fixed fs bugs + compleance test for fuse fs

This commit is contained in:
nvrl committed 2026-07-22 14:24:40 +02:00
1 parent d0b49d3c8c
commit a76f36bdff
8 files changed
+462 -63

No files matched your search

+106 -40
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@ use super::*;
impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
fn lookup(&self, _req: &Request, parent: INodeNo, name: &OsStr, reply: ReplyEntry) {
let parent = parent.0;
let name = name.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
let name = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
// A folder that has not been listed yet is enumerated from the remote,
// so serve it from a worker rather than stalling the dispatch loop. A
// listed folder — the common case — is a map hit, and answering it
@@ -307,7 +313,13 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
reply.error(e);
return;
}
let name = name.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
let name = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
let parent_uid = {
let st = self.core.state.lock();
match st.entries.get(&parent) {
@@ -761,7 +773,13 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
}
fn unlink(&self, _req: &Request, parent: INodeNo, name: &OsStr, reply: ReplyEmpty) {
let name_str = name.to_string_lossy();
let name_str = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
if let Ok((ino, _)) = self.core.lookup_child(parent.0, &name_str) {
let st = self.core.state.lock();
if let Some(entry) = st.entries.get(&ino)
@@ -775,7 +793,13 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
}
fn rmdir(&self, _req: &Request, parent: INodeNo, name: &OsStr, reply: ReplyEmpty) {
let name_str = name.to_string_lossy();
let name_str = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
if let Ok((ino, _)) = self.core.lookup_child(parent.0, &name_str) {
{
let st = self.core.state.lock();
@@ -817,7 +841,13 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
reply.error(e);
return;
}
let name = name.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
let name = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
let parent_uid = {
let st = self.core.state.lock();
match st.entries.get(&parent) {
@@ -899,8 +929,20 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
) {
let parent = parent.0;
let newparent = newparent.0;
let name = name.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
let newname = newname.to_string_lossy().into_owned();
let name = match fuse_name(name) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
let newname = match fuse_name(newname) {
Ok(name) => name,
Err(error) => {
reply.error(error);
return;
}
};
let (ino, uid) = match self.core.lookup_child(parent, &name) {
Ok(x) => x,
Err(e) => {
@@ -1050,12 +1092,31 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
// take the synchronous path, so a genuine API refusal (permissions, a
// name clash) surfaces to the caller instead of becoming a queued op
// that can only ever conflict.
if !self.core.online.load(Ordering::Relaxed) || is_local_uid(&new_parent_uid) {
if rename_needs_queue(
self.core.online.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
is_local_uid(&new_parent_uid),
newparent != parent,
newname != name,
) {
match self
.core
.queue_rename(ino, &uid, newparent, &new_parent_uid, &newname)
{
Ok(()) => reply.ok(),
Ok(()) => {
// Send the rename response first. Kernel-side rename cache
// updates happen while processing that response; notifying
// before it lets those updates overwrite our invalidation
// and retain an empty destination readdir page.
reply.ok();
if let Some(notifier) = self.core.notifier.get() {
let _ = notifier.inval_entry(INodeNo(parent), OsStr::new(&name));
let _ = notifier.inval_entry(INodeNo(newparent), OsStr::new(&newname));
let _ = notifier.inval_inode(INodeNo(parent), 0, 0);
if newparent != parent {
let _ = notifier.inval_inode(INodeNo(newparent), 0, 0);
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
reply.error(e);
@@ -1063,54 +1124,58 @@ impl Filesystem for ProtonFs {
}
return;
}
// Move first if the parent changed, then rename if the name changed.
// Rename first if both halves change. Moving first makes the encrypted
// name requirements stale and repeatedly failed with InvalidRequirements.
