A partial write whose base was not in the content cache queued an
incomplete revision, and every write open over it was refused with EIO
until the drain uploaded it. CI's one-client-lan simulation hit this on
seed 1: a create over a file whose partial edit had not drained yet.
The write open now copies the blob and fills its gaps from the remote
base with Core::fill_gaps, as the drain does, and fails only when that
fill fails (B204).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EuyxByBpK3fSWtyPkugeHz
A rotation the keyring refused was retried and kept in the kernel
keyring, but only the log said so, and a reboot before the keyring took
it still signed the user out.
`Response::Status` carries `tokens_unsaved` while one waits. The tray
says "Sign-in not saved — unlock your keyring" and needs attention, the
app's status says the same, `pdfs status` prints a Keyring line and
`pdfs diagnose` warns. New strings are translated in every catalog
(B61).
`pdfs unlock` resumes the daemon's session and may refresh it. The
daemon then holds a spent refresh token, and since B202 a refusal of it
read as an expired session although the keyring held a live one.
Before calling a refused session expired, compare the keyring with what
this process last stored. When it holds a newer rotation or another
login, end the mount with `MountOutcome::ResumeStored` and mount again
from the keyring. A rotation another process already wrote counts as
this session's, so the daemon keeps writing its later ones (B203).
A refresh token Proton refused, or a deleted or disabled account, was
treated as a lost connection: the mount came up "offline", the probe
retried forever and logged only at debug, and nothing told the user that
only signing in again helps (issue #35).
session_revoked() names those errors. The root fetch, probe, drain,
event poll, event seed and photos root now set session_expired, log one
warning naming `pdfs login`, and stop retrying. Cached files stay
readable and changes stay queued.
Response::Status carries session_expired (serde default false). The
tray shows "Session expired — sign in again" with a Sign In Again…
item that opens the app's sign-in page; the app's status and Sync card
say the same with a button. `pdfs status` and `pdfs diagnose` report it.
New strings are translated in every catalog.
docs/BUGS.md B202.
Offline or paused, a drain worker claims nothing and then slept until the
earliest queued op fell due. Every queued op was already due and nothing
attempted it, so the wait was zero and all 16 workers spun on the queue
for the whole outage (issue #35: 17 min of CPU in 2 min 16 s).
A worker that claims nothing now sleeps the full idle poll; a reconnect
or resume wakes it. earliest_due_at also uses the claim's exclusions, so
an op held behind a claimed op on the same node no longer counts as due.
docs/BUGS.md B200.
Stop Sharing removes the link, invitations and members but cannot delete
the share itself, and Drive keeps listing the empty share until its
backend removes it, minutes later.
The daemon now leaves a share with no member, invitation or link out of
the listing (unless a lookup failed, so a live share is never hidden),
and the app drops stopped items from the page as soon as the requests
succeed instead of waiting for the slow reload.
Every mirror pass, the two-minute poll included, reported a "Checking
{folder}" job, and the tray took any job for syncing, so its icon spun
every two minutes over folders with nothing to do.
JobItem gains a background flag (absent from older daemons, so false)
for housekeeping that changes nothing in the user's files: a pass still
scanning, the home index rebuild and the cache integrity check. The tray
keeps them in its menu line but only turns busy for transfers or a job
that is not background; a pass that queues work becomes a Syncing job
and still spins the icon.
The watcher also reconciles only the folder an event lies in, instead of
walking every mirror folder over one edit.
An unreadable subfolder, such as a container's root-owned cache, failed
every pass of its synced folder, so nothing else in the tree reached
Drive (#33, B196). The scan now leaves such a path out, together with an
entry that vanished mid-scan and a name that is not UTF-8, and the pass
drops everything under it from classification, the wipe guard and the
push pass's deletions. It is never read as deleted and never downloaded
into. An unreadable or absent root still fails the pass. The activity
feed names unreadable paths once each time the set changes.
Two related bugs on the way to online-only:
- The push pass read deletions from the raw baseline, so a synced path
that later became ignored was trashed on Drive (B197).
- The switch evicted everything once the folder was idle, including
ignored paths such as .git/, symlinks, unreadable folders and files
changed after the pass, none of which are on Drive (B198). It now
refuses and names the path.
