feat(fuse,core,gui,cli): one-request move+rename drain, show who shared an item

- A queued rename that also changes folder now lands as one `move-multiple`
  request carrying the target name instead of rename-then-move, so there is
  no half-applied state and no second call for stale name requirements to
  hit (B46 follow-up). A destination name collision moves under a conflict
  name in one step; same-folder renames still use the rename endpoint.
- Shared with me shows the inviter and invite date (GUI subtitle, `pdfs
  shared-with-me`), with a warning when the invitation signature does not
  verify against the claimed inviter's keys. `DirEntry` gains `shared_by`,
  `shared_at` and `shared_by_unverified`, all serde-defaulted.
- Bump `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` to 0.6.3 (anonymous-node moves,
  `TrashTime` trashed detection).

Cargo.lock

@@ -3858,9 +3858,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "proton-drive-rs"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.6.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9d919c52e0ffcb94459ec14daf46d13e7590b81ade0ff757665c62c310faac0b"
+checksum = "11faa95cf40bd87d4d48435cdf9b16fff5f14caf45b3a565a941fd4a6e18cefe"
 dependencies = [
  "async-trait",
  "base64",
@@ -3885,9 +3885,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "proton-sdk"
-version = "0.6.2"
+version = "0.6.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6b531dbbaa8133c0ef63453ed75dbc0a416dfb12f24f39a6e4f0549caa95dcc0"
+checksum = "7de99acbd776f7bad5e1e1f3c40d7df3e4ef7411984d02370008ba1ff270a047"
 dependencies = [
  "aes-gcm 0.11.0",
  "async-trait",

Cargo.toml

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ keywords = ["proton", "drive", "fuse", "sync", "linux"]
 categories = ["filesystem", "command-line-utilities"]
 
 [workspace.dependencies]
-proton-sdk = { version = "0.6.2" }
+proton-sdk = { version = "0.6.3" }
-proton-drive-rs = { version = "0.6.2" }
+proton-drive-rs = { version = "0.6.3" }
 
 # Internal crates.
 pdfs-core = { path = "crates/pdfs-core" }

crates/pdfs-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -1129,6 +1129,9 @@ fn cmd_shared_with_me(uid: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
                     format!("  ({})", e.role)
                 };
                 println!("{kind} {:>12}  {}{role}  [{}]", e.size, e.name, e.uid);
+                if let Some(line) = shared_by_line(&e) {
+                    println!("{:>15}{line}", "");
+                }
             }
         }
         CtlResponse::Error { message, kind } => bail!("{}", cli_error(kind, &message)),
@@ -1137,6 +1140,39 @@ fn cmd_shared_with_me(uid: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Who shared an entry with me, and when, as a line printed under it — `None`
+/// when the invitation said nothing (owned content, or a node inside a shared
+/// folder rather than its root). An inviter whose signature did not verify is
+/// said to be claimed, not stated: the name may be forged.
+fn shared_by_line(entry: &pdfs_core::control::DirEntry) -> Option<String> {
+    if entry.shared_by.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut line = format!("shared by {}", entry.shared_by);
+    if entry.shared_at > 0 {
+        line.push_str(&format!(" at {}", format_epoch_utc(entry.shared_at)));
+    }
+    if entry.shared_by_unverified {
+        line.push_str("  WARNING: invitation signature did not verify; the sender may be forged");
+    }
+    Some(line)
+}
+
+/// `YYYY-MM-DD` (UTC) for epoch seconds, without pulling a date crate into the
+/// CLI for one column. Civil-from-days per Howard Hinnant's algorithm.
+fn format_epoch_utc(secs: i64) -> String {
+    let z = secs.div_euclid(86_400) + 719_468;
+    let era = z.div_euclid(146_097);
+    let doe = z - era * 146_097;
+    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1_460 + doe / 36_524 - doe / 146_096) / 365;
+    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
+    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
+    let day = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
+    let month = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 };
+    let year = yoe + era * 400 + i64::from(month <= 2);
+    format!("{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}")
+}
+
 /// Download a file shared with me. The daemon puts the plaintext in its content
 /// cache and replies with that path; with a `dest` we copy it out, so the caller
 /// gets a file it owns rather than one the cache may later evict.
@@ -2805,4 +2841,39 @@ mod login_wait_tests {
         wait_for_session(|| Ok(()), |_| slept += 1).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(slept, 0);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn epoch_seconds_format_as_utc_calendar_dates() {
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(0), "1970-01-01");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(951_782_400), "2000-02-29");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(1_700_000_000), "2023-11-14");
+        assert_eq!(format_epoch_utc(-86_400), "1969-12-31");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_forged_looking_invitation_is_flagged_not_stated() {
+        let mut entry = pdfs_core::control::DirEntry {
+            name: "Budget.ods".into(),
+            is_dir: false,
+            size: 1,
+            modified: 0,
+            pinned: false,
+            cached: false,
+            uid: "vol~link".into(),
+            path: String::new(),
+            role: "viewer".into(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(shared_by_line(&entry), None, "no invitation, no line");
+        entry.shared_by = "alice@proton.me".into();
+        entry.shared_at = 1_700_000_000;
+        assert_eq!(
+            shared_by_line(&entry).as_deref(),
+            Some("shared by alice@proton.me at 2023-11-14")
+        );
+        entry.shared_by_unverified = true;
+        assert!(shared_by_line(&entry).unwrap().contains("WARNING"));
+    }
 }

