Three things the 12,445-photo library showed that the tests did not.
A Pixel raw capture is two files named after the role each plays —
`PXL_….RAW-01.COVER.jpg` and `PXL_….RAW-02.ORIGINAL.dng` — so their stems differ
and the pairing rule never saw one shot. The marker is now cut off before names
are compared, narrowly: digits, then one role word, so an ordinary name that
happens to contain `.raw-` keeps its stem. Fed the real library's first 40 rows
through the grouping, they collapse to 21 tiles.
A raw that has a JPEG beside it is now painted with that JPEG's thumbnail, which
the server usually already holds. The Raw tab costs no raw download and no raw
decode for those tiles. Raws are found in one batched read, so an ordinary page
pays nothing for the lookup.
Photos could not be moved to Trash at all: they live on the photo volume, which
the mount never holds, so no `nodes` row exists, every authority answered
`Unknown`, and the write check refused the whole library with "trash access: not
allowed". Membership of our own timeline is the authority that does exist for a
photo, and it now answers. An album photo on someone else's volume still fails
closed.
Refreshing the gallery then reported `io: Resource temporarily unavailable (os
error 11)` (B92). The daemon held the control reply until the whole timeline had
been re-read — 63 batches of 200 nodes for this library, minutes of work against
a 120 s read bound. The daemon now answers as soon as the refresh is running,
`PhotosRefreshStatus` reports when it is done, and both front ends follow it: the
gallery reloads the page when it clears, and `pdfs refresh photos` blocks so the
command still means what it says. Each refresh logs its photo count, batch count
and duration.
Released as 1.11.0.
The grouping landed in the daemon; this is what it looks like. A tile whose shot
was stored as more than one file badges that in the corner — "RAW" when one of
the members is a raw file, since that is the word the person is looking for, and
a plain count otherwise (a live photo, a burst). The lightbox gains a control
that steps through the group's files, which is the only way to reach the RAW now
that the grid shows the shot once.
Deleting says what it will do: the daemon takes the whole group, so the
confirmation names the file count when a selection stands for more files than
tiles.
The gallery could show photos and nothing else: a photo deleted on the phone
stayed on the page for minutes, and a photo you wanted gone had to be deleted
on another device. Both are now handled here.
Deleting needs a uid-addressed request, because `Request::Delete` takes a
mountpoint path and the photos volume is not in the FUSE mount. `TrashNodes`
trashes through the SDK and answers per-uid outcomes, so a partial failure is
reportable; the daemon then drops those rows with `Db::photos_delete`, album
membership included, rather than leaving the gallery to wait for the next
timeline refresh. The GUI removes the tiles immediately with an Undo toast and
puts back anything the server refused — the photos are in Proton's trash and
stay recoverable there either way. Selection is Ctrl/Shift+click, the Select
toggle or Delete in the lightbox.
Remote deletions arrive on their own now. The Drive volume and the photos
volume have separate event streams, so the photos volume gets its own poller
and its own cursor. Trash and delete events remove rows; anything else only
marks the timeline stale, because there is no inode space to converge on this
volume. With the timeline TTL down to 60 s and an explicit Refresh that waits
for the server instead of only clearing the freshness stamp, a photo deleted
elsewhere leaves the grid in about ten seconds.
Teardown flagged the FUSE worker pool closed but never joined it, so the
process could drop the tokio runtime while a worker was still inside a
job — which is where 2026-09-18's "A Tokio 1.x context was found, but it
is being shutdown" panic came from. `Workers::stop_and_join` now waits
for the jobs in flight, bounded at 10 s so a worker wedged on the network
cannot hold the stop the user asked for; what is still stuck is named in
the log and shutdown continues around it.
The queues stay unbounded — the only caller that could feel backpressure
is fuser's dispatch loop, and blocking that is the stall the pool exists
to avoid — but a lane now logs its depth every 256 jobs, so a queue that
keeps climbing is visible before it is reported as a slow mount.
Documents the hang as B91, with the journal evidence, what made it
undiagnosable, and the candidates the evidence does not yet separate.
The trash is a flat list of uids, but a delete has a shape: a folder, and
often items inside it that were trashed separately beforehand. Restoring
one of those in isolation is not what it means — a folder came back
without the contents deleted with it, and a file came back inside a
folder that is still trashed, which is to say nowhere the user can see.
- Schema 29: `trash.parent_uid`, filled by the trash refresh from the
node's parent, plus an index for the walk.
- `expand_restore` takes the connected piece of the trashed tree around
what was asked for (every trashed descendant, every trashed ancestor)
and orders it into waves, shallowest first: the server cannot put a
node back under a parent that is still trashed. A uid the listing does
not know about is restored on its own, because the listing is
materialised in chunks and can be stale.
- `Core::restore` restores wave by wave, still streaming per-node
outcomes, so one node the server refuses leaves the rest restored.