Closes#33
A user switching from a Windows PC to Linux had two half answers:
adopting the old device makes this machine back up as it, and restoring
its folders keeps them in the old device's tree. Neither puts the data
under this machine's own device.
Device roots are separate shares on the main volume, so each top-level
folder of the other device can move under this device's root in one
server-side move. Nothing is uploaded again, and the other device stays
registered, without those folders.
- core: `Request::MigrateDevice { uid }` and
`Db::sync_folder_set_share`
- fuse: `Core::migrate_device` moves every folder, suffixes a name
already taken here with the other device's name, keeps going past a
failed folder, and re-points sync folders that already tracked a
moved folder at the new share
- cli: `pdfs devices migrate UID [--yes]` confirms, moves, then runs
the ordinary restore picker
- gui: "Move to This Computer…" on another computer's row, followed by
the restore picker
- i18n: translate the new strings in every catalog
- docs: CLI.md, USER_GUIDE.md, RECOVERY.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, changelog
The watchdog is armed when the process starts, but only the mount's supervisor
pinged it. A daemon waiting for a login or backing off after a failed mount
(#26: key unlock failing) was aborted after WatchdogSec and left a coredump
instead of its error. Sleep through idle_sleep in those stretches; the mounted
ping still has to pass the control-socket probe.
66 comments cited `bugs.md B<n>`, the ledger's old name; they now say
`docs/BUGS.md B<n>`, and every cited number has an entry. About 90 more
cited offline.md, devices.md, features.md, mount-architecture.md,
plan.md and improvements.md, planning notes that were never in the
repository. Those citations are removed; the comments keep their text.
ARCHITECTURE.md described the 2.x write path, where namespace changes
waited for Drive and every mount had its own inode space. Rewrite it
around the local tree (lid, inode = lid + 1, local~<lid> stand-ins), the
queue and its 16 drain workers, sync issues, and the remaining split
between the mount and the mirror engine. Drop the pins.json claim; pins
moved into the database at schema v5.
TESTING.md gains the simulation runs and loses the per-case narrative
that --list and BUGS.md already carry. ROADMAP.md takes over the
post-3.0.0 items from the milestone status file.
Remove MILESTONE-3.0.0-STATUS.md (a working log) and UI_UX_PLAN.md (the
2.x design audit). Code comments and CI that cited the untracked
docs/MILESTONE-3.0.0.md now point at TESTING.md, ARCHITECTURE.md and
ROADMAP.md. Threat-model links follow the section to §10.
The confirmation run on 812eb3d (PDFS_SIM_KNOWN=fail, twelve seeds)
passed every profile, so no open bug is tolerated any more: the call,
hang and damage matchers for B125 to B134 go, and any of them now fails
the seed. B126, B128 and B133 were fixed with B138, B162 and B137;
B134 stays open with local_first off only, which the runs do not mount.
The known-bug confirmation run failed one_client_on_a_flaky_link seeds 6
and 11 on three bugs around a create whose answer was lost:
- B182: after a restart, a write over a file whose create landed but was
never read back forked a conflict copy. A revision of a file that has
no revision of Drive's now adopts the landed node first.
- B183: the SHA-1s a create sent were kept in memory, so after a restart
its trash or retry no longer knew the node Drive made. They are now on
the op's row (pending_op.sent_sha1, schema 42).
- B184: a rename rewrote the op's target, and the trash and the retry
looked for the node under the last name only. Each attempt's parent
and name are recorded (pending_op.sent_to); the trash looks under all
of them, and a retry adopts the node an earlier attempt made and moves
it to the current name.
A refused change was only on the Sync page. A folder listing now carries
each node's issue (by local id, so a file not yet on Drive has it too),
and the browser's badge ranks it first, folders included, with the
issue's explanation as its tooltip. The event sampler publishes Files
when the set of issues changes, so the badge comes and goes with it.
A change Drive will not take could be exported or retried, never let go
of. The Sync page's Discard button (with a confirmation) and
`pdfs sync discard <id>` drop it: a node made here goes, as if deleted
before it was sent; a node Drive has goes back to what Drive has, under
the same inode, with every change queued on it, while what is queued
below it stays. A change on the wire or an open file is refused.