crates/pdfs-core/src/control.rs

@@ -906,6 +906,22 @@ pub struct DirEntry {
     /// report. Defaulted for wire-compat with clients/daemons predating it.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub role: String,
+    /// Who shared this node with me, as the invitation claims it — empty for
+    /// content I own, for a node reached *inside* a shared folder (only the share
+    /// root carries the invitation), and when the API did not say. Trust it only
+    /// as far as [`shared_by_unverified`](Self::shared_by_unverified) allows.
+    /// Defaulted for wire-compat with clients/daemons predating it.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_by: String,
+    /// When it was shared with me, epoch seconds; 0 when unknown.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_at: i64,
+    /// The invitation's signature did not check out against `shared_by`'s keys,
+    /// so the name may be forged. False when it verified *and* when it could not
+    /// be checked at all (no signature, no keys): only an actual mismatch is a
+    /// warning worth showing.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub shared_by_unverified: bool,
 }
 
 /// One hit in a [`Request::Search`] result. Like [`DirEntry`] but carries the

crates/pdfs-core/src/db/tests.rs

@@ -3201,6 +3201,8 @@ fn test_db_has_children_and_trashed_filtering() {
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     };
     db.upsert_node(&parent_node).unwrap();
 
@@ -3227,6 +3229,8 @@ fn test_db_has_children_and_trashed_filtering() {
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     };
     db.upsert_node(&child_node).unwrap();
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/background.rs

@@ -541,6 +541,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/drain.rs

@@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 use parking_lot::Mutex;
 
+use futures::StreamExt;
 use pdfs_core::batch;
 use pdfs_core::cache::{Baseline, StagedWrite};
 use pdfs_core::control::{ActivityKind, TransferDirection};
 use pdfs_core::db::{OP_CREATE, OP_MKDIR, OP_RENAME, OP_REVISION, OP_TRASH, PendingOp, RenameMeta};
-use proton_drive_rs::Node;
+use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::error::ProtonError;
 use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::ids::NodeUid;
+use proton_drive_rs::{Node, NodeMoveItem};
 use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
 