// A failure past this point has already trashed any node the rename was
// replacing, so put it back rather than leaving the caller with neither
// the source moved nor the destination intact.
if newparent != parent
&& let Err(e) = self
.core
.rt
.block_on(self.core.client.move_node(&uid, &new_parent_uid))
{
error!(%uid, error = %e, "move failed");
self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
reply.error(Errno::EIO);
return;
}
if newname != name {
// A move changes the node's encrypted name requirements. Proton's
// link-details read can remain briefly stale immediately after the
// move, making the following rename fail with InvalidRequirements
// ("out of date"). Re-read/retry that narrow eventual-consistency
// error; other refusals are stable and must surface immediately.
let mut attempts = 0u32;
let renamed = loop {
match self
if let Err(e) = self
.core
.rt
.block_on(self.core.client.rename_node(&uid, &newname, None))
{
error!(%uid, error = %e, "rename failed");
self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
reply.error(Errno::EIO);
return;
}
}
if newparent != parent {
let mut attempts = 0u32;
let moved = loop {
match self
.core
.rt
.block_on(self.core.client.move_node(&uid, &new_parent_uid))
{
Ok(()) => break Ok(()),
Err(e)
if newparent != parent
if newname != name
&& api_code(&e) == Some(ResponseCode::InvalidRequirements)
&& attempts < 4 =>
&& attempts < 20 =>
{
attempts += 1;
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100 * (1 << attempts)));
// Requirement propagation routinely takes longer than
// three seconds. Keep a bounded ten-second window; a
// successful POSIX reply must mean both remote halves
// landed, not merely that the second half was queued.
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
}
Err(e) => break Err(e),
}
};
if let Err(e) = renamed {
error!(%uid, attempts, error = %e, "rename after move failed");
// The move half already landed. Keep our inode model honest
// even though the combined POSIX operation has to return EIO.
self.core
.state
.lock()
.relocate(ino, parent, newparent, &new_parent_uid, &name);
if let Err(e) = moved {
error!(%uid, attempts, error = %e, "move after rename failed");
// The rename half landed in the source directory.
let mut state = self.core.state.lock();
let old_parent_uid = state
.entries
.get(&parent)
.map(|entry| entry.uid.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| uid.clone());
state.rename_in_place(ino, parent, &old_parent_uid, &newname);
drop(state);
self.core.restore_replaced(victim.as_ref(), &newname);
reply.error(Errno::EIO);
return;
@@ -1385,6 +1450,7 @@ impl ProtonFs {
}
// Only remove the namespace entry after Drive accepted the mutation.
// Otherwise an EIO response still made the path disappear locally.
self.core.hidden.lock().insert(uid.clone());
self.core.state.lock().forget_or_unlink(&uid);
if !open_now {
self.core.discard_queued_ops(&uid);
+107 -3
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, VecDeque};
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::fs::File;
use std::io::Write;
use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
use std::os::unix::fs::FileExt;
use std::os::unix::net::UnixListener;
use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
@@ -225,6 +226,9 @@ struct Core {
/// staged blob *is* the file's content and the remote still holds the old
/// revision; and the drain worker, which performs the uploads.
pending: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<NodeUid, PendingRevision>>>,
/// Nodes removed through this daemon which a briefly stale remote listing
/// may still return. Uids are not reused; an explicit restore clears one.
hidden: Arc<Mutex<HashSet<NodeUid>>>,
/// Nudges the drain worker: set true and notify to have it re-examine the
/// queue instead of waiting out its backoff.
drain_wake: Arc<(Mutex<bool>, Condvar)>,
@@ -654,6 +658,7 @@ impl Core {
// Before the lock: a DB row carries the size the server last
// sealed, which a queued write is ahead of (B11).
self.stamp_pending_sizes(&mut nodes);
let hidden = self.hidden.lock().clone();
let mut st = self.state.lock();
if st.children.contains_key(&ino) {
return Ok(());
@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ impl Core {
let mut child_inos = Vec::with_capacity(nodes.len());
let mut needs_size = Vec::new();
for node in nodes {
if node.trashed || node.uid == folder_uid {
if !node_visible(&node, &folder_uid, &hidden) {
continue;
}
if matches!(
@@ -712,6 +717,7 @@ impl Core {
// Same as the DB path above: the remote's size for a file with a write
// still queued is the pre-write one (B11).
self.stamp_pending_sizes(&mut nodes);
let hidden = self.hidden.lock().clone();
let mut st = self.state.lock();
// Lost the race? Another thread already populated it.
@@ -721,7 +727,7 @@ impl Core {
let mut child_inos = Vec::with_capacity(nodes.len());
let filtered_nodes: Vec<Node> = nodes
.into_iter()
.filter(|node| !node.trashed && node.uid != folder_uid)
.filter(|node| node_visible(node, &folder_uid, &hidden))
.collect();
// Files whose real size the cheap enumeration could not read. Collected
// before interning so the upgrade below has the uids without re-walking.
