added webgtk recaptcha

crates/pdfs-gui/src/app/pages/verify.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+//! The human-verification (CAPTCHA) dialog.
+//!
+//! Proton gates logins it does not recognise — a new IP, a VPN exit — behind a
+//! CAPTCHA. The API answers the login with a challenge instead of a session, and
+//! expects the client to present Proton's hosted verification page, collect the
+//! token the user earns by solving it, and retry the login carrying that token.
+//!
+//! The page is hosted in a `WebKitWebView` rather than handed to the system
+//! browser because it reports completion by posting a message to its host, not
+//! by redirecting: a browser has nowhere to post it back to.
+
+use crate::*;
+use webkit6::prelude::*;
+
+/// Bridge the verification page's `postMessage` to a handler this side can read.
+///
+/// The page targets its embedding host (`window.parent`), which in a webview is
+/// the page itself — so nothing arrives unless the message is forwarded
+/// explicitly. Injecting at document start guarantees the listener is installed
+/// before the page can post anything.
+const BRIDGE: &str = r#"
+window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {
+    try {
+        window.webkit.messageHandlers.hv.postMessage(JSON.stringify(event.data));
+    } catch (e) {}
+});
+"#;
+
+/// Present the challenge and hand the solved token back through `token_tx`.
+///
+/// Closing the dialog without solving drops the sender, which the waiting login
+/// worker reads as a cancelled sign-in — the same contract as the 2FA prompt.
+pub(crate) fn prompt_human_verification(
+    ui: &Rc<Ui>,
+    url: &str,
+    token_tx: std::sync::mpsc::Sender<String>,
+) {
+    let content = webkit6::UserContentManager::new();
+    content.add_script(&webkit6::UserScript::new(
+        BRIDGE,
+        webkit6::UserContentInjectedFrames::AllFrames,
+        webkit6::UserScriptInjectionTime::Start,
+        &[],
+        &[],
+    ));
+    // Registration is what makes `messageHandlers.hv` exist in the page; without
+    // it the bridge above throws on every message.
+    content.register_script_message_handler("hv", None);
+
+    let webview = webkit6::WebView::builder()
+        .user_content_manager(&content)
+        .vexpand(true)
+        .hexpand(true)
+        .build();
+
+    let dialog = adw::Dialog::builder()
+        .title("Verification")
+        .content_width(420)
+        .content_height(560)
+        .build();
+
+    let header = adw::HeaderBar::new();
+    let body = gtk4::Box::new(gtk4::Orientation::Vertical, 0);
+    body.append(&header);
+    body.append(&webview);
+    dialog.set_child(Some(&body));
+
+    // Taken on the first success *or* on close, so the token is sent at most
+    // once and a cancelled dialog always drops the sender.
+    let token_tx = Rc::new(RefCell::new(Some(token_tx)));
+
+    let tx = token_tx.clone();
+    let dlg = dialog.clone();
+    content.connect_script_message_received(Some("hv"), move |_, value| {
+        let Some(token) = extract_token(&value.to_str()) else {
+            // Every `postMessage` on the page reaches here, most of them the
+            // verification app's own chatter. Anything that is not a completion
+            // is simply not ours.
+            return;
+        };
+        if let Some(tx) = tx.borrow_mut().take() {
+            let _ = tx.send(token);
+        }
+        dlg.close();
+    });
+
+    // Covers the close button, Escape, and the user giving up.
+    dialog.connect_closed(move |_| {
+        token_tx.borrow_mut().take();
+    });
+
+    webview.load_uri(url);
+
+    let parent = ui.login.login_button.root().and_downcast::<gtk4::Window>();
+    // Returns immediately; the login worker stays blocked on the channel until
+    // the handler above sends, or the dialog closes and drops the sender.
+    dialog.present(parent.as_ref());
+}
+
+/// Pull the verification token out of a message posted by the verification page.
+///
+/// Returns `None` for anything that is not a completion message. The page posts
+/// a good deal besides — resize requests, readiness pings — and treating an
+/// unrecognised shape as success would hand the API an empty token and fail the
+/// login with a confusing error.
+fn extract_token(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(raw).ok()?;
+    // The payload is nested under `payload` and the message names itself in
+    // `type`; both spellings of the success type have shipped.
+    let kind = value.get("type")?.as_str()?;
+    if !matches!(
+        kind,
+        "HUMAN_VERIFICATION_SUCCESS" | "human_verification_success"
+    ) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let payload = value.get("payload")?;
+    let token = payload.get("token")?.as_str()?;
+    if token.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(token.to_owned())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::extract_token;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_completion_message_yields_its_token() {
+        let raw =
+            r#"{"type":"HUMAN_VERIFICATION_SUCCESS","payload":{"token":"tok-1","type":"captcha"}}"#;
+        assert_eq!(extract_token(raw).as_deref(), Some("tok-1"));
+    }
+
+    /// The page posts plenty that is not a completion; none of it may be
+    /// mistaken for one, or the login retries with a garbage token.
+    #[test]
+    fn unrelated_messages_are_ignored() {
+        for raw in [
+            r#"{"type":"resize","payload":{"height":400}}"#,
+            r#"{"type":"HUMAN_VERIFICATION_SUCCESS"}"#,
+            r#"{"payload":{"token":"tok"}}"#,
+            r#"{"type":"HUMAN_VERIFICATION_SUCCESS","payload":{"token":""}}"#,
+            "not json at all",
+            "",
+        ] {
+            assert!(extract_token(raw).is_none(), "accepted: {raw}");
+        }
+    }
+}