 use super::state::Intervals;
@@ -642,61 +644,46 @@ impl Core {
                 return Ok(());
             }
         };
-        // The name half goes first, so that a collision on the move half below is
+        let landed = if node.parent_uid.as_ref() == Some(&parent) {
-        // about the name the node will actually land under rather than the one it
+            self.drain_rename_in_place(&uid, &node.name, &name)?
-        // is about to lose.
+        } else {
-        let mut landed = node.name.clone();
+            // Move and rename land as one request (`move-multiple` takes a
-        if landed != name {
+            // target name), so there is no half-applied state between them and
-            match self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &name, None)) {
+            // no window for the requirements to go stale between two calls —
-                Ok(()) => landed = name.clone(),
+            // the race B46 queued this op to get away from.
-                // Someone took the name while we were offline. Renaming to a
+            let target = (node.name != name).then_some(name.as_str());
+            match self.move_renaming(&uid, &parent, target) {
+                Ok(()) => name.clone(),
+                // The destination holds that name already. Landing under a
                 // *different* name is the non-destructive resolution: it neither
                 // clobbers their file nor drops ours, and it is visible.
                 Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
                     let alt = conflict_name(&name, now_secs());
-                    warn!(%uid, name, alt, "rename target name is taken; using a conflict name");
+                    warn!(%uid, name, alt, "destination already holds that name; using a conflict name");
-                    self.rt
+                    self.move_renaming(&uid, &parent, Some(&alt))?;
-                        .block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &alt, None))?;
-                    landed = alt.clone();
                     self.adopt_drained_name(&uid, &alt);
                     self.log_activity(
                         ActivityKind::Rename,
                         &name,
-                        format!("name was taken remotely; renamed to {alt}"),
-                        false,
-                    );
-                }
-                Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
-            }
-        }
-        if node.parent_uid.as_ref() != Some(&parent) {
-            match self.rt.block_on(self.client.move_node(&uid, &parent)) {
-                Ok(()) => {}
-                // The destination holds a `landed` of its own. Same resolution as
-                // a name collision, and it has to happen before the move: the API
-                // has no move-and-rename, so the node is renamed out of the way
-                // here and moved second.
-                Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
-                    let alt = conflict_name(&landed, now_secs());
-                    warn!(%uid, name = %landed, alt, "destination already holds that name; using a conflict name");
-                    self.rt
-                        .block_on(self.client.rename_node(&uid, &alt, None))?;
-                    self.rt.block_on(self.client.move_node(&uid, &parent))?;
-                    self.adopt_drained_name(&uid, &alt);
-                    self.log_activity(
-                        ActivityKind::Rename,
-                        &landed,
                         format!("destination already had that name; moved as {alt}"),
                         false,
                     );
+                    alt
                 }
                 // The destination folder is gone. Leaving the node in its current
                 // parent is the honest outcome: it is not where the user asked for
-                // it, but it exists, it is where it has always been, and the
+                // it, but it exists and it is where it has always been. The name
-                // rename half above still applied. Retrying could only fail again
+                // the user chose still applies there. Retrying the move could
-                // — the folder is not coming back — and would wedge the queue.
+                // only fail again — the folder is not coming back — and would
+                // wedge the queue.
                 Err(e) if is_gone(&e) => {
-                    warn!(%uid, name = %landed, %parent, "move destination is gone; leaving the node where it is");
+                    warn!(%uid, name, %parent, "move destination is gone; leaving the node where it is");
+                    let landed = match self.drain_rename_in_place(&uid, &node.name, &name) {
+                        Ok(landed) => landed,
+                        // The node went with it; nothing is left to rename.
+                        Err(e) if is_gone(&e) => node.name.clone(),
+                        Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+                    };
                     self.log_activity(
                         ActivityKind::Rename,
                         &landed,
@@ -704,16 +691,73 @@ impl Core {
                             .to_string(),
                         false,
                     );
+                    landed
                 }
                 Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
             }
-        }
+        };
         self.db.delete_op(op.id)?;
         self.note_self_change(&uid);
         info!(%uid, name = %landed, "pending rename landed");
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Rename `uid` without moving it, from `current` to `name`, and return the
+    /// name it landed under. Someone may have taken the name while we were
+    /// offline; the node then lands under a conflict name instead.
+    fn drain_rename_in_place(
+        &self,
+        uid: &NodeUid,
+        current: &str,
+        name: &str,
+    ) -> Result<String, ProtonError> {
+        if current == name {
+            return Ok(current.to_string());
+        }
+        match self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(uid, name, None)) {
+            Ok(()) => Ok(name.to_string()),
+            Err(e) if is_already_exists(&e) => {
+                let alt = conflict_name(name, now_secs());
+                warn!(%uid, name, alt, "rename target name is taken; using a conflict name");
+                self.rt.block_on(self.client.rename_node(uid, &alt, None))?;
+                self.adopt_drained_name(uid, &alt);
+                self.log_activity(
+                    ActivityKind::Rename,
+                    name,
+                    format!("name was taken remotely; renamed to {alt}"),
+                    false,
+                );
+                Ok(alt)
+            }
+            Err(e) => Err(e),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Move `uid` under `parent` in one request, renaming it to `target_name` on
+    /// the way when one is given.
+    fn move_renaming(
+        &self,
+        uid: &NodeUid,
+        parent: &NodeUid,
+        target_name: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Result<(), ProtonError> {
+        let item = NodeMoveItem {
+            uid: uid.clone(),
+            target_name: target_name.map(str::to_string),
+        };
+        self.rt.block_on(async {
+            let mut outcomes =
+                std::pin::pin!(self.client.move_nodes_streaming(vec![item], parent.clone()));
+            match outcomes.next().await {
+                Some(Ok((_, outcome))) => outcome,
+                Some(Err(e)) => Err(e),
+                None => Err(ProtonError::invalid_operation(format!(
+                    "move of {uid} reported no outcome"
+                ))),
+            }
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Apply a queued trash to the remote.
     ///
     /// A node that is already gone is a success, not a failure: the outcome the
@@ -1587,6 +1631,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -1879,6 +1925,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs

@@ -3738,6 +3738,9 @@ impl Core {
                 // My own tree: a role only means something under a share, and
                 // this listing never crosses into one.
                 role: String::new(),
+                shared_by: String::new(),
+                shared_at: 0,
+                shared_by_unverified: false,
             })
             .collect())
     }
@@ -4319,6 +4322,9 @@ impl Core {
                 uid: item.uid,
                 path: String::new(),
                 role: String::new(),
+                shared_by: String::new(),
+                shared_at: 0,
+                shared_by_unverified: false,
             })
             .collect())
     }
@@ -4994,6 +5000,8 @@ fn local_node(uid: NodeUid, parent_uid: NodeUid, name: String, is_dir: bool) ->
         album: None,
         // Nothing signed it: it has never been near the crypto layer.
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     }
 }
 
@@ -5918,6 +5926,8 @@ mod pending_size_tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -7128,6 +7138,9 @@ mod tests {
                 share_id,
                 membership_id: ShareMembershipId::from("membership"),
                 permissions,
+                invite_time: None,
+                inviter_email: None,
+                inviter_verification: None,
             });
             node
         };
@@ -7588,6 +7601,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 }

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sharing.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ use pdfs_core::{CoreError, CoreResult};
 use tracing::debug;
 
 use crate::QUOTA_TTL;
+use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::crypto::VerificationStatus;
 use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::ids::NodeUid;
 use proton_drive_rs::{MemberRole, NodeKind};
 