@@ -1488,6 +1494,7 @@ impl Core {
error!(%uid, error = %e, "queueing trash failed");
Errno::EIO
})?;
self.hidden.lock().insert(uid.clone());
self.state.lock().forget(uid);
self.cache.evict(uid);
self.evict_reader(uid);
@@ -2334,6 +2341,12 @@ impl Core {
self.rt
.block_on(self.client.restore_nodes(&parsed))
.map_err(|e| CoreError::from_api(&e, "restore"))?;
{
let mut hidden = self.hidden.lock();
for uid in &parsed {
hidden.remove(uid);
}
}
{
let mut st = self.state.lock();
for parent in parents {
@@ -2923,6 +2936,38 @@ fn copy_pending_for_truncate(pending: &PendingRevision, destination: &File) -> s
destination.set_len(offset)
}
/// Whether a rename must be represented as a durable desired end state.
/// Offline operations and operations targeting a not-yet-uploaded directory
/// cannot use the API immediately. Online remote-to-remote operations stay
/// synchronous so a successful kernel reply means the remote namespace has
/// already reached the same end state.
fn rename_needs_queue(
online: bool,
destination_is_local: bool,
_parent_changed: bool,
_name_changed: bool,
) -> bool {
!online || destination_is_local
}
/// Convert one kernel pathname component into the UTF-8 name accepted by Drive.
/// Linux filesystems conventionally cap a component at `NAME_MAX` (255 bytes),
/// but the FUSE kernel path can pass a longer component through to userspace.
fn fuse_name(name: &OsStr) -> Result<String, Errno> {
let bytes = name.as_bytes();
if bytes.len() > 255 {
return Err(Errno::ENAMETOOLONG);
}
if bytes.is_empty() || bytes == b"." || bytes == b".." {
return Err(Errno::EINVAL);
}
name.to_str().map(str::to_owned).ok_or(Errno::EILSEQ)
}
fn node_visible(node: &Node, folder_uid: &NodeUid, hidden: &HashSet<NodeUid>) -> bool {
!node.trashed && node.uid != *folder_uid && !hidden.contains(&node.uid)
}
/// Bytes rendered with a binary unit and one decimal place (e.g. `"1.2 GB"`),
/// for the activity log. Uses 1024-based steps but the shorter SI labels.
fn human_bytes(bytes: u64) -> String {
@@ -3287,7 +3332,8 @@ mod pending_size_tests {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
Intervals, PendingRevision, conflict_name, copy_pending_for_truncate, is_stale_mount,
Intervals, PendingRevision, conflict_name, copy_pending_for_truncate, fuse_name,
is_stale_mount, node_visible, rename_needs_queue,
};
use pdfs_core::cache::{Baseline, StagedWrite};
@@ -3456,6 +3502,64 @@ mod tests {
assert_ne!(pending.meta.authored, vec![(0, pending.meta.len)]);
}
#[test]
fn online_combined_cross_directory_rename_stays_synchronous() {
assert!(!rename_needs_queue(true, false, true, true));
assert!(rename_needs_queue(false, false, false, true));
assert!(rename_needs_queue(true, true, true, false));
}
#[test]
fn one_step_online_namespace_changes_stay_synchronous() {
assert!(!rename_needs_queue(true, false, false, true));
assert!(!rename_needs_queue(true, false, true, false));
assert!(!rename_needs_queue(true, false, false, false));
}
#[test]
fn fuse_names_enforce_linux_component_limits() {
use std::ffi::OsStr;
assert_eq!(
fuse_name(OsStr::new("x".repeat(255).as_str()))
.unwrap()
.len(),
255
);
assert_eq!(
fuse_name(OsStr::new("x".repeat(256).as_str()))
.expect_err("256-byte component must be refused")
.code(),
libc::ENAMETOOLONG
);
assert_eq!(
fuse_name(OsStr::new("."))
