Logout only deleted the keyring entry, so the session's tokens stayed
valid on Proton's side. It now ends the session first (DELETE auth/v4,
bounded to 10 s) and signs out locally either way. `pdfs logout` says
when Proton could not be reached (B233).
A rotation the keyring refused was retried and kept in the kernel
keyring, but only the log said so, and a reboot before the keyring took
it still signed the user out.
`Response::Status` carries `tokens_unsaved` while one waits. The tray
says "Sign-in not saved — unlock your keyring" and needs attention, the
app's status says the same, `pdfs status` prints a Keyring line and
`pdfs diagnose` warns. New strings are translated in every catalog
(B61).
A rotation the Secret Service refused lived only in the daemon's
memory, so a crash or SIGKILL before the retry landed lost the only live
refresh token.
Keep it in the kernel keyring as well until it is written. The next
resume, by the daemon or `pdfs unlock`, puts it back in when the stored
blob still holds the refresh token it spent, and writes it; one left
over from an older login is dropped. `kernelkey` now holds named keys,
the passphrases and the unsaved tokens (B61).
`pdfs unlock` resumes the daemon's session and may refresh it. The
daemon then holds a spent refresh token, and since B202 a refusal of it
read as an expired session although the keyring held a live one.
Before calling a refused session expired, compare the keyring with what
this process last stored. When it holds a newer rotation or another
login, end the mount with `MountOutcome::ResumeStored` and mount again
from the keyring. A rotation another process already wrote counts as
this session's, so the daemon keeps writing its later ones (B203).
A failed keyring write after a refresh was only a warning, and the one
live refresh token then lived in memory only (B61). The sink now keeps
the rotation as unsaved and retries it in the background after 1 s, 5 s,
30 s and then every 5 minutes, until it is written or the blob has moved
on. The refusal is logged as an error naming `pdfs login`.
docs/BUGS.md B61.
Proton refresh tokens are single-use. store_tokens replaced the tokens of
whatever blob was stored, so after `pdfs login` restarted the daemon, the
old daemon's shutdown persist wrote its spent tokens into the new
session's blob, and the new daemon failed with InvalidRefreshToken
(issue #35). `pdfs unlock` and the legacy migration had the same shape.
Each session now writes through a TokenSink that only touches a blob
with its session id that still holds the refresh token it last left
there. Shutdown only flushes a rotation the keyring refused. unlock and
migrate_legacy re-read the blob after verifying.
docs/BUGS.md B201.
The verification window now runs in its own process, so the app survives
when WebKit cannot start its sandbox on secureblue, but the CAPTCHA still
could not be solved there (#29). WebKit binds the journal socket with
`--ro-bind-try`, bubblewrap only skips a missing path, not an unreadable
one, and WebKit has no switch to leave the socket out.
Proton Mail Bridge never uses a web view: it opens verify.proton.me in the
system browser and retries with the original challenge token, typed with
the offered methods. Do the same as a fallback.
- core: `browser_verification_url` and `browser_verified` build the page
URL and the retry credential from the challenge
- gui: when the verification window fails, a dialog opens the page in the
browser and continues the sign-in once the user is done
- cli: `pdfs login` handles a CAPTCHA the same way instead of failing
- i18n: translate the new dialog in every catalog
- docs: B195, TROUBLESHOOTING.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, changelog
Fixes#29
Every release sent the fixed `external-drive-linux@0.1.0-alpha`. If Proton
ever retires that version, every release fails sign-in at once and no update
can fix it.
- core: APP_VERSION and USER_AGENT follow CARGO_PKG_VERSION
(`external-drive-linux@<version>-stable`, `proton-drive-linux/<version>`)
- core: `app_version` and `user_agent` in config.json are optional overrides;
the fixed values older releases stored there read as unset and leave the
file on the next save, a hand-set value is kept
- gui: the About dialog shows the release, its debug info the identity
actually sent
- docs: describe the new default and the migration
A two-password account signed in with its login password as the mailbox
password, so the key chain never unlocked and the daemon retried forever.
Login now asks for the mailbox password and checks it against the account
(proton-sdk 0.8 `unlock`), so a typo is a retry. The password is never
stored: the keyring blob keeps the per-key passphrases instead, and for a
two-password account only when the user opts in (`--remember`, or the
"Keep unlocked on this computer" switch). By default they live in the
kernel keyring for the login session and the account is locked after a
reboot until `pdfs unlock` or the app supplies them again.
- core: kernelkey module, Error::Locked / WrongMailboxPassword, unlock,
lock, key_state, ready; blobs written by 3.0.x are migrated on first
start; token refresh updates only the tokens in the stored blob
- cli: `pdfs unlock [--remember]`, `pdfs lock [--forget]`; status and
diagnose report the key state; the daemon waits while locked and is
marked non-dumpable
- gui: mailbox password dialog at sign-in and on open, locked tray state
- po: all catalogs translated
- bump to 3.1.0, depend on proton-sdk and proton-drive-rs 0.8.0
Refs #26.
- keyring 3 -> keyring-core 1 + dbus-secret-service-keyring-store 1
(crypto-rust). Same libdbus Secret Service backend; with no target the
store matches items keyring 3 wrote, so stored sessions survive.
- ksni 0.2 -> 0.3 via the blocking API, with assume_sni_available so a
tray that starts before the SNI watcher waits instead of failing. Drops
the clap 2 / atty chain (Dependabot atty advisory).
- gtk4 0.11, libadwaita 0.9, webkit6 0.6, rusqlite 0.40, fuser 0.18,
directories 6, sha1/sha2 0.11, base64 0.23.
nvrl