@@ -47,6 +48,18 @@ fn shared_entry_of(core: &Core, n: Node) -> DirEntry {
         .map(role_to_str)
         .unwrap_or_default()
         .to_string();
+    let invitation = n.membership.as_ref();
+    let shared_by = invitation
+        .and_then(|m| m.inviter_email.clone())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let shared_at = invitation.and_then(|m| m.invite_time).unwrap_or(0);
+    // Only a signature that is present and wrong is a warning. An invitation
+    // that could not be checked — unsigned, or no keys for the claimed inviter —
+    // is not evidence of forgery, and flagging every such share would teach the
+    // user to ignore the flag.
+    let shared_by_unverified = invitation
+        .and_then(|m| m.inviter_verification)
+        .is_some_and(|status| status == VerificationStatus::Failed);
     DirEntry {
         name: n.name,
         is_dir,
@@ -57,6 +70,9 @@ fn shared_entry_of(core: &Core, n: Node) -> DirEntry {
         path: core.rel_path_for_uid(&n.uid).unwrap_or_default(),
         uid: n.uid.to_string(),
         role,
+        shared_by,
+        shared_at,
+        shared_by_unverified,
     }
 }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/state.rs

@@ -1120,6 +1120,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 
@@ -1128,6 +1130,9 @@ mod tests {
             share_id: ShareId::from("share"),
             membership_id: ShareMembershipId::from("membership"),
             permissions,
+            invite_time: None,
+            inviter_email: None,
+            inviter_verification: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/sweep.rs

@@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ mod tests {
             photo: None,
             album: None,
             verification: Default::default(),
+            direct_role: None,
+            share_id: None,
         }
     }
 

crates/pdfs-fuse/src/virtual.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ pub(crate) fn virtual_node(parent_uid: NodeUid, name: String, timestamp: i64) ->
         photo: None,
         album: None,
         verification: Default::default(),
+        direct_role: None,
+        share_id: None,
     }
 }
 

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/browser.rs

@@ -2345,6 +2345,9 @@ pub(crate) fn repaint_search(ui: &Rc<Ui>, hits: &[SearchHit]) {
             uid: h.uid.clone(),
             path: h.path.clone(),
             role: String::new(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
         })
         .collect();
     entries.sort_by(|a, b| {

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/shared.rs

@@ -309,6 +309,17 @@ fn shared_entry_row(ui: &Rc<Ui>, entry: &DirEntry) -> adw::ActionRow {
     if let Some(badge) = role_badge(&entry.role) {
         row.add_suffix(&badge);
     }
+    // The "shared by" in the subtitle is what the invitation claims. When its
+    // signature does not check out against that person's keys, the claim must
+    // not read as fact — someone may be impersonating a contact to get a file
+    // opened.
+    if entry.shared_by_unverified {
+        let warning = gtk4::Image::from_icon_name("dialog-warning-symbolic");
+        warning.add_css_class("warning");
+        warning.set_valign(gtk4::Align::Center);
+        warning.set_tooltip_text(Some(UNVERIFIED_INVITER_TOOLTIP));
+        row.add_suffix(&warning);
+    }
     row.add_prefix(&file_thumbnail(ui, entry, 40, 24, true));
     let ui_act = ui.clone();
     let uid = entry.uid.clone();
@@ -329,12 +340,29 @@ fn shared_entry_row(ui: &Rc<Ui>, entry: &DirEntry) -> adw::ActionRow {
     row
 }
 