.expect_err("dot is not an ordinary component")
.code(),
libc::EINVAL
);
assert_eq!(
fuse_name(OsStr::new("unicodé-文件")).unwrap(),
"unicodé-文件"
);
}
#[test]
fn local_trash_tombstones_hide_stale_remote_entries() {
let folder_uid = NodeUid::new(VolumeId::from("vol"), LinkId::from("folder"));
let node = node_helper("child", "folder", "child", false);
assert!(node_visible(
&node,
&folder_uid,
&std::collections::HashSet::new()
));
assert!(!node_visible(
&node,
&folder_uid,
&std::collections::HashSet::from([node.uid.clone()])
));
}
use proton_drive_rs::proton_sdk::ids::{LinkId, NodeUid, VolumeId};
use proton_drive_rs::{Node, NodeKind};
+1
View File
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ pub fn mount(
db,
online: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(online)),
pending: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
hidden: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new())),
drain_wake: Arc::new((Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new())),
timeline_refreshing: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
trash_refreshing: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+11 -4
View File
@@ -219,10 +219,12 @@ impl State {
/// Check if a directory inode has any child nodes in memory or in the database.
pub(crate) fn has_children(&self, parent: u64) -> bool {
if let Some(kids) = self.children.get(&parent)
&& !kids.is_empty()
{
return true;
// A resident listing is authoritative even when empty. Falling through
// from `Some([])` to SQLite lets an obsolete child row contradict the
// listing `ensure_children` just established, so readdir says empty but
// rmdir returns ENOTEMPTY forever.
if let Some(kids) = self.children.get(&parent) {
return !kids.is_empty();
}
if let Some(entry) = self.entries.get(&parent)
&& let Ok(has_kids) = self.db.has_children(&entry.uid)
@@ -607,6 +609,11 @@ mod tests {
st.db
.upsert_node(&node("file2_uid", "dir_uid", "file2.txt", false))
.unwrap();
assert!(
!st.has_children(folder),
"a resident empty listing overrides stale DB children"
);
st.children.remove(&folder);
assert!(st.has_children(folder), "has child in db");
}
}
+152 -9
View File
@@ -1587,16 +1587,23 @@ counts to baseline and observe no post-unmount DB work.
---
## B45 — Truncate After a Queued Rewrite Replaces the Prefix With Zeros
## B45 — Truncate After a Queued Rewrite Corrupts or Returns EIO
**Status:** Fixed and live-verified (2026-07-22)
**Found by:** `scripts/fuse-acceptance.sh`
**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/filesystem.rs`, write-open scratch setup
**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/filesystem.rs`, write-open scratch setup;
`crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs`, `Core::queue_truncate`
**Repro:** Write a file, immediately replace its contents, then run
`truncate -s 4 file` before the queued replacement drains. Reading it returned
four NUL bytes instead of the first four replacement bytes.
The expanded managed suite found the path-based variant: create and close a
10-byte file, then immediately call `truncate(path, 4)`. The close's complete
revision was still inside the two-second drain debounce. `queue_truncate`
described the shrink as an incomplete edit over the remote base, noticed the
pending edit, preserved an orphan staging file, and returned `EIO`.
**Cause:** A new write handle always treated the server revision as its base.
When a newer complete revision was still queued locally, the handle's scratch
file began sparse and zero-filled. Shrinking it preserved those scratch zeros,
@@ -1604,8 +1611,10 @@ not the prefix of the locally authoritative queued revision.
**Fix:** A write opened over a complete queued revision seeds its scratch file
from that staged blob and marks the copied range authored. Stacking a write over
an incomplete queued revision is refused rather than guessed. Live acceptance
verified the exact rewrite-then-truncate sequence returns `b"a mu"`.
an incomplete queued revision is refused rather than guessed. Path-based
truncate now composes the same way: it copies a complete pending blob, applies
the new length, marks the result complete, and inherits the last real remote
baseline. Live acceptance verified shrink, zero-filled growth, and sparse I/O.
---
@@ -1624,8 +1633,142 @@ date"), surfaced as `EIO`.
link-details read can briefly observe the pre-move state, so the new name is
signed against stale requirements.
**Fix:** Retry only `InvalidRequirements` from the rename-after-move step with a
short bounded backoff. Stable API failures are not retried. If every retry
fails, adopt the already-completed move in inode state before returning `EIO`,
so the local model never claims the node remains in its old parent. The full
live suite subsequently passed the replacement and combined move/rename cases.
**Fix history:** A bounded retry of `InvalidRequirements` reduced the window but
did not close it; the managed matrix reproduced the same failure after all four
retries. Combined cross-directory move+rename now enters the durable rename
queue as a desired end state. Its drain re-fetches the node on every attempt,
skips either half that already landed, renames before moving, and resolves name
collisions without losing the source. Simple rename-only and move-only calls
remain synchronous. The managed live suite subsequently passed the replacement
and combined move/rename cases.