The SDK bump brings the 6cbf2f44 port: permanent API errors are no
longer retried on block transfers, expired block URLs are re-minted on
the whole-file and public-link download paths, and a server-supplied
Retry-After is capped at 120 s.
The "This computer" indexer walks $HOME, and `default_excludes` only kept it
out of the Drive mountpoint and our own state/cache dirs. A home directory
that also holds third-party FUSE mounts (sshfs, rclone) got walked into.
`scan` does ask for `same_file_system(true)`, which looks sufficient and is
not: `ignore` implements it as `is_same_file_system` -> `device_num(path)` ->
`path.metadata()`, run after the directory is queued. Learning that a mount is
foreign requires stat'ing it first, and against a mount whose server is gone
that stat never returns.
The consequence is worse than a stalled scan. The blocked thread sits in
uninterruptible FUSE wait, so it ignores SIGKILL: the daemon can never exit,
systemd's stop times out, and the unreapable process keeps the cache.db lock
the next start needs, turning one dead mount into a permanent restart loop.
No userspace recovery exists once a thread is in that state, so the fix has to
be to never enter it.
Exclude every mountpoint strictly below the scan root, read by path from
/proc/self/mounts (octal-unescaped, so a path with a space still matches).
`filter_entry` runs before the device stat, so the walker never touches them.
Re-read per scan rather than cached at startup: a mount that appeared since
the daemon started is the likeliest to be half-alive.
This does not change what is indexed — a nested mount is a different device,
so it was already going to be skipped. Only the stat in front of that decision
goes away.
Refs: docs/BUGS.md B90
- A queued rename that also changes folder now lands as one `move-multiple`
request carrying the target name instead of rename-then-move, so there is
no half-applied state and no second call for stale name requirements to
hit (B46 follow-up). A destination name collision moves under a conflict
name in one step; same-folder renames still use the rename endpoint.
- Shared with me shows the inviter and invite date (GUI subtitle, `pdfs
shared-with-me`), with a warning when the invitation signature does not
verify against the claimed inviter's keys. `DirEntry` gains `shared_by`,
`shared_at` and `shared_by_unverified`, all serde-defaulted.
- Bump `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` to 0.6.3 (anonymous-node moves,
`TrashTime` trashed detection).
B69 — spurious `(sync-conflict)` copies came from `(mtime, size)` being used as a
revision identity. The server re-stamps a sealed revision with its own commit
time, so the drain diverted a write into a conflict copy of its own base; and
`plan_file` classified a no-baseline (local, remote) pair as `Conflict`, forking
every pre-existing file on first reconcile.
- `Baseline` carries `revision_id` (from the SDK's new `active_revision_id`),
captured at write-open and preserved across supersede/rebaseline.
`revision_changed` trusts the id and only falls back to `(mtime, size)` for
old sidecars.
- Planner gains `FilePlan::AdoptBaseline`: equal-size no-baseline pairs are
recorded, not conflicted. Divergent sizes stay a real conflict.
- New `sweep.rs` (`pdfs-conflict-sweep`, 5-min cadence) removes conflict copies
proven identical by size + `content_sha1` and surfaces divergent ones once as
an `ActivityKind::Conflict` entry. Never removes what it cannot prove.
B70 — browsers downloading into an on-demand mount had their in-flight temps
sealed as canonical revisions, exiling the finished file to a conflict copy.
`syncignore::is_transient_name` now recognises download/scratch temps, and the
on-demand `release`/`rename` paths hold them (`set_create_hold`) instead of
sealing until the name is finalized.
Workspace deps bumped to proton-sdk/proton-drive-rs 0.2.2 (registry, no patch).
Live validation against a real account still pending for both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V8P42asymU158CPnhjRwri
- Durable scratch/staging publication and preservation on failure.
- Transactional pending-operation supersession.
- Conflict copies cannot overwrite older copies or lose the source.
- Single-entry wipe protection and incomplete-scan aborts.
- Failed local deletion retains its baseline.
- Downloads are fsynced before baseline settlement.
- Future database schemas are refused.
- Event cursors advance only after successful invalidation and persistence.
- IPC frame, timeout, and concurrency limits.
- Atomic config saves; malformed configs are preserved.
- Sensitive directories require correct ownership, real directories, and 0700.
- Debian package now includes service and tray autostart files.
- Release workflow enforces versions, tests, lint, formatting, and offline acceptance.
- CI now runs offline filesystem acceptance.
- B23: Generate synthetic StagedWrite sidecars in rescue_scratch when sidecar is corrupted
- B26: Add open_count and unlinked state fields to defer node removal and cache eviction on unlinked open files until release
- B27: Discard orphaned write revisions for local UIDs unlinked prior to upload
- B28: Add emergency_evict to ContentCache for LRU blob eviction upon ENOSPC
- B29: Implement FUSE forget handler and forget_lookup in state to prune unreferenced inodes
- B33: Quarantine failing drain ops on HTTP 40x / max retries to unblock offline sync queue
- docs: Track audit items B18-B36 in docs/BUGS.md with fix details and verification results