-/// A shared row's subtitle: its size (files only), and where it can be reached
+/// Tooltip on the warning shown next to a share whose invitation did not verify.
-/// in the local mount once the synthetic `Shared with me/` directory has interned
+const UNVERIFIED_INVITER_TOOLTIP: &str = "The invitation's signature doesn't match the sender's keys. \
-/// it. An unlisted share has no local path yet, and says nothing rather than
+     It may not really be from them.";
-/// pointing at a directory that is not there.
+
+/// A shared row's subtitle: who shared it and when (share roots only — that is
+/// where the invitation lives), its size (files only), and where it can be
+/// reached in the local mount once the synthetic `Shared with me/` directory has
+/// interned it. An unlisted share has no local path yet, and says nothing rather
+/// than pointing at a directory that is not there.
 pub(crate) fn shared_row_subtitle(entry: &DirEntry) -> String {
     let mut parts: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    if !entry.shared_by.is_empty() {
+        let date = if entry.shared_at > 0 {
+            format_modified(entry.shared_at)
+        } else {
+            String::new()
+        };
+        parts.push(if date.is_empty() {
+            format!("Shared by {}", entry.shared_by)
+        } else {
+            format!("Shared by {} on {date}", entry.shared_by)
+        });
+    }
     if !entry.is_dir {
         parts.push(human_bytes(entry.size));
     }
@@ -723,9 +751,25 @@ mod tests {
             uid: "vol~link".into(),
             path: path.into(),
             role: role.into(),
+            shared_by: String::new(),
+            shared_at: 0,
+            shared_by_unverified: false,
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn a_share_root_says_who_shared_it() {
+        let mut root = entry(true, "", "viewer");
+        root.shared_by = "alice@proton.me".into();
+        assert_eq!(shared_row_subtitle(&root), "Shared by alice@proton.me");
+        root.shared_at = 1_700_000_000;
+        let subtitle = shared_row_subtitle(&root);
+        assert!(
+            subtitle.starts_with("Shared by alice@proton.me on "),
+            "{subtitle}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn a_share_with_no_local_path_says_nothing_about_one() {
         // Before the synthetic directory has been listed, the daemon cannot

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/shared_by_me.rs

@@ -293,5 +293,8 @@ pub(crate) fn shared_item_as_entry(item: &SharedItem) -> DirEntry {
         path: item.path.clone(),
         // Shared *by* me: I own it, so there is no role of mine to report.
         role: String::new(),
+        shared_by: String::new(),
+        shared_at: 0,
+        shared_by_unverified: false,
     }
 }

docs/BUGS.md

@@ -2650,6 +2650,16 @@ collisions without losing the source. Simple rename-only and move-only calls
 remain synchronous. The managed live suite subsequently passed the replacement
 and combined move/rename cases.
 
+**Follow-up (2026-09-15, unverified):** With SDK 0.6.3 the drain sends the
+move and the rename as one `move-multiple` request carrying the target name,
+instead of renaming in the source folder and then moving. That removes the
+second call the stale requirements could hit, and the SDK retries a remaining
+`InvalidRequirements` once with the server's current name hash. A destination
+name collision now moves under a conflict name in one step. Same-folder renames
+are unchanged. The synchronous FUSE `rename` path (`serve_rename`) still renames
+then moves with its bounded retry and has not been converted. Needs a managed
+live run of the combined move/rename cases.
+
 ---
 
 ## B47 — FUSE Accepts Path Components Longer Than NAME_MAX

docs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -11,7 +11,28 @@ scratch (user data in `staging/` and `recovery/` is never touched by this).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
-Nothing yet.
+SDK bumped to `proton-sdk` / `proton-drive-rs` **0.6.3**. No schema change.
+
+### Added
+- **Shared with me says who shared an item, and when.** The GUI row subtitle and `pdfs
+  shared-with-me` show the inviter and invite date for a share root. The invitation's signature is
+  checked against the claimed inviter's keys; when it does not verify, the GUI shows a warning
+  and the CLI prints one, since the sender may be forged. `DirEntry` gains `shared_by`,
+  `shared_at` and `shared_by_unverified` (defaulted, so older front-ends and daemons interoperate).
+
+### Changed
+- **A queued move-and-rename lands as one request.** `drain_rename` used to rename in the source
+  folder and then move, with a rename-out-of-the-way step when the destination held the name. It
+  now calls `move-multiple` with a target name, so there is no half-applied state between the two
+  halves and no second call for the encrypted-name requirements to go stale against (B46). A
+  rename that stays in the same folder still uses the rename endpoint.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Moving a node with no signature email no longer fails.** Such nodes (created anonymously, e.g.
+  through a public link) need the passphrase signed by the mover; SDK 0.6.3 sends that signature.
+- **A node trashed through the newer API field is recognised as trashed.** The SDK now reads
+  `TrashTime` as well as the legacy `Trashed` field, so the drain no longer tries to rename a node
+  that is already in the trash.
 
 ## [1.9.3] — 2026-09-01