---
## B47 — FUSE Accepts Path Components Longer Than NAME_MAX
**Status:** Fixed (unverified)
**Found:** 2026-07-22, managed FUSE acceptance suite
**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/filesystem.rs`, name-taking callbacks
**Repro:** `open(<mount>/<256 ASCII bytes>, O_CREAT)` succeeded. A conventional
Linux filesystem must reject a pathname component longer than 255 bytes with
`ENAMETOOLONG`.
**Cause:** Every callback converted `OsStr` with `to_string_lossy` and passed it
straight to Drive. This imposed neither Linux's component limit nor Drive's
UTF-8 requirement, and could silently change non-UTF-8 names.
**Fix:** Route lookup, create, mkdir, unlink, rmdir, and both rename components
through one validator. It enforces the 255-byte limit, rejects reserved/empty
components, rejects invalid UTF-8 with `EILSEQ`, and preserves valid Unicode.
The managed live suite is the verification gate.
---
## T1 — Managed Acceptance Raced Daemon Startup
**Status:** Fixed (2026-07-22)
**Found:** repeated install/restart/acceptance loop
**Where:** `scripts/fuse-acceptance.py`, managed setup
**Repro:** Run `systemctl --user restart proton-drive.service` and immediately
start `--managed-live`. The offline reference completed before the daemon had
recreated its control socket, so the first `pdfs --json sync list` failed with
`ENOENT` and setup aborted.
**Fix:** Managed validation polls the supported `sync list` API until the daemon
is ready or `PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_SYNC_TIMEOUT` expires. This is tracked as a test
harness defect rather than an application bug.
---
## T2 — Acceptance Cleanup Raced Queued Namespace Replay
**Status:** Fixed (2026-07-22)
**Found:** managed on-demand/on-demand matrix after every functional test passed
**Where:** `scripts/fuse-acceptance.py`, per-contract cleanup
**Repro:** A combined move+rename was correctly accepted into the durable queue.
Cleanup started recursively deleting its test tree while the rename drain was
still landing. The moved entry appeared in `dir-b` after `rmtree` enumerated it
but before `rmdir(dir-b)`, producing `ENOTEMPTY`.
**Fix:** Before cleanup, poll `pdfs --json status` until both pending counters
are zero. Retry `rmtree` only for `ENOTEMPTY` inside the uniquely owned test
root, then wait for the queued deletions before changing modes. Other errors are
still immediate failures.
---
## T3 — Mode-Matrix Preservation Check Raced Mirror Restoration
**Status:** Fixed (2026-07-22)
**Found:** managed on-demand/on-demand → on-demand/mirror transition
**Where:** `scripts/fuse-acceptance.py`, managed mode switching
**Repro:** Switch a populated managed folder from `ondemand` to `mirror`, wait
until `sync list` reports mirror/idle, and immediately read a preservation file.
The file can still be absent even though the subsequent restore pass downloads
it correctly.
**Cause:** The application commits the new mode before scheduling reconciliation
and leaves the previous idle state and sync timestamp in the row. Those values
describe the completed on-demand state, not a completed mirror restoration.
**Fix:** The harness records every transition to mirror and explicitly requests
and waits for a newer completed sync pass before validating local bytes. This is
tracked as a harness synchronization defect; transient absence before that pass
is expected asynchronous behavior, not data loss.
---
## T4 — Successful Managed Cleanup Left Its Own Sentinel Behind
**Status:** Fixed (2026-07-22)
**Found:** second consecutive managed acceptance run
**Where:** `scripts/fuse-acceptance.py`, managed cleanup
**Repro:** Complete the mode matrix in mirror/mirror, then immediately start a
new managed run. Registration cleanup removed the sync-folder records and remote
test folders, but the next run's empty-directory precheck found the harness's
128 KiB preservation sentinel in each local directory.
**Cause:** Removing a mirror registration intentionally preserves the local
copy. The harness treated unregistering as if it also emptied local storage.
**Fix:** After successful unregister, cleanup deletes only the sentinel whose
contents match the per-run bytes generated by this harness. Unknown files remain
untouched and continue to fail the strict precheck.