A file deleted after its create was sent keeps the op as a trash. The op
kept the create's attempts and backoff, and the drain recorded the failure
of a create attempt still on the wire on the row that was by then the trash.
The trash waited out the create's backoff.
The trash starts due, as a create that becomes a revision does, and the
drain records a failed attempt only if the op is still the kind it ran as
(`Db::record_attempt_failure`).
An upload that landed let go of its blob before the tree had its node. A
write open in between took the base it sampled at its start, the revision
the upload replaced, found none of its bytes cached, and queued an
incomplete revision; the next write open failed with EIO.
The drain keeps the landing node aside until the tree has it, and a write
open with no queued revision takes its base from that node, or from the
tree as it is when the handle goes in. The fake Drive can hold the drain
in that window (`hold_next_landing`).
A stop that came while a mirror pass was uploading let the pass go on to
the next level of folders until the stop gave up on it and the runtime's
end cancelled the uploads under it. Once the daemon is stopping, a batch
starts none of its waiting ops, lets the ones sending finish, and ends
the pass; the remote walk and a new pass stop too.
A delete of a file whose create was on the wire withdraws the create into
a trash. When its folder was removed too and that trash landed first,
Drive refused the create, and the drain re-homed the deleted file in the
root; only its missing bytes stopped it. The withdrawn create's trash
then read the trashed folder back into the cache before finding nothing
to trash.
A withdrawn create is no longer re-homed, and its trash is done once the
folder it was sent to is trashed or gone.
The hydrate rebuilt each listed folder's listing with a pass over every
entry. With 4,600 listed folders and 37,000 entries that took 1.7 s at
every start before the mount came up; one pass grouping the entries by
parent takes 3 ms.
The account run's 0-byte read of a new file was B166 too: Drive's
listing had the node from before its create was committed, and the
queue no longer held it when read. The fake Drive can now hold a
folder's listing on its way back with one file listed unrevised.
A listing from Drive was overlaid with the queue as it was after Drive
answered. A create that landed in between was in neither, and a wide
folder on Wi-Fi dropped files that were never unlinked. The queue is now
read before Drive is asked too; a node that left it meanwhile is listed
as the DB has it.
A stop joined every background thread for as long as each took. The sync
engine's mirror pass calls Drive with no deadline, and a stop that waited for
it was killed by systemd at TimeoutStopSec. The stop now waits up to 10 s for
the background threads and FUSE workers together, names any still running, and
the runtime shuts down within 2 s.
A listing from Drive overlays what is still queued for the folder. A create
Drive has made but whose answer is on its way, or which the drain is still
reading back, was in both: Drive's node under its new uid and the queue's
stand-in, under one name. A node queued in the folder now holds its name there.
A folder removed and made again met the old folder while its trash was on
the wire and adopted it, so the new folder's contents went into the old
one and were trashed with it. The twin search now skips hidden nodes, as
listings do.
The fake Drive can hold a trash (hold_next_trash).
adopt_real_uid asked whether a move was queued only after reading the
node back. A move that landed in between left no op, and the answer still
had the old name, so the mount showed the file under it. Ask first.
The fake Drive can hold a read's answer (hold_answer_to_next_read) so the
test can land the move while the answer is on its way.
Queueing a folder's create left the workers asleep until their 30 s idle
poll; every other enqueue woke them. A file's create still waits for the
release that attaches its bytes.
A lookup in the root publishes the "Shared with me" entry only if the root
listing did not change while its plan was read, and answered EAGAIN when it
had. Right after a restart the root is listed again as the first lookups come
in, so a write could fail with "Resource temporarily unavailable".
ensure_children now takes the listing again, up to four times.
When the read-back after an upload went unanswered, the drain let go of
the staged blob without caching it. A partial write opened next had
nothing to fill its gaps from and queued an incomplete revision, so the
write open after it was refused with EIO.
The bytes are now cached under the size and mtime the tree still has,
which is the base the next write takes. Their SHA-1 stands in for the
revision id the read-back did not bring, so that write chains onto the
upload and does not fork a conflict copy of itself.
Claude
nvrl