand FUSE mount, CLI, GTK4 app + tray"
 arch=('x86_64')