A camera that writes both puts two files on the volume, and the timeline showed
two tiles of the same photo. They are one shot to the person who took it.
Schema v30 records what ties them together: the server's own duplicate hash and
main-photo relation, plus a `group_key` every member of a shot carries. The key
is computed when the timeline is replaced, in three steps — the server relation
first, because it knows about live photos and bursts and we do not have to guess
at them; then same capture day, same file-name stem and one member raw while the
other is not, which is the pair a camera writes; otherwise the photo is its own
group. The member the grid shows is the non-raw one, since a JPEG decodes in
milliseconds and is what the person expects to see.
The gallery therefore pages by group and carries `group_size` and `has_raw` on
each entry, and the date scrubber counts what the page shows. The Raw tab is the
exception and still lists every raw file, because that tab exists to answer
"which raws do I have". Album pages are not grouped at all: an album is a list
someone made, and it shows exactly what they put in it.
`TimelineRow` is a struct now. It had grown to five positional fields and was
about to grow to seven, at which point nobody can read a call site.
The gallery could show photos and nothing else: a photo deleted on the phone
stayed on the page for minutes, and a photo you wanted gone had to be deleted
on another device. Both are now handled here.
Deleting needs a uid-addressed request, because `Request::Delete` takes a
mountpoint path and the photos volume is not in the FUSE mount. `TrashNodes`
trashes through the SDK and answers per-uid outcomes, so a partial failure is
reportable; the daemon then drops those rows with `Db::photos_delete`, album
membership included, rather than leaving the gallery to wait for the next
timeline refresh. The GUI removes the tiles immediately with an Undo toast and
puts back anything the server refused — the photos are in Proton's trash and
stay recoverable there either way. Selection is Ctrl/Shift+click, the Select
toggle or Delete in the lightbox.
Remote deletions arrive on their own now. The Drive volume and the photos
volume have separate event streams, so the photos volume gets its own poller
and its own cursor. Trash and delete events remove rows; anything else only
marks the timeline stale, because there is no inode space to converge on this
volume. With the timeline TTL down to 60 s and an explicit Refresh that waits
for the server instead of only clearing the freshness stamp, a photo deleted
elsewhere leaves the grid in about ten seconds.
The trash is a flat list of uids, but a delete has a shape: a folder, and
often items inside it that were trashed separately beforehand. Restoring
one of those in isolation is not what it means — a folder came back
without the contents deleted with it, and a file came back inside a
folder that is still trashed, which is to say nowhere the user can see.
- Schema 29: `trash.parent_uid`, filled by the trash refresh from the
node's parent, plus an index for the walk.
- `expand_restore` takes the connected piece of the trashed tree around
what was asked for (every trashed descendant, every trashed ancestor)
and orders it into waves, shallowest first: the server cannot put a
node back under a parent that is still trashed. A uid the listing does
not know about is restored on its own, because the listing is
materialised in chunks and can be stale.
- `Core::restore` restores wave by wave, still streaming per-node
outcomes, so one node the server refuses leaves the rest restored.
The SDK bump brings the 6cbf2f44 port: permanent API errors are no
longer retried on block transfers, expired block URLs are re-minted on
the whole-file and public-link download paths, and a server-supplied
Retry-After is capped at 120 s.
- A queued rename that also changes folder now lands as one `move-multiple`
request carrying the target name instead of rename-then-move, so there is
no half-applied state and no second call for stale name requirements to
hit (B46 follow-up). A destination name collision moves under a conflict
name in one step; same-folder renames still use the rename endpoint.
- Shared with me shows the inviter and invite date (GUI subtitle, `pdfs
shared-with-me`), with a warning when the invitation signature does not
verify against the claimed inviter's keys. `DirEntry` gains `shared_by`,
`shared_at` and `shared_by_unverified`, all serde-defaulted.
- Bump `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` to 0.6.3 (anonymous-node moves,
`TrashTime` trashed detection).
B69 — spurious `(sync-conflict)` copies came from `(mtime, size)` being used as a
revision identity. The server re-stamps a sealed revision with its own commit
time, so the drain diverted a write into a conflict copy of its own base; and
`plan_file` classified a no-baseline (local, remote) pair as `Conflict`, forking
every pre-existing file on first reconcile.
- `Baseline` carries `revision_id` (from the SDK's new `active_revision_id`),
captured at write-open and preserved across supersede/rebaseline.
`revision_changed` trusts the id and only falls back to `(mtime, size)` for
old sidecars.
- Planner gains `FilePlan::AdoptBaseline`: equal-size no-baseline pairs are
recorded, not conflicted. Divergent sizes stay a real conflict.
- New `sweep.rs` (`pdfs-conflict-sweep`, 5-min cadence) removes conflict copies
proven identical by size + `content_sha1` and surfaces divergent ones once as
an `ActivityKind::Conflict` entry. Never removes what it cannot prove.