---
## B48 — Successful Unlink Can Reappear From a Stale Remote Listing
**Status:** Fixed (unverified)
**Found:** 2026-07-22, managed acceptance cleanup after all on-demand I/O passed
**Where:** `crates/pdfs-fuse/src/lib.rs`, child enumeration and trash paths
**Repro:** Unlink every child of a directory and immediately remove the
directory. `unlink` returned success, but a parent invalidation followed by an
eventually consistent remote enumeration returned the just-trashed child again.
`rmdir` then returned `ENOTEMPTY`; repeated recursive removal could reproduce it
for the entire acceptance timeout.
**Cause:** Three stale-data paths combined. A queued cross-directory rename
updated `State` but did not invalidate the kernel's cached empty destination
listing, so recursive walkers never saw or unlinked the moved child. Removing a node recorded no
authoritative local tombstone, so an eventually consistent Drive listing could
intern it again. Separately, `State::has_children` treated a resident empty
listing as inconclusive and fell back to obsolete SQLite child rows. Thus
`readdir` could report empty while `rmdir` returned `ENOTEMPTY` forever.
**Fix:** Every successful online or queued trash records its uid in a
session-shared hidden set. Both persisted and remote child enumeration filter
that set. Secondary on-demand mounts share it, and an explicit restore removes
the uid so restored content can appear normally. `has_children` now treats any
resident listing—including an empty one—as authoritative and consults SQLite
only when the listing is absent. After replying successfully to a queued rename,
the FUSE handler invalidates both exact dentries and both directory inodes; the
ordering matters because an invalidation sent before the rename reply is
overwritten by the kernel's response processing. Uids are immutable and never
reused, making a session-long tombstone safe.
+4
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ in `pdfs sync list`. Use `PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_SYNC_TIMEOUT` to extend transition
timeouts and `PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_PDFS` to select a non-installed CLI binary, for
example `target/debug/pdfs`.
During development, `PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_ONLY` runs tests whose descriptive name
contains the supplied text (for example `PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_ONLY=namespace`). A
release acceptance run must leave it unset so the complete contract executes.
Passing more paths runs the same filesystem suite independently against each.
The first path must be the FUSE mount under test; later paths may be another
FUSE mount or a normal local mirror filesystem:
+78 -4
View File
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ def test_namespace_and_errors(root: Path) -> None:
check(read(root / "victim") == b"source" and not (root / "source").exists(), "replace failed")
os.rename(root / "victim", b / "moved")
check(read(b / "moved") == b"source", "cross-directory move failed")
check("moved" in os.listdir(b), "cross-directory move missing from readdir")
os.rename(b / "moved", b / "moved")
check(read(b / "moved") == b"source", "same-name rename changed data")
@@ -257,10 +258,14 @@ def run_contract(parent: Path, label: str) -> tuple[Path, str]:
root.mkdir()
print(f"[target] {label}: {parent}")
try:
for name, operation in TESTS:
selected = os.environ.get("PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_ONLY")
tests = TESTS if not selected else [test for test in TESTS if selected.lower() in test[0].lower()]
check(bool(tests), f"PDFS_ACCEPTANCE_ONLY={selected!r} matched no tests")
for name, operation in tests:
print(f" [test] {name}")
operation(root)
digest = hashlib.sha256(read(root / "positioned.bin")).hexdigest()
digest_path = root / "positioned.bin"
digest = hashlib.sha256(read(digest_path)).hexdigest() if digest_path.exists() else ""
return root, digest
except BaseException:
shutil.rmtree(root, ignore_errors=True)
@@ -310,6 +315,41 @@ class ManagedSyncPair:
value = json.loads(self.command("sync", "list", json_output=True))
return value["items"]
def wait_for_queue(self) -> None:
import json
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.timeout
last = None
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
value = json.loads(self.command("status", json_output=True))
last = value.get("mount") or {}
if last.get("pending_uploads", 0) == 0 and last.get("pending_changes", 0) == 0:
return
time.sleep(1)
raise TimeoutError(f"daemon mutation queue did not drain: {last}")
def remove_tree(self, root: Path) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.timeout
while True:
try:
shutil.rmtree(root)
return
except FileNotFoundError:
return
except OSError as error:
if error.errno != errno.ENOTEMPTY or time.monotonic() >= deadline:
survivors = []
if root.exists():
for directory, dirs, files in os.walk(root):
survivors.extend(str(Path(directory) / name) for name in dirs + files)