B70 — browsers downloading into an on-demand mount had their in-flight temps
sealed as canonical revisions, exiling the finished file to a conflict copy.
`syncignore::is_transient_name` now recognises download/scratch temps, and the
on-demand `release`/`rename` paths hold them (`set_create_hold`) instead of
sealing until the name is finalized.
Workspace deps bumped to proton-sdk/proton-drive-rs 0.2.2 (registry, no patch).
Live validation against a real account still pending for both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V8P42asymU158CPnhjRwri
- Durable scratch/staging publication and preservation on failure.
- Transactional pending-operation supersession.
- Conflict copies cannot overwrite older copies or lose the source.
- Single-entry wipe protection and incomplete-scan aborts.
- Failed local deletion retains its baseline.
- Downloads are fsynced before baseline settlement.
- Future database schemas are refused.
- Event cursors advance only after successful invalidation and persistence.
- IPC frame, timeout, and concurrency limits.
- Atomic config saves; malformed configs are preserved.
- Sensitive directories require correct ownership, real directories, and 0700.
- Debian package now includes service and tray autostart files.
- Release workflow enforces versions, tests, lint, formatting, and offline acceptance.
- CI now runs offline filesystem acceptance.
- Standardize POSIX unlink (EISDIR) and rmdir (ENOTDIR/ENOTEMPTY) checks
- Defer local directory eviction in mode switch until FUSE mount verification succeeds
- Enforce fsync before atomic renames in ContentCache store operations
- Add directory ancestor loop check in rename (EINVAL)
- Implement punch_hole interval tracking in fallocate
- Purge un-created local node write revisions on unlink
- Fix control socket permission race with octal umask 0o77
- Add unit tests for state, DB, and FUSE POSIX logic (208/208 tests passing)
Verified against a live install: vacuum reported "34.3 MiB freed (170.3 MiB
-> 136.0 MiB), 0 WAL frame(s) checkpointed" while the WAL grew from 67 MiB to
143 MiB. Net disk use barely moved, and the frame count was zero because the
checkpoint ran before the VACUUM, when there was nothing to fold.
Reordering is strictly better, but the commit message should not overstate it:
the live inflation happens because the daemon's other connections hold read
transactions and a TRUNCATE checkpoint waits on readers, so under a busy
daemon this can still move little. journal_size_limit stays the backstop --
the live WAL did fall back to its 64 MiB cap on its own afterwards.
The accompanying test deliberately does not assert on WAL size or frame count.
Measured both ways, a single-connection test reports frames=0 and a 0-byte WAL
under either ordering, because SQLite folds the log itself without a
concurrent reader to block it; an assertion there would pass on the bug and be
decoration. It asserts what is reliably true instead -- that a file-backed
vacuum reclaims space and leaves the database sound -- and the ordering
rationale plus the residual uncertainty are documented on vacuum() itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JFzNQyb4TWrCRWcnegqWxY
A corrupt database or an oversized cache previously left the user with no
answer but "delete the state directory and re-sync", which for a large
account means re-downloading everything to fix a problem that may have been
a few stale rows.
pdfs diagnose reports on paths, keyring, daemon, and mountpoint, and exits
non-zero if any check fails so it works in a health check. Every check is
written to run with no daemon, because that is the situation it gets run in:
a stopped daemon is reported as a finding rather than aborting the report.
Writability is tested by writing, since permission bits say nothing about a
full disk or a read-only remount.
pdfs cache inspect reports database size, reclaimable space, per-table row
counts, and cache usage; --deep adds SQLite's integrity check, opt-in because
it reads every page. The report distinguishes "checked and clean" from "not
checked" rather than letting an empty problem list imply a clean bill of
health it never gave.
pdfs cache vacuum checkpoints the WAL and compacts the database.
Deliberately no orphaned-cache-row pruning: ContentCache::reconcile already
rebuilds the index from what is on disk at every open, so a second pass here
would duplicate it against a worse view of the truth. The WAL is likewise
left to journal_size_limit, which already caps it -- a periodic checkpoint
would paper over a problem that no longer exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JFzNQyb4TWrCRWcnegqWxY
relocate() called forget(), dropping the node's by_uid mapping, so
the re-enumeration assigned a fresh inode. The kernel had already
carried the renamed dentry onto the old one and holds it for the
entry TTL, so lookup/getattr/opendir resolved to an inode entries
no longer held and returned ENOENT — while readdir walked children
and reported the new inode. A renamed directory listed in its
parent but could not be entered until the TTL expired.
Rewrite the node in place and invalidate both parents' listings
instead. Also stops the moved node's DB row being deleted and
recreated on every move, which the B1 data-loss fix worked around
nvrl