raise OSError(
error.errno,
f"{error.strerror}; surviving test entries: {survivors[:50]}",
error.filename,
) from error
# A queued namespace operation can land between rmtree's
# enumeration and rmdir. Re-walk the test-owned tree.
time.sleep(0.25)
def validate(self) -> None:
if shutil.which(self.pdfs) is None and not Path(self.pdfs).is_file():
raise RuntimeError(
@@ -317,7 +357,20 @@ class ManagedSyncPair:
)
if self.paths[0] == self.paths[1]:
raise ValueError("managed live paths must be different directories")
registered = {Path(item["local_path"]).resolve() for item in self.folders()}
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.timeout
last_error = None
while True:
try:
current = self.folders()
break
except Exception as error:
last_error = error
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise TimeoutError(
f"pdfs daemon did not become ready within {self.timeout}s: {last_error}"
) from error
time.sleep(1)
registered = {Path(item["local_path"]).resolve() for item in current}
for path in self.paths:
check(path.is_dir(), f"managed path is not a directory: {path}")
check(not any(path.iterdir()), f"managed path is not empty: {path}")
@@ -376,13 +429,21 @@ class ManagedSyncPair:
raise TimeoutError(f"forced sync for {path} did not complete: {last}")
def set_modes(self, modes: tuple[str, str]) -> None:
changed_to_mirror: set[Path] = set()
for path, mode in zip(self.paths, modes, strict=True):
current = self.wait_for(path)
if current["mode"] != mode:
print(f"[setup] switching {path} to {mode}")
self.command("sync", "mode", str(self.ids[path]), mode)
if mode == "mirror":
changed_to_mirror.add(path)
for path, mode in zip(self.paths, modes, strict=True):
self.wait_for(path, mode=mode)
# The mode row flips before the asynchronous restore pass starts,
# and its prior idle/last_sync values remain visible meanwhile.
# Demand a completed pass before inspecting restored local bytes.
if path in changed_to_mirror:
self.force_sync(path)
mounted = is_mountpoint(path)
check(mounted == (mode == "ondemand"), f"{path}: mode is {mode}, mounted={mounted}")
check(
@@ -407,6 +468,17 @@ class ManagedSyncPair:
self.command("sync", "rm", str(folder_id), "--delete-remote")
except Exception as error:
print(f"WARNING: cleanup failed for sync folder {folder_id}: {error}")
continue
# Unregistering a mirror intentionally preserves its local copy.
# Remove only the sentinel owned by this harness so the next run's
# strict empty-directory precondition remains meaningful. Unknown
# survivors are left untouched and will fail validate() next time.
sentinel = path / "pdfs-mode-preservation.bin"
try:
if sentinel.exists() and read(sentinel) == self.sentinels[path]:
sentinel.unlink()
except OSError as error:
print(f"WARNING: could not remove managed sentinel {sentinel}: {error}")
def is_mountpoint(path: Path) -> bool:
@@ -432,8 +504,10 @@ def run_managed_matrix(paths: list[Path]) -> None:
for path, mode in zip(pair.paths, modes, strict=True):
root, _ = run_contract(path, f"managed {mode}")
roots.append(root)
shutil.rmtree(root)
pair.wait_for_queue()
pair.remove_tree(root)
roots.remove(root)
pair.wait_for_queue()
# Mirror changes are asynchronous; force and await a pass before
# changing its mode so authored bytes/deletions cannot be lost.
if mode == "mirror":
+3 -3
View File
@@ -23,13 +23,13 @@ case "${1:-}" in
-h|--help) usage ;;
--offline-only|"")
(( $# <= 1 )) || usage
exec python3 "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py"
exec python3 -u "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py"
;;
--live) shift ; (( $# > 0 )) || usage ;;
--managed-live)
shift
(( $# == 2 )) || usage
exec python3 "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py" --managed-live "$@"
exec python3 -u "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py" --managed-live "$@"
;;
--*) usage ;;
esac
@@ -44,4 +44,4 @@ fstype="$(findmnt -T "$1" -n -o FSTYPE | head -n 1)"
exit 2
}
exec python3 "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py" --live "$@"
exec python3 -u "$script_dir/fuse-acceptance.py" --live